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     The time period for compliance, granted to Respondent after completion 
of WTO Dispute Settlement Body’s (DSB) decision, functions as a key factor 
to promote trade liberalization via enforcement of WTO provision. The 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
(DSU) Article 21.3 lays out specific procedure on how to determine the 
reasonable period of time (RPT) for implementation. The said provision, 
however, does not offer which factors or principles shall be considered to 
determine the duration of RPT. 
     Thus, the objective of this paper is to address this issue by analyzing 
patterns of RPT from previous WTO disputes, focusing on relationship 
between duration of RPT and four potential factors: 1) economic status and 
development level of parties in dispute, 2) protection level of product at 
issue, 3) means of implementation (administrative or legislative), and 4) 
effect from violation of specific WTO covered agreement(s) in dispute.
     As the very first study to apply statistical method of correlation and 
regression analysis to RPT determined under both DSU Article 21.3(b) and 
ii
21.3(c), following findings were drawn. First, the study concluded that special 
attention to developing countries is not granted easily, especially when 
developing country requests for special treatment as a complainant. Secondly, it 
was concluded that protection level of product at issue of respondent and 
complainant does not affect duration of RPT under both DSU Article 21.3(b) 
and 21.3(c). Moreover, the means of implementation was found to have 
meaningful connection with length of RPT. RPT from disputes requiring 
legislative means of implementation for compliance resulted in longer period of 
time than those requiring administrative means of implementation under both 
Article 21.3(b) and 21.3(c). Finally, the study found that RPT from disputes 
covering violation of trade remedy agreements turned out to be shorter than 
those addressing violation of non－trade remedy agreements, not due to 
violation of different WTO covered agreement but due to type of means of 
implementation necessary for compliance.
     The key findings from statistical and normative analysis of this study 
implies that RPT is agreed by the parties or awarded by the arbitrator via 
considering various factors combined as a whole, rather than imposing more 
weight on a single particular factor than the others. Furthermore, even though 
prompt compliance to DSB’s recommendation and ruling shall be the prior 
goal for every losing party who have violated WTO provisions, the patterns of 
past RPT discussed in this paper would be useful guideline for Members in 
dispute when adoption of RPT is unavoidable.  
Key words : Reasonable Period of Time for Implementation, DSU Article 
21.3(b), DSU Article 21.3(c), Particular Circumstances, Dispute Settlement 
Procedure, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement 
of Disputes (DSU), WTO
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     Ever since its enforcement in 1995, Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) has been the 
ultimate map and a compass for WTO Members, in search of satisfactory 
settlement in times of conflict against other countries. Even though WTO's 
dispute settlement system has been one of the most successful resolution 
mechanism in international legal system, there has been an increase in the 
number of delayed or disputed implementation cases.1 Thus, in order to 
protect Members’ benefit and to maintain current dispute settlement 
procedure's goal to establish secure and predictable, rule-based multilateral 
trading system,2 determining when and how to implement the Dispute 
Settlement Body's (DSB)　 recommendations and rulings under this unique 
system is a critical matter within the overall WTO　 dispute settlement 
procedure. 
    The issue of when to implement, in particular, is addressed  throughout 
the legal text of DSU, emphasizing immediate compliance to WTO 
provisions by inserting the word "prompt" in every step of the dispute 
settlement procedure, from composition of the panel to implementation by 
the respondent. Such "promptness" becomes more critical once the DSB 
adopts panel (and Appellate Body) reports and provides recommendation and 
ruling to the losing party to bring itself into conformity with WTO law. If 
immediate, prompt compliance to the ruling is infeasible, the implementing 
Member (respondent) shall have a “reasonable period of time” (RPT) to 
execute DSB's decision. Since respondent is often required to withdraw or 
1 Won-Mog Choi, "To Comply or Not to Comply?－Non-Implementation Problems in the 
WTO Dispute Settlement System," Journal of World Trade 41, no.05 (2007): 1048.
2 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes [hereinafter 
'DSU'], Apr. 15th 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing th World Trade Organization, 
Annex 2, Legal Instruments－Results of Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994), 
http://www.wto.org/ english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm (accessed January 03, 2015).
2
amend its domestic law in order to fulfill its obligation for compliance, the 
length of reasonable time period is critical for successful completion of any 
legislative, regulatory or administrative changes that are necessary. Moreover, 
RPT ensures that responding parties do not operate with an open ended 
time frame to comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB.3 
The key question then comes down to how this reasonable period of time 
for implementation is determined in the WTO dispute settlement system.
     Article 21.3 of the DSU specifically answers this question. According 
to the said provision, the time period for implementation can be : i) 
proposed by the member concerned and approved by the DSB (DSU Article 
21.3(a)), ii) mutually agreed by the parties to the dispute (DSU Article 
21.3(b)); or iii) determined by an arbitrator, not exceeding fifteen months 
from the date of adoption of report, depending on the particular 
circumstances (DSU Article 21.3(c)). Even though determining the duration 
of reasonable period of time is a central element to secure effective and 
timely compliance to the WTO law, the DSU legal text itself does not 
provide specific factors or principles that must be taken into account when 
the parties reach an agreement on RPT or an arbitrator awards binding RPT 
to the implementing Member. DSU Article 21.3(c) further states that RPT 
may be longer or shorter depending on the "particular circumstances." 
However, what constitutes this "particular circumstances" is also not 
mentioned in the DSU.   
     Even though scholars have written several pieces on the topic of how 
to determine reasonable period of time, most of the previous studies have 
mainly focused on RPT under DSU Article 21.3(c) by reviewing arbitrator's 
reasoning and rationale provided in the Award of the Arbitrator reports of 
DSU Article 21.3(c). From January 1995 till December 2014, respondents 
and complainants of 81 disputes have agreed on RPT under DSU Article 
3 Shin-Yi Peng, "How Much Time is Reasonable?－The Arbitral Decisions under Article 
21.3(c) of the DSU," Berkeley Journal of International Law 26, no.01 (2008): 324.
3
21.3(b) and respondents of 27 disputes were awarded with binding RPT by 
arbitrator under DSU Article 21.3(c). No RPT has been determined yet 
under DSU　 Article 21.3(a). Therefore, with sufficient amount of RPT 
available for statistical analysis, the objective of this study is to determine 
which factors or criteria are taken into account i) when the dispute parties 
reach an agreement on RPT under DSU Article 21.3(b) and ii) when the 
arbitrator confers RPT under DSU Article 21.3(c) by engaging in statistical 
analysis and case-based reasoning to investigate the patterns of RPT in 
WTO disputes which already has its panel (and Appellate Body) report to 
be adopted by the DSB.
     To accomplish this goal, the study will first provide overview of 
WTO dispute settlement procedure, focusing on the issue of implementation. 
Secondly, the study will analyze patterns of RPT under two DSU provisions 
at issue to observe differences and similarities between the agreed RPT 
under DSU　 Article 21.3(b) and arbitrated RPT under Article 21.3(c). 
Furthermore, the study will engage in statistical analysis to investigate 
relationship between length of RPT and these four potential factors: i) 
economic status and development level of the parties in dispute measured in 
GNI/capita,  ii) the protection level of the product at issue of dispute, 
measured in tariff rate of both respondent and complainant countries, iii) 
means of implementation, i.e., need for legislative or administrative process 
for compliance, and iv) effect from addressing violation of certain WTO 
covered agreement(s) in disputes, especially focusing on violation of trade 
remedy agreements (anti-dumping, subsidies and countervailing duties, and 
safeguard). Each factor would be tested against length of RPT determined 
via DSU Article 21.3(b) and DSU Article 21.3(c). Since official Award of 
the Arbitrator report is available in WTO website for DSU Article 21.3(c), 
the study will also engage in normative review of the past RPT reports and 
address change of trend in RPT, past arbitrators' interpretations, and other 
4
factors or principles that have been raised in the previous Award of the 
Arbitrator reports. Lastly, the study will present concluding remarks with 
implications for arbitrators and Members of the WTO and provide useful 
recommendations for future development of WTO dispute settlement system. 
    Although stare decisis is not officially part of the dispute settlement 
system, not only panel and Appellate Body, but also arbitrators of DSU 
Article 21.3(c), heavily rely on prior decisions.4 Thus, the result of statistical 
analysis and patterns of RPT discovered from previous disputes will be 
useful guidance for both the Members of the WTO and the arbitrators to 
determine RPT.
4 Daniel Godinho, "The Determination of the Reasonable Period of Time under Article 
21.3(c) of the DSU: An 'Arbitrary' Arbitration?," World Trade Institute (2007): 35.  
5
II. Literature Review
     Ever since the first RPT was agreed under DSU Article 21.3(b) 
between the United States and Venezuela in May 1996 from US－Gasoline 
(DS2), followed by the first RPT under DSU Article 21.3(c) from Japan－
Alcohol (DS8,10,11) in November 1996, RPT has been conferred to 
numerous implementing parties. Nevertheless, the topic of reasonable period 
of time in WTO dispute settlement only began to receive attention from 
scholars around year 2000, five years after enforcement of the DSU. Since 
then limited number of studies have completed a detailed analysis on the 
topic, especially focusing on the length of RPT and what is required of the 
losing party while it is underway.5 Although most of RPT were determined 
under DSU Article 21.3(b), scholars have mainly focused on RPT awarded 
under DSU Article 21.3(c), especially aiming to determine what constitutes 
"particular circumstances" as stated in the provision and how this "particular 
circumstances" affect duration of RPT. 
     As one of the early studies focusing on determination of RPT, 
Monnier explored how DSU provisions related to RPT were interpreted in 
both theory and in practice by reviewing arbitration reports of RPT awards 
granted from 1997 to 2001. Monnier noted that arbitrator's have built up a 
very consistent and homogeneous case law, despite the existence of 
uncertainty in interpreting Article 21.3.6 In relation to interpreting "particular 
circumstances" in Article 21.3(c), Monnier found complexity of the 
implementing measure, implementing party's adoption of legislative or 
administrative procedure, economic status as a developing country, were all 
relevant in determining RPT.7 Monnier especially focused on determining the 
5 Carolyn B. Gleason and Pamela D. Walther, "The WTO Dispute Settlement Implementation 
Procedures: A System in need of Reform," Law and Policy in International Business 31 
(2000): 713.
6 Pierre Monnier, "The Time to Comply with an Adverse WTO Ruling : Promptness within 
Reason," Journal of World Trade 35, no.05 (2001): 840.
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time period for compliance in prohibited subsidy case, which remains to be 
difficult and more complex. Monnier stated that in order to avoid difficulties 
arising from determination of RPT after the adoption of the panel (and 
Appellate Body) report, the panel should be granted with authority to 
determine the time period for compliance in every prohibited subsidies case, 
while arbitrator would be allowed to revisit the RPT determined by the 
panel when necessary and to rule on other matters related to 
implementation, including making non-binding but mutually satisfactory 
suggestion on ways and means of implementation.8 The author not only 
provided comprehensive overview of RPT, but also generated meaningful 
insight especially on RPT from disputes involving prohibited subsidies 
matter.
     The next study written by Zdouc provides an introductory overview of 
the application and interpretation of DSU provisions in relation to RPT. By 
engaging in normative reviews of the past cases and interpreting DSU legal 
text itself, Zdouc notes that complexity of the implementation process, 
volume of implementation measures, and interests of developing country 
have been recognized as "particular circumstances" by the arbitrators, while 
the extent to which the losing party has taken steps towards implementation, 
domestic contentiousness of compliance measures, peculiar features of 
legislative bodies have not been considered in determining RPT.9  
     With additional RPT available over time, Godinho's dissertation 
provided critique of the past disputes with respect to 21 RPT awards under 
Article 21.3(c) of the DSU from 1997 to 2007. The author aimed to 
explore how arbitrators calculate RPT, what objective criteria have been 
7 Ibid., 837-840.
8 Ibid., 841-842.
9 Werner Zdouc, "The Reasonable Period of Time for Compliance with the Rulings and 
Recommendations adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body," in Key Issues in WTO 
Dispute Settlement : The First Ten Years, ed. Rufus Yerxa and Bruce Wilson (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 90-92.
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used for the calculation of RPT, and finally whether arbitration under 
Article 21.3(c) of the DSU is arbitrary, i.e., subjective.10 By conducting in 
depth case reviews on 21 RPT awards granted under Article 21.3(c), 
Godinho demonstrated changes in interpretation of Article 21.3(c) since its 
very first RPT award, moving from arbitrators adhering to the fifteen month 
guideline stated in the DSU Article 21.3(c), adopting a narrow interpretation 
of this legal provision, towards establishing RPT away from the fifteen 
month guideline, providing more comprehensive analysis of the "particular 
circumstances."11 Godinho also concluded that even though arbitrators have 
heavily relied on prior decisions, especially regarding the interpretation of 
the "particular circumstances," the calculation of the RPT has remained 
essentially subjective and that there is no connection between these 
"particular circumstances" and the final RPT fixed for each award, i.e., 
arbitrations under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU are "arbitrary."12 
     Godinho's dissertation is a meaningful study summarizing arbitrator's 
key reasoning behind determining RPT and raising several key determinants 
of RPT. However, even though certain factors did appear repeatedly in 
Award of the Arbitrator reports, such as the parties' economic status as a 
developing country and implementing party's adoption of domestic legislative 
procedure for compliance, the author focused more on the fact that absence 
or lack of explicit reasoning explaining why particular period was chosen by 
arbitrator (i.e., arbitrator conferred longer RPT but did not specifically or 
explicitly mentioned why certain amount of extra period was granted) and 
failing to explain how a single or multiple factor(s) were weighted in the 
process of calculating RPT, the author concluded that arbitrator's 
determination of RPT is mainly subjective and arbitrary. 
10 Godinho, "The Determination of the Reasonable Period of Time under Article 21.3(c) of 




     Peng's unique study discussed the effectiveness of DSU Article 21.3(c) 
proceedings by exploring ten potential factors13 that has been raised by the 
complaining and/or implementing parties to determine the time allowed for 
implementation via case-based reasoning and theoretical review of Article 
21.3 and other related provisions of the DSU.14 Expanding previous studies 
on RPT, Peng also conducted quantitative analysis in addition to reviewing 
previous WTO disputes. Among ten factors, the author concluded that 
adoption of legislative procedure, developing countries' need for special 
attention are actually considered by the arbitrators to determine longer or 
shorter RPT.15 Furthermore, Peng emphasized that factors such as political 
and social complexity shall not be potential factors in determining RPT to 
ensure legal certainty and predictability and special treatment shall be 
provided by arbitrators only when the implementing party is a developing 
country.16 Even though the author engaged in quantitative analysis, it 
remained at a basic level of simply observing the trend of RPT proposed 
by the complainant and respondent, in addition to 21 RPT awards from 
1997 till 2006 that has been actually determined by the arbitrators under 
DSU Article 21.3(c). Nevertheless, Peng's study delivered comprehensive 
analysis on determinants of RPT, offering helpful road map for future 
scholars to study RPT.
     Similar to Peng's study, Hansen and McRae also listed relevant and 
irrelevant "particular circumstances" in determining the duration of RPT. 
Revisiting past RPT awarded under DSU Article 21.3(c), Hansen and McRae 
stated that i) non-required elements in the implementation process (steps to 
13 The 10 potential factors include constitutional schedule, legislative procedure, political 
sensitivity, particular political events, fiscal difficulty, developing countries, other economic 
matters, scientific studies, other international obligations, and punitive deadline. (from Peng, 




16 Ibid., 350. 
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be taken in implementation even though they are not legally required under 
domestic law), ii) the legal complexity of an implementing measure, i.e., 
measures requiring extensive new regulations affecting many sectors of 
activity in terms of drafting and coordinating, iii) involvement of a 
developing country Member in a dispute, and iv) prior determinations of 
reasonable period of time have emerged as relevant "particular 
circumstances."17 On the other hand, the authors indicated that i) the need 
for structural adjustment, ii) the political contentiousness of an implementing 
measure, iii) continued economic harm to complainant, and iv) detailed 
operations of legislatures (parliamentary majority, parliamentary calender, 
etc.) are irrelevant "particular circumstances."18 Interestingly, unlike other 
scholars who have suggested various ways to improve how RPT should be 
determined under the current dispute settlement system, Hansen and McRae 
stated that there seems to be little dissatisfaction with the operation of DSU 
Article 21.3, for arbitrators have established a high degree of conformity in 
their RPT decisions via informally adopting a precedential approach to their 
work.19  
     Unlike Hansen and McRae, Lee and Kim criticized the way RPT is 
awarded under the current dispute settlement system. The authors indicated 
that the current system allowing leeways in terms of compliance by 
establishing exceptional provision such as DSU Article 21.3 is contradictory 
to the rest of the DSU as a whole, which mandates promptness throughout 
every step of the dispute settlement procedure.20 Lee and Kim provided 
interesting recommendation to resolve such issue. Noting that permitting RPT 
17 Robin Hansen and Donald McRae, "Reconciling the International and the Domestic: The 
Reasonable Period of Time under Article 21.3 of the DSU," in The WTO: Governance, 
Dispute Settlement and Developing Countries, ed. Merit E. Janow, Victoria Donaldson, and 
Alan Yanovich (New York: Juris Publishing, 2008), 995-1000.
18 Ibid., 1000-1005.
19 Ibid., 1006.
20 Hwangyu Lee and Minjiin Kim, "A Study on WTO Dispute Settlement Process: Focusing 
on the Reasonable Period of Time," Research on International Economic Law 7, no.02 
(2009): 142.
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to be longer or shorter than fifteen months according to "particular 
circumstances" without providing clear guideline for arbitrators is 
problematic, Lee and Kim stated that such lenient provision should be taken 
out from the current dispute settlement system, i.e., reasonable period of 
time should be eliminated as a whole, while implementing party shall be 
mandated to comply with WTO provision immediately after the adoption of 
panel and Appellate Body report.21 Even though Lee and Kim were 
successful in addressing some of the key issues within the current dispute 
settlement system regarding post-dispute compliance to WTO provisions, 
their suggestion appears to be a radical one, since outright ignorance of 
implementing party's circumstances, such as domestic law making process 
and temporary political or economical difficulties, would be unrealistic. 
     One of the most recent scholarly article on RPT written by Qian in 
2012 also summarized some of the key problems relevant to the RPT 
determination. First, Qian pointed out that RPT is used over and over again 
by the parties through negotiated extension, resulting in possible misuse of 
the RPT.22 In addition, the author stated that DSB's inability to effectively 
supervise the losing party's implementation during the RPT, excessive 
overreaching of the time frame for determining the RPT, and the fact that 
both the DSU provision and the WTO practice demonstrate an insufficiency 
in considering the interest of the developing country Members, are also 
problematic in relation to RPT under current dispute settlement system.23 
Regarding each of these problems, Qian made following proposals to reform 
current dispute settlement: i) efforts should be made to make Article 21.3(c) 
arbitration process more rigorous, ii) intensify the current notification 
requirement on implementation, iii) endow DSB with more supervision 
21 Ibid., 144.
22 Ma Qian, "Reasonable Period of Time in the WTO Dispute Settlement System," Journal 
of International Economic Law 15, no.01 (2012) : 264.
23 Ibid., 265.
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responsibilities and powers to enhance its implementation surveillance, iv) 
establish an interim relief system in the DSU, which allows the 
non-breaching party to initiate Article 21.5 compliance objection procedure 
without having to wait until the expiration of the RPT, and v) provide 
perfect retaliatory mechanism for perfect RPT mechanism to best play its 
role of ensuring prompt compliance.24 In summary, with most up-to-date 
review of the RPT determined under DSU Article 21.3,  Qian's study 
successfully pointed out key problems with respect to RPT and provided 
helpful, realistic recommendations to improve current dispute settlement 
system.
     Even though RPT received relatively little attention by the scholars, 
some took a step further and specifically focused on one specific potential 
determinant of RPT: participant's economic status as a developing country. 
Gambardella and Rovetta pointed out that even though the legal text of DSU 
calls for favorable treatment to be granted to developing countries parties to 
DSU Article 21.3(c) arbitrations, there is no WTO definition of a developing 
country, i.e., the status of developing country member is based on 
self-selection, and that the provision makes no distinction where developing 
country members are complainants rather than the implementing members in 
a particular dispute.25 Emphasizing damage from a big WTO player trying to 
delay the implementation of an adverse WTO ruling might result in loss of 
market share or some jobs, affecting minimum living standards of some 
citizens of developing country, the authors suggested that future RPT 
arbitrators shall not tolerate developed defendant member from trying to 
unduly gain time to avoid implementation via RPT.26 Furthermore, the 
authors noted that the same principle of granting favor to developing 
24 Ibid., 281-284.
25 Maurizio Gambardella and Davide Rovetta, "Reasonable Period of Time to Comply with 
WTO Rulings: Need to Do More for Developing Countries?," Global Trade and Customs 
Journal 3, no.03 (2008): 105.
26 Ibid., 106. 
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countries would apply when the defending country in the RPT arbitration is 
a developing country by granting a longer period to implement the WTO 
rulings that would otherwise be granted if it were a developed Member.27 
Finally, as for the developing countries, the authors advised complainant 
developing countries to rely on the principle of immediate compliance read 
in conjunction with DSU Article 21.228 and utilize the said provision (Article 
21.2) as a mitigating factor to that principle if they are defendants. By 
revisiting past RPT determined under DSU Article 21.3(c), Gambardella and 
Rovetta suggested useful recommendations to both future RPT arbitrators and 
developing member countries. However, such advice were made by engaging 
in normative review of comments written by the arbitrators in Award of the 
Arbitrator reports, not addressing how economic status of parties of dispute 
actually affect calculation of RPT in practice via quantitative analysis.  
     Another scholar, Alvarez-Jimenez, also published a study investing the 
effect of parties' economic status on duration of RPT, based on reviewing 
arbitrator's interpretation from three disputes under DSU Article 21.3(c): US
－Gambling (DS285), EC－Sugar Subsidies (DS265,266,283), and EC－
Chicken Cuts (DS269,286). First, focusing on arbitrator's interpretations from 
EC－Chicken Cuts (DS269,286), the author stated that from developing 
complainant's perspective, connecting the RPT only to the time that the 
implementing Member takes to adopt measures to comply with the 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB according to its standard practice 
may not always be the shortest period of implementation, i.e., developed 
respondent countries may take advantage of such interpretation and avoid 
omitting some non-statutory steps of the standard practice or reducing the 
time they usually took.29 Moreover, on arbitrator's interpretation from US－
27 Ibid.
28 Article 21.2 of the DSU states that "particular attention should be paid to matters 
affecting the interests of developing country Members with respect to measures which have 
been subject to dispute settlement." Refer to <Appendix 1> for the original text. 
29 Alberto, Avarez-Jimenez, "A Reasonable Period of Time for Dispute Settlement 
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Gambling (DS285) and EC－Sugar Subsidies (DS265,266,283), 
Alvarez-Jimenez pointed out that even though these two cases represent an 
important development in protecting developing country Members interests, 
the RPT award itself in both cases were completely silent on how much of 
a role these circumstances played in the calculation of RPT.30 With that 
note, the author provided four requirements to satisfy interpretation of DSU 
Article 21.3(c) to be persuasive and operative for arbitrators: i) interpretation 
must protect the developing country complainant's interests, ii) it cannot 
interfere unduly with the respondent Member's right to choose the means of 
implementation, iii) interpretation must preserve DSU Article 21.3(c) 
arbitrators' discretion in calculating the RPT, and iv) the interpretation must 
ensure transparency regarding how and to what extent arbitrators apply 
Article 21.2 when estimating the RPT by a developed country respondent.31 
Furthermore, Alvarez-Jimenez made similar suggestions to Gambardella and 
Rovetta that in order to protect their interest as developing countries, 
developing country complainants should satisfy their burden to prove shorter 
RPT is necessary and use the time for implementation according to the 
standard practice in the respondent member as a reference and ask for some 
specific reduction that they regard appropriate, and possibly even 
demonstrate the existence of shorter means of implementation than those 
proposed by the developed country.32 Even though Alvarez-Jimenez's study 
well-summarized history of arbitrator's interpretation and provided meaningful 
tips for developing countries and arbitrators in considering disputants' 
economic status in relation to RPT, this study, similar to other previous 
ones, did not show how such factor is actually reflected in length of RPT.  
Implementation : An Operative Interpretation for Developing Country Complainants," World 





     Most recent scholarly paper on RPT, written by Zaman in 2013, also 
specifically focused on RPT awarded to developing countries. By 
investigating the consistency and coherence of practice from past arbitral 
awards in which developing countries claimed "particular attention" either as 
complainant or as respondent via quantitative analysis similar to that of the 
Peng's study (trend analysis, calculating % share of Member countries' use 
of RPT, etc.) and case reviews, Zaman pointed out that the lack of specific 
guidelines in the DSU is the substantial cause for arbitrators' non-compliance 
with Article 21.2 provisions in Article 21.3(c) arbitrations, which questions 
the procedural fairness of such arbitrations.33 Moreover, the author also 
noted that incoherency in providing the expected special and differential 
treatment in the implementation level of a dispute could ultimately deliver 
substantial detrimental effects on developing countries' economies and 
economic development.34 Zaman concluded that such situation reiterates the 
urgent necessity to amend the relevant DSU rules and suggested that a new 
mandatory provision should be included in the DSU Article 21.3(c) 
arbitration process, mandating arbitrators to provide sufficiently clear reasons 
for their decisions on the point of "particular attention" to developing 
countries under DSU Article 21.2.35 
     Overall, previous literatures on RPT have focused on only those 
determined under DSU Article 21.3(c) via reviewing previous Award of the 
Arbitrator reports or applying simple quantitative analysis of comparing the 
duration of RPT. Therefore, this study will utilize advanced statistical 
methods, such as correlation and regression analysis with updated data, 
including the most recent WTO disputes (from January 1995 to December 
33 Kohrsed Zaman, "Determining a Reasonable Implementation Timeline for Developing 
Countries in WTO Disputes: An Appraisal of Special Treatment Commitments in DSU 
Article 21.3(c) Arbitrations," The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 12 
(2013) : 31.
34 Ibid., 40.
35 Ibid., 31 and 47.
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2014). Among various determinants discussed in previous studies, this study 
will observe relationship between the length of RPT and two factors that 
have been mentioned most frequently in both previous literatures and the 
Award of the Arbitrator reports: means of implementation and developing 
countries' need for special attention. Furthermore, the study will also raise 
two additional factors that have not been discussed thus far: protection level 
of product at issue of dispute and effect from violating specific WTO 
covered agreement(s), especially targeting agreements that address trade 
remedy matters. 
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III. WTO Dispute Settlement System and DSU Article 21.3
     Before moving on to the 'Analysis and Result' section (Section V), it 
is pertinent to understand WTO dispute settlement system, especially 
focusing on the implementation stage. Thus, this chapter will walk through 
overall process of the dispute settlement and discuss the importance of 
reasonable period of time via conducting theoretical analysis of DSU Article 
21.3(b) and DSU Article 21.3(c).      
1. Overview : WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure
     One of the most significant achievements of the Uruguay Round 
negotiations was the establishment of an effective dispute settlement system 
under the umbrella of the WTO Agreement.36 Adopted in 1995 at the end 
of the Uruguay Round, the DSU established rules and procedures for dispute 
settlement with strong emphasis on compliance by all WTO Members, 
aiming i) to protect and balance rights and obligations of Members by 
settling disputes on the basis of rules and ii) to provide security and 
predictability to the multilateral trading system.37 
     There are four major phases within the WTO dispute settlement 
system.38 First, the parties must attempt to resolve their differences through 
consultations. Second, if that fails, the complaining party may demand that a 
panel of independent experts be established to rule on the dispute. Third, if 
the losing party disagrees with the final decisions of the panel, such party 
may bring the case to the Appellate Body. Finally, if the complaining party 
36 Choi, "To Comply or Not to Comply?－Non-Implementation Problems in the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System," 1043.
37 DSU, Article 3.1 and Article 3.2.
38 John H. Jackson, William Davey, and Alan Sykes, Legal Problems of International 
Economic Relations : Cases, Materials and Text, 5th ed. (St. Paul : West Publishing, 2008), 
269.
17
succeeds, the DSB is charged with monitoring the implementation of its 
recommendations. Each process will be explained in more detail. 
Figure 1. WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure
Source : World Trade Organization 
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1.1 Consultation
     The current dispute settlement procedure always begins with 
consultation, where parties can discuss the matter and find a satisfactory 
solution without resorting to litigation.39 If parties fail to settle a dispute via 
consultation within sixty days after the date of receipt of the request for 
consultations, the complaining party may request the establishment of the 
panel.40 
1.2 Adjudication by the Panel41
     After such request is submitted in writing to the Chairman of the 
DSB, panel is established at the DSB meeting. Since there is no permanent 
panel with designated panelists in the WTO, a new panel is composed for 
each dispute with three or five members of panelists. Once established, the 
panel will initiate its work, following the panel procedure according to 
Article 1242 and Appendix 343 of the DSU. Upon completion of panel 
procedure, a final report (Report of the Panel) is prepared including 
concluding remarks that the challenged measure is inconsistent with a 
covered agreement, recommending to the DSB that the panel request the 
Member concerned to bring its measure into conformity with WTO law. 
Completed report is translated and circulated to all WTO Members. 
Although the panel report contains findings and conclusions ruling on the 
substance of the dispute, it only becomes binding when the DSB adopts it. 
If there is no appeal by either party, the DSB is obliged to adopt the 
39 Ibid., 43.
40 DSU, Article 4.7.
41 WTO Secretariat, A Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System : A WTO 
Secretariat Publication Prepared for Publication by the Legal Affairs Division and Appellate 
Body, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 49~62.
42 DSU, Article 21. Refer to <Appendix 2> for original text.
43 DSU, Appendix 3.
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report. If a party has notified its decision to appeal, the panel report cannot 
yet be adopted, given that the Appellate Body could modify or reverse it. 
In that case, the panel report will be considered for adoption by the DSB 
only after completion of the appeal. 
1.3 Adjudication by the Appellate Body44
     When appealed, a standing Appellate Body is established by the DSB, 
composed of seven members.45 As a general rule, the proceedings shall not 
exceed sixty days from the date a party to the dispute formally notifies its 
decision to appeal to the date the Appellate Body circulates its report.46 
Similar to the panel report, a separate report by the Appellate Body would 
be circulated and adopted by the DSB.47    
1.4 Implementation of Ruling48
     According to Article 19.1 of the DSU, following the DSB's adoption 
of the panel (and Appellate Body) report(s), respondent is asked to comply 
with the rulings and recommendations of the DSB.49 This is the phase 
where DSU Article 21.3 plays a critical role. 
    DSU Article 21.3 chapeau states that the first obligation of the 
implementing Member is to inform the DSB at a meeting within 30 days 
after the adoption of the report(s), of its intentions to implement the 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB. However, if immediate compliance 
is not possible, the implementing Member has a reasonable period of time 
44 WTO Secretariat, A Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 63~73.
45 DSU, Article 17.1.
46 DSU, Article 17.5.
47 DSU, Article 17.14.
48 WTO Secretariat, A Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 75-78.
49 Ibid.
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for achieving that compliance, the grace period granted the Member 
concerned to bring its WTO inconsistent measures into compliance within 
designated time period. More detailed analysis on DSU Article 21.3 will be 
provided in the next section.
2. Application and Legal Technicalities of DSU Article 21.3 
Table 1. Legal Text of DSU Article 21.3
DSU Article 21
: Surveillance of Implementation of Recommendations and Rulings
(emphasis added)
3. At a DSB meeting held within 30 days after the date of adoption of the 
panel or Appellate Body report, the Member concerned shall inform the DSB of 
its intentions in respect of implementation of the recommendations and rulings of 
the DSB. If it is impracticable to comply immediately with the recommendations 
and rulings, the Member concerned shall have a reasonable period of time in 
which to do so. The reasonable period of time shall be:
(a) the period of time proposed by the Member concerned, provided that such 
period is approved by the DSB; or, in the absence of such approval, 
(b) a period of time mutually agreed by the parties to the dispute within 45 
days after the date of adoption of the recommendations and rulings; or, in 
the absence of such agreement,
(c) a period of time determined through binding arbitration within 90 days 
after the date of adoption of the recommendations and rulings. In such 
arbitration, a guideline for the arbitrator should be that the reasonable 
period of time to implement panel or Appellate Body recommendations 
should not exceed 15months from the date of adoption of a panel or 
Appellate Body report. However, that time may be shorter or longer, 
depending upon the particular circumstances.
2.1 DSU Article 21.3
    
     According to DSU Article 21.3, the reasonable period of time is 
actionable when two conditions are satisfied: i) the respondent has been 
found to have violated WTO rules or otherwise nullified or impaired 
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benefits accruing to the complaining party and ii) the incriminated measure 
is still in existence at the time when the responding party that has lost the 
case has to inform the DSB of its intentions in respect of implementation.50 
Thus, it is clear that the reasonable period of time for complying with the 
recommendation and rulings is not available unconditionally.51 Rather, an 
implementing Member is entitled to RPT only when "it is impracticable to 
comply immediately with the recommendation and ruling of the DSB."52 
     According to the above legal text in Table 1, DSU Article 21.3 lays 
out specific guidelines on how the reasonable period of time, counted as of 
the day of adoption of the report(s), is determined. This time period can be: 
(i) proposed by the Member concerned and approved by consensus by the 
DSB (DSU Article 21.3(a)); (ii) mutually agree by the parties to the dispute 
within forty-five days after adoption of the report(s) (DSU Article 21.3(b)); 
or (iii) determined by an arbitrator (DSU Article 21.3(c)). The first 
alternative, DSU Article 21.3(a), is unlikely to be adopted due to difficulty 
in getting approval from the DSB, since it is almost impossible for a 
Member concerned to get consent from all other Members beforehand when 
the DSB decides by 'positive' consensus, i.e., a single objection by a 
Member prevents approval to be obtained from the DSB.53 Since no RPT 
has been determined under DSU Article 21.3(a), this study will focus on 
RPT agreed or awarded under DSU Article 21.3(b) and DSU Article 
21.3(c), each respectively. With that note, each subsection of DSU Article 
21.3 will be observed in more detail as written below.
50 Zdouc, "The Reasonable Period of Time for Compliance with the Rulings and 
Recommendations adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body," 88.
51 Award of the Arbitrator (13 June 2003), United States－Continued Dumping and Subsidy 
Offset Act of 2000 [hereinafter "US－Offset Act"], Recourse to Arbitration under DSU Article 
21.3(c), WT/DS217/14, WT/DS234/22, para. 40.
52 DSU, Article 21.3.
53 Qian, "Reasonable Period of Time in the WTO Dispute Settlement System," 259.
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2.2 DSU Article 21.3(b)
     Unfortunately, no official WTO documents are available providing 
which determinants and principles have been considered by the parties of 
dispute in reaching an agreement on duration of RPT. Information that are 
disclosed regarding RPT determined under DSU Article 21.3(b) include final 
duration of RPT that has been agreed by the respondent and complainant, 
the date of agreement, and sometimes reports on how the respondent has 
complied to WTO law. Such information were available in official Status 
Reports or Communications which have been filed by the respondent to 
WTO. Moreover, no previous literatures have specifically investigated 
reasonable period of time under DSU Article 21.3(b). Therefore, with no 
reliable resources available other than the legal text itself in DSU and 
minimal information available in WTO Analytical Index, it is unavoidable 
but to provide only limited analysis on interpretation and technicalities of 
DSU Article 21.3(b).
     First of all, parties in disputes have agreed on RPT via DSU Article 
21.3(b) almost three times more than receiving arbitrated RPT award through 
DSU Article 21.3(c). Such phenomenon is due to the fact that respondent 
and complainant are free from applying strict legal interpretation of DSU 
legal text itself, enjoying more room and discretion in negotiating duration 
of RPT without arbitrator's mediation.
     It also has been found that sometimes the parties may enter into 
agreements on RPT under Article 21.3(b) following the appointment of an 
arbitrator to determine the reasonable period of time under Article 21.3(c).54 
In US－Zeroing (Japan) (DS322), the parties reached an agreement on RPT 
after the appointment of an arbitrator under the procedure in Article 21.3(c). 
54 World Trade Organization, WTO Analytical Index: DSU Article 21.3(b) Parties' Agreement 
after Appointment of Arbitrator, http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/ analytic
index_e/dsu_08_e.htm#article21B3 (accessed Jan. 07, 2015), para. 1018.
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Since Japan, the complainant of this case, no longer sought to have the 
period at issue to be determined by binding arbitration, the arbitrator 
decided not to issue an award in these proceedings.55 
     One of the key issue to address regarding DSU Article 21.3(b) is its 
forty-five day time frame for agreeing on RPT and how this should be 
integrated into the ninety day time frame under DSU Article 21.3(c). Within 
the legal text of the DSU, there is no indication for the date or when to 
make a request for binding arbitration.56 It has been argued that DSU 
Article 21.3(b) should be interpreted as affording a Member a right to 
impose a legal objection to a referral to arbitration beyond the contemplated 
forty-five days.57 However, it would appear that complainants usually make 
such a request when they realize that no mutually acceptable reasonable 
period of time would be reached during the course of negotiation with the 
implementing party.58 Even if complainants may want to request the 
establishment of the arbitration before the forty-five days elapse, DSU 
Article 21.3(b) seems to effectively limit the power of the complainants to 
request binding arbitration before the end of the forty-five-day time frame.59 
Consequently, DSU Article 21.3(b) in principle accords more opportunity for 
the implementing party to delay reaching an agreement on implementation.60
55 Award of the Arbitrator (11 May 2007), United States－Measures Relating to Zeroing and 
Sunset Reviews [hereinafter "US－Zeroing (Japan)"], Recourse to Arbitration under DSU 
Article 21.3(c), WT/DS322/21, para. 4. 
56 Nganagjoh H. Yenkong, "The Role of Arbitrators in Determining Reasonable Period of 
Time and Retrospective Remedies in WTO Dispute Resolution: Beyond the 
Australia-Automotive Leather Panel," Journal of World Investment & Trade: Law, Economics, 
Politics 6 (2005): 615.
57 David Palmeter and Petros C. Mavroidis, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade 
Organization: Practice and Procedure, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), 236~242.
58 Yenkong, "The Role of Arbitrators in Determining Reasonable Period of Time and 




2.3 DSU Article 21.3(c)
     Analysis on interpretation and technicalities of DSU Article 21.3(c) 
will be addressed in more detail in the following 'Analysis and Result' 
section (Section V) of this study. Therefore, only those that are not 
mentioned in the next section are discussed below.
2.3.1 Arbitrators : Who are they? 
     Under DSU Article 21.3(c), the reasonable period of time is counted 
as the day of DSB's adoption of the panel (and Appellate Body) report(s).61 
The arbitrator can be any individual or group of individuals,62 but so far all 
arbitrators under DSU Article 21.3(c) have been current or former Appellate 
Body members.63 If the parties cannot agree on who should serve as the 
arbitrator within ten days after referral of the matter to arbitration, the 
Director General appoints  arbitrator within another ten days after consulting 
with the parties.64 This indicates that arbitrator's tasks are not typical under 
DSU Article 21.3(c), requiring a senior figure with ample amount of 
experience and acquaintance with the WTO dispute settlement system.65
2.3.2 Arbitrator's Mandate
     Continuing with the topic of arbitrators, it is necessary to define the 
scope of their mandate under DSU Article 21.3(c). Apart from stating the 
61 WTO Secretariat, A Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 77.
62 DSU, Article 21.3 Footnote 13.
63 Kara Leitner and Simon Lester, "WTO Dispute Settlement System 1995-2013-A Statistical 
Analysis," Journal of International Economic Law 17 (2014) : 198.
64 DSU, Article 21.3 Footnote 12.
65 Giorgio Sacerdoti, "The Nature of WTO Arbitrations on Retaliation," in The Law, 
Economics and Politics of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement, ed. Chad P. Bown and 
Joost Pauwelyn (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 30~31.
25
guideline of fifteen months and that "particular circumstances" can justify a 
shorter or longer period, DSU Article 21.3(c) is silent on the role or 
mandate of the arbitrator, allowing arbitrators themselves to articulate their 
mandate.66 The phrase that "time may be longer or shorter depending upon 
the particular circumstances" more or less dilutes the fifteen month time 
period guiding the arbitral award, allowing RPT to be determined largely 
based on the reasoning of the arbitrator.67 Moreover, arbitrator's mandate 
under DSU Article 21.3(c) is quite powerful, since awarded RPT is 
effectively binding and cannot be challenged before any other arbitral body.68 
     The arbitrators from previous cases were all on same page regarding 
their mandate.69 The past arbitrators have stated that arbitrator's mandate 
remains within determining the reasonable period of time for implementation 
under DSU Article 21.3(c), not suggesting ways and means of 
implementation or assessing whether the step proposed by the implementing 
Member brings about conformity with WTO law.70 If there are several 
66 Hansen and McRae, "Reconciling the International and the Domestic: The Reasonable 
Period of Time under Article 21.3 of the DSU," 989.
67 Yenkong, "The Role of Arbitrators in Determining Reasonable Period of Time and 
Retrospective Remedies in WTO Dispute Resolution," 617.
68 Ibid., 620.
69 Arbitrators from these disputes raised one voice regarding their mandate : Award of the 
Arbitrator (29 May 1998), European Communities－Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products (Hormones) [hereinafter "EC－Hormones"], Recourse to Arbitration under DSU 
Article 21.3(c), WT/DS26/15, WT/DS48/13, paras. 33-39., Award of the Arbitrator (4 June 
1999), Korea－Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages [hereinafter "Korea－Alcohol"], Recourse to 
Arbitration under DSU Article 21.3(c), WT/DS75/16, WT/DS84/14, paras. 45-47., Award of 
the Arbitrator (18 Auguest 2000), Canada－Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products 
[hereinafter "Canada－Pharmaceuticals"], Recourse to Arbitration under DSU Article 21.3(c), 
WT/DS114/13, paras. 38-43., Award of the Arbitrator (17 March 2003), Chile－Price Band 
System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural Products [hereinafter "Chile
－Agricultural Products"], Recourse to Arbitration under DSU Article 21.3(c), WT/DS207/13, 
paras 32 and 36-37., Award of the Arbitrator, US－Offset Act, paras. 47-52., Award of the 
Arbitrator (19 August 2005), United States－Measures Affecting the Cross Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services [hereinafter "US－Gambling"], Recourse to Arbitration under 
DSU Article 21.3(c), WT/DS285/13, paras. 28 and 32-33., Award of the Arbitrator (28 
October 2005), European Communities－Export Subsidies on Sugar [hereinafter "EC－Sugar 
Subsidies"], Recourse to Arbitration under DSU Article 21.3(c), WT/DS265/33, WT/DS266/33, 
WT/DS283/14, paras. 69-73., Award of the Arbitrator (5 May 2008),  Japan－Countervailing 
Duties on Dynamic Random Access Memories from Korea [hereinafter "Japan－DRAMs"], 
Recourse to Arbitration under DSU Article 21.3(c), WT/DS336/16, paras. 23-27., Award of 
the Arbitrator (29 August 2008), Brazil－Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres 
[hereinafter "Brazil－Tyres"], Recourse to Arbitration under DSU Article 21.3(c), 
WT/DS332/16, paras. 43-48. 
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possible ways to bring about conformity, the implementing Member has the 
discretion to choose among these options and whether the chosen option 
truly achieves full conformity is to be decided according to the procedure of 
DSU Article 21.5, not DSU Article 21.3(c).71 
     However, arbitrator from Chile－Agricultural Products (DS207) pointed 
out that this does not mean that the precise means or manner of 
implementation is not immaterial to arbitrators, as it will provide guidance 
in selecting the reasonable period of time and make it more likely that such 
period of time will balance the legitimate needs of the implementing 
Member against those of the complaining Member.72 The arbitrator from US
－Gambling (DS285) also commented that it will be necessary to consider 
certain aspects of the means of implementation proposed by each of the 
parties, even though it is not the role of an arbitrator to identify a 
particular method of implementation and to determine the reasonable period 
of time on the basis of that method.73 Moreover, regarding situation where 
the panel suggests means of implementation in its report, the arbitrator from 
US－Offset Act (DS217,234) stated that since the panel also recognized that 
there could potentially be a number of ways in which the measure at issue 
could be brought into conformity, the existence of panel's suggestion does 
not affect the well established principle that choosing the means of 
implementation is, and should be, the prerogative of the implementing 
Member.74
     Even though implementing party's discretion in choosing the ways and 
means of implementation has been well respected, arbitrators from latter 
disputes sent out a cautionary message that implementing party's discretion 
is not unlimited. Arbitrators from EC－Sugar Subsidies (DS265,266,283)75, 
70 WTO Secretariat, A Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 77-78.
71 Ibid., 78.
72 Award of the Arbitrator, Chile－Agricultural Products (Article 21.3(c)), paras. 36-37.
73 Award of the Arbitrator, US－Gambling (Article 21.3(c)), paras. 28, 32-33.
74 Award of the Arbitrator, US－Offset Act (Article 21.3(c)), paras. 47-52.
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Japan－DRAMs (DS336)76 and Brazil－Tyres (DS332)77 stated that 
implementing party does not have an unfettered right to choose any method 
of implementation, as the chosen method must be such that it could be 
implemented within a reasonable period of time in accordance with the 
guidelines contained in DSU Article 21.3(c) and also that objectives that are 
extraneous to the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in the dispute 
concerned may not be included in the method if such inclusion were to 
prolong the implementation period.78 Arbitrator from EC－Chicken Cuts 
(DS269,286) further added that if the implementation means fall within the 
respondent's legal system, arbitrator should defer to the Member's choice 
even if that choice takes longer to implement than other available internal 
means of implementation.79 However, if the respondent attempts to deploy 
implementation means that fall outside its legal system, arbitrator should 
show a lower degree of deference and that implementing Member has the 
burden of demonstrating that this deployment "is necessary for, and therefore 
indispensable to, that Member's full and effective compliance with its 
obligations under the covered agreements by implementing the 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB."80 It is assumed that the 
implementing Member will act in good faith in the selection of the method 
that it deems most appropriate for implementation of the recommendations 
and rulings of the DSB.81  
75 Award of the Arbitrator, EC－Sugar Subsidies (Article 21.3(c)), paras. 69-73.
76 Award of the Arbitrator, Japan－DRAMs (Article 21.3(c)), paras. 23-27.
77 Award of the Arbitrator, Brazil－Tyres (Article 21.3(c)), paras. 43-48.
78 Award of the Arbitrator, EC－Sugar Subsidies (Article 21.3(c)), paras. 69-73.
79 Alvarez-Jimenez, "A Reasonable Period of Time for Dispute Settlement Implementation: 




2.3.3 Timeline of DSU Article 21.3 and Duration of RPT
 
     According to the legal text of DSU Article 21.3(c) states that RPT 
shall be determined within ninety days after the date of adoption of the 
final report. However, due to DSU Article 21.3(b), which states that RPT is 
"period of time agreed to by the parties to the dispute within forty-five 
days after the date of adoption of the final report," arbitrator of DSU 
Article 21.3(c) will only have forty-five days to determine RPT if parties 
were unsuccessful in reaching an agreement on RPT, using all forty-five 
days granted under DSU Article 21.3(b).82 Even though it is pertinent for 
arbitrator to hear arguments from both parties and to provide logical 
reasoning and rationale behind determining certain duration of RPT, Article 
21.3(c) of DSU does not provide realistic time period for arbitrators to do 
so. In practice, it was found that the forty-five or ninety days time limit for 
determination of RPT has been exceeded in most cases.83 The amount of 
time spent on reaching a mutually agreed RPT ranged from 0 to 212 days, 
with an average duration of 81 days, 36 days more than the stipulated 
forty-five days under DSU Article 21.3(b).84 The time the arbitrator takes to 
determine the RPT under DSU Article 21.3(c) also exceeded the ninety day 
limit, ranging from 103 to 256 days, with an average of 144 days, 54 days 
more than stipulated.85
     The legal text of DSU Article 21.3(c) also provides that the RPT to 
implement recommendations and rulings should not exceed fifteen months 
from the date of the adoption of the reports. However, such time period 
may be shorter or longer depending upon the "particular circumstances."86 
82 Peng, "How Much Time is Reasonable?－The Arbitral Decisions under Article 21.3(c) of 
the DSU," 327-328.  
83 Qian, "Reasonable Period of Time in the WTO Dispute Settlement System," 271.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 DSU, Article 21.3(c).
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According to DSU Article 21.4, the reasonable period could be extended up 
to eighteen months in exceptional circumstances, but such implementation 
timeline has not been upheld in any case.87 Even though RPT has been 
defined as the "shortest period possible within the legal system of the 
Member to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB" since 
the EC－Hormones (DS26,48) case, RPT should be adequate enough to 
grant the implementing Member the time it truly needs to go through 
normal domestic rule making procedures, rather than undertaking an 
extraordinary procedures.88 Arbitrator from Korea－Alcohol (DS75,84) 
elaborated definition of RPT as provided by the arbitrator from EC－
Hormones (DS26,48), stating that even though RPT shall be the shortest 
period possible within the legal system of the implementing Member, this 
does not require a Member to utilize an extraordinary legislative procedure 
rather than the normal legislative procedure in every case.89 The change of 
trend in length of RPT over the years will be discussed in depth in the 
'Analysis and Result' section (Section V).
2.3.4 Burden of Proof
     The arbitrator of EC－Hormones (DS26,48) was the very first 
arbitrator to mention the issue of burden of proof in relation to RPT. The 
arbitrator stated that "the party seeking to prove that there are particular 
circumstances justifying a shorter or a longer time has the burden of proof 
under Article 21.3(c)."90 Here, the arbitrator noted that the burden of proof 
falls on whichever party argues for period shorter or longer than the fifteen 
87 Zaman, "Determining a Reasonable Implementation Timeline for Developing Countries in 
WTO Disputes: An Appraisal of Special Treatment Commitments in DSU Article 21.3(c) 
Arbitrations," 35.
88 WTO Secretariat, A Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 77.
89 Award of the Arbitrator, Korea－Alcohol (Article 21.3(c)), para. 42.
90 Award of the Arbitrator, EC－Hormones (Article 21.3(c)), para. 27.
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month guideline, regardless of the entity's status as an implementing or 
complaining party. However, details on burden of proof changed in Canada
－Pharmaceuticals (DS114). In this dispute, the arbitrator described the 
burden as falling on to the implementing Member to justify the duration of 
any proposed period of implementation.91 Specifically, the arbitrator stated 
that the implementing Member bears the burden of proof in showing that 
proposed period of implementation, including its supposed component steps, 
is the shortest period possible.92 He added, the longer the proposed period 
of implementation, the greater this burden would be.93 This comment on 
burden of proof indicates that immediate compliance concept has 
progressively superseded the fifteen month guideline model.94 The arbitrator 
from US－1916 Act (DS136,162) also adopted this same reasoning from 
arbitrator of the Canada－Pharmaceuticals (DS114).95 
     Interestingly, as more arbitrators began to discuss on the topic of 
burden of proof, diverse interpretations began to arise. In EC－Tariff 
Preference (DS246), the arbitrator returned to the very first interpretation of 
burden of proof provided by the arbitrator from EC－Hormones (DS26,48) 
and argued that the burden of proof is not placed on one party or the 
other.96 Rather, both the respondent and complainant must provide evidence 
and arguments in support of the periods they propose.97 The arbitrators from 
US－Offset Act (DS217,234) and Brazil－Tyres (DS332) added that even 
though they agree with previous arbitrators that it is for the Member 
seeking a reasonable period of time for implementation to establish that the 
91 Award of the Arbitrator, Canada－Pharmaceuticals (Article 21.3(c)), para. 47.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
94 Monnier, "The Time to Comply with an Adverse WTO Ruling : Promptness within 
Reason," 834. 
95 Award of the Arbitrator (28 February 2001), United States－Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 
[hereinafter "US－1916 Act"], Recourse to Arbitration under DSU Article 21.3(c), 
WT/DS136/11, WT/DS162/14, paras. 32-33.
96 Award of the Arbitrator, EC－Hormones (Article 21.3(c)), para. 27.
97 Ibid.
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proposed period indeed constitutes the shortest period possible within its 
legal system to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB, 
when the implementing Member fails to do so, then the arbitrator must 
determine the shortest period possible for implementation, which will be 
shorter than proposed by the implementing Member, on the basis of the 
evidence presented by all parties.98 The arbitrator from US－Stainless Steel 
(Mexico) (DS344) also agreed with arbitrators from US－Offset Act 
(DS217,234) and Brazil－Tyres (DS332). 
2.4 Significance of the Reasonable Period of Time
     With depth understanding on overall process of the WTO dispute 
settlement and interpretation, application of DSU Article 21.3, it is pertinent 
to review the significance of reasonable period of time for implementation. 
First of all, RPT balances the respondent's desire for an indefinite 
compliance period and the complainant's desire for immediate 
implementation.99 Moreover, RPT prevents implementing party from having 
an open ended time frame to comply by imposing deadline for the 
implementation of ruling and recommendation of the DSB.100 Furthermore, 
RPT enables prompt compliance and hence prompt settlement of disputes, 
which is the goal of the WTO dispute settlement system.101 Failure by the 
Members to implement the DSB's decisions within the RPT not only 
perpetuates the adverse trade effects caused by the inconsistent measure, but 
also undermines the dispute settlement mechanism.102 Thus, various problems 
98 Award of the Arbitrator, Brazil－Tyres (Article 21.3(c)), para. 51. Award of the Arbitrator, 
US－Offset Act (Article 21.3(c)), paras. 44 and 55. 
99 Peng, "How Much Time is Reasonable?－The Arbitral Decisions under Article 21.3(c) of 
the DSU," 325. 
100 Godinho, "The Determination of the Reasonable Period of Time under Article 21.3(c) of 
the DSU : An 'Arbitrary' Arbitration?," 9.
101 Qian, "Reasonable Period of Time in the WTO Dispute Settlement System," 258. 
102 Ibid.
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with respect to the determination of the RPT can affect the proper 
functioning of the WTO dispute settlement system.103 In addition, since 
parties of dispute may proceed further to additional arbitration under DSU 
Article 21.5 (disagreement between the parties regarding implementation of 
the DSB rulings) and DSU Article 22.6 for retaliation by the complainant 
till expiration of RPT, determining a reasonable timeline for implementation 
under DSU Article 21.3(c) plays a pivotal role in adjudicating substantial 
legal issues in DSU Article 21.5 and DSU Article 22.6 arbitrations.104 Due 
to such significance, it is pertinent to look into DSU Article 21.3 in more 
details.  
103 Ibid.
104 Zaman, "Determining a Reasonable Implementation Timeline for Developing Countries in 
WTO Disputes: An Appraisal of Special Treatment Commitments in DSU Article 21.3(c) 
Arbitrations," 34.
33
IV. Method and Factors at Issue
     In order to determine which factors or principles are taken into 
account when dispute parties reach an agreement on RPT under DSU Article 
21.3(b) or receives binding RPT by the arbitrator via DSU Article 21.3(c), 
the duration and patterns of RPT from previous WTO disputes will be 
analyzed in depth. Since RPT begins immediately after the date of adoption, 
this study investigated 81 disputes under DSU Article 21.3(b) and 27 
disputes under DSU Article 21.3(c), which has its panel (and Appellate 
Body) report to be adopted by the DSB between January 1995 and 
December 2014. Since RPT is originally composed of number of months 
and weeks or days, each RPT was converted into a single unit of months, 
assuming a single month equals to 30 days. Since no official report or 
document is published explaining the reasoning and rationale behind how 
respondent and complainant countries have reached agreement on RPT under 
DSU Article 21.3(b), most of the factors to be tested against duration of 
RPT were selected based on reviewing Award of the Arbitrator report of 
DSU Article 21.3(c). Such design would allow this research to investigate 
patterns and determinants of RPT and to observe similarities and differences 
between RPT determined under DSU Article 21.3(b) and Article 21.3(c). 
Detailed methodology and assumption for each factor is discussed below. 
1. Factor 1 : Economic Status and Development Level
     Thus far, developing Members in dispute have requested for special 
attention in determining RPT. According to previous literatures, a disputant's 
economic status as a developing country has been said to be recognized as 
a factor constituting "particular circumstances" by number of arbitrators. 
Moreover, apart from the issue of RPT, the DSU legal text itself offers 
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special and differential treatment or attention to developing countries across 
various stages of dispute settlement procedure. However, according to Busch 
and Reinhardt, the WTO dispute settlement does not make developing 
country complainants significantly more likely to get defendants to liberalize 
disputed policies, while wealthy complainants are significantly more likely to 
secure their desired outcomes under the current system.105 On the other 
hand, Antell and Coleman's study showed opposite result from Busch and 
Reinhardt, arguing that developing countries actually do not face a 
disadvantage in the litigation and compliance stages of WTO dispute 
settlement but appears to have a small advantage in these stages.106 
Moreover, the authors also found that developing countries who use DSU 
Article 21.3 process of reasonable period of time faced no unusual delays in 
litigation when they are in dispute against a richer respondent.107 
     With continuation of such debate on developing countries' experience 
in WTO dispute settlement, it is worth investigating the relationship between 
length of RPT and economic status and development level of respondent 
and complainant, i.e., developed or developing country. In order to observe 
such relationship, the study applied various statistical methods, including 
F-test, correlational and regression analysis. For regression analysis, 
hypotheses were developed as written below. 
l H0 : Country's economic status and development level, measured in 
GNI/capita, does not have a significant relationship with length of RPT.
l H1 : Country's economic status and development level, measured in 
GNI/capita, does have a significant relationship with length of RPT.
105 Marc L. Busch and Eric Reinhardt, "Developing Countries and General Agreement on 
Tariff and Trade/World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement," Journal of World Trade 37, 
no.04 (2003) : 729-730.
106 Geoffrey Antell and James W. Coleman, "An Empirical Analysis of Wealth Disparities in 
WTO Disputes: Do Poorer Countries Suffer from Strategic Delay during Dispute Litigation?," 
Boston University International Law Journal 29 (2011): 281.
107 Ibid., 283.
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     The historical GNI/capita (Gross National Income/capita) in current 
US$ for each country was collected from the World Bank database. Since it 
often takes years to go through dispute settlement procedure, GNI/capita was 
measured by averaging GNI/capita from a year before, year of, and a year 
after the date of the adoption, i.e., average of three consecutive years of 
GNI/capita. Moreover, In order to provide clear distinction between 
developed and developing countries, only those classified as "High Income" 
country according to the World Bank Analytical Classifications were 
categorized as "Developed" countries. Those with "Upper-Middle," 
"Lower-Middle," or "Low" income were categorized as "Developing" 
countries. Since this study aimed to find relationship between the duration 
of RPT and economic status and development level of respondent and 
complainant, those cases with multiple complainants were broken down into 
independent cases with a single respondent against a single complainant, 
generating 103 disputes in total under DSU Article 21.3(b) and 54 disputes 
under DSU Article 21.3(c).
2. Factor 2 : Protection Level of Product at Issue 
     The study also aimed to observe relationship between the respondent 
and complainant country’s protection level of product at issue. Even though 
this factor has never been raised in previous literatures or Award of the 
Arbitrator reports, it is worth investigating since product at issue of a 
dispute usually tends to be socially and economically sensitive product in 
both respondent and complainant countries, which often tend to affect 
special interest groups or industry and domestic rule making process. Thus, 
for this specific factor, it was assumed respondent with high protection level 
of product at issue (i.e., higher tariff rate) would desire longer RPT to gain 
sufficient time to resolve various social and political issues that may arise 
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from modifying specific industry of product at issue and to maintain WTO 
inconsistent but economically beneficial measure at home as long as 
possible. Moreover, it was also assumed that complainant with higher 
protection level of product at issue would desire shorter RPT, since swift 
compliance by the implementing party would be necessary to protect their 
economic interest. With these assumptions, the study will first apply 
correlational analysis. The study will also examine the significance of 
protection level of product at issue in determining RPT by running a 
regression. Hypotheses for regression analysis is written below. 
l H0 : Higher the tariff rate, i.e., higher the protection level of 
product at issue, shorter the RPT. 
l H1 : Higher the tariff rate, i.e., higher the protection level of 
product at issue, longer the RPT.   
    
     In order to measure level of protection, first, all products at issue 
received 4-digit or 6-digit Harmonized System code based on the panel (and 
Appellate Body) report of the dispute or official government documents such 
as the United States Federal Register or European Communities Council 
Regulation, which specifically addresses promulgation of measure at issue of 
a dispute. Moreover, tariff rate was measured by computing average tariff 
rate of respondent and complainant from a year before, year of, and a year 
after the date of the adoption. All tariff rates are MFN (Most Favored 
Nation) applied tariffs, which are normal non-discriminatory tariffs charged 
on imports, excluding preferential tariffs under free trade agreements and 
other schemes or tariffs charged inside quotas.108 Tariff rates were collected 
from WTO Tariff Download Facility. The tariff rates were measured as ad 
valorem tariff (percentage). Two previous disputes under DSU Article 
108 World Trade Organization, Tariff Download Facility, http://tariffdata.wto.org (accessed
January 07, 2015).
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21.3(c), Japan-Alcohol (DS8,10,11) and Chile-Alcohol (DS87,110), however, 
used non-ad valorem tariff of national currency per liter. Since non-ad 
valorem tariff cannot be converted into ad-valorem tariff, these two cases 
were excluded from the analysis. Since tariff rate differs in each country, 
those disputes with multiple complainants were each broken down into 
independent dispute with a single respondent against a single complainant, 
resulting in total of 106 disputes under DSU Article 21.3(b) and 54 disputes 
under Article 21.3(c). Those disputes covering certain methodology, 
regulation or measures,109 intellectual property or trademarks matters110 or 
services111 were all excluded from the analysis due to absence of product at 
issue.  
3. Factor 3 : Means of Implementation  
     The third factor, means of implementation, has been raised as a key 
factor in determining RPT throughout previous literatures and Award of the 
Arbitrator reports of DSU Article 21.3(c). It was assumed that if legislative 
means of implementation is necessary, which requires government to go 
through multiple levels of law making entities, then the duration of RPT 
would be longer. On the other hand, for disputes in need of adopting 
administrative means of implementation, the length of RPT would be shorter. 
In order to test this factor, each previous dispute under DSU Article 21.3(b) 
and Article 21.3(c) was assigned with a means of implementation, i.e., 
legislative or administrative, via revisiting Award of the Arbitrator reports or 
Communication reports that has been officially filed by the respondent to 
the WTO. 
109 US－Zeroing of Dumping Margins (EC) (DS294), US－Zeroing (Japan) (DS322), US－
Continued Zeroing (DS350), US－Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China) 
(DS449) 
110 US－Section 211 "Havana Club" (DS176), China－IP Rights (DS362)
111 Mexico－Telecoms (DS204), China－Electronic Payment Services (DS413)
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     Under DSU Article 21.3(b) there were two disputes where both 
administrative and legislative means of implementations were applied for 
compliance (Mexico－Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice (DS295) and US－
Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) (DS379)) and three 
additional disputes where two sets of RPT have been agreed between the 
parties of dispute (Mexico－Taxes on Soft Drinks (DS308), Thailand－
Cigarettes (DS371), US－Zeroing (Korea) (DS402)). Sinc+e this study aimed 
to find relationship between means of implementation and duration of RPT, 
each of these case was broken down into separate independent cases with a 
single mean of implementation with one set of RPT, resulting in 86 disputes 
under DSU Article 21.3(b) and 27 disputes under DSU Article 21.3(c). In 
order to observe significance of relationship between the variables at issue, 
the study applied F-test and regression analysis using dummy variables.112  
4. Factor 4 : Violation of Certain WTO Covered Agreements
     Along with Factor 2 of this study, Factor 4 is also a new factor that 
has not been raised in previous literatures or in DSU Article 21.3(c) Award 
of the Arbitrator reports. This factor was selected in order to examine 
whether there are any differences in length of RPT according to different 
WTO agreement that has been found to be in violation by the DSB. Since 
most of the disputes involve violation of more than one WTO covered 
agreements, those cases with multiple violations were broken down into 
independent disputes with a single set of RPT and violation of one WTO 
agreement, resulting in 113 disputes in total under DSU Article 21.3(b) and 
41 disputes under DSU Article 21.3(c). 
     More specifically, this study investigated whether duration of RPT is 
shorter from disputes with violation of trade remedy agreement (Agreement 
112 For regression analysis, the study used 0 to indicate disputes in need of administrative 
means of implementation and '1' for those in need of legislative means of implementation. 
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on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping) (AD), Agreement on Safeguards (Safeguards), 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM)), since adoption 
of administrative procedure is usually sufficient to bring trade remedy 
disputes into compliance with WTO law, such as simply lifting anti-dumping 
measures or countervailing duties.  
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Question at Issue Article 21.3(b) Article 21.3(c)
Total Number of Disputes (01.1995~12.2014) 81 disputes 27 disputes
Average Length of RPT 9.66 months 11.38 months
Longest RPT 24 months113 15 months, 1 week114
Shortest RPT 2.23 months115 6 months116
Most heavy user – Respondent117 United States United States
Most heavy user – Complainant United States EC/EU












Average Length of RPT for Disputes with 
Legislative Means of Implementation 11.01 months 12.62 months
Average Length of RPT for Disputes with 
Administrative Means of Implementation 9.12 months 9.56 months
Total Number of Trade Remedy Disputes 50 disputes (44.25%)
12 disputes 
(29.27%)
   Safeguards 6 disputes 1 disputes
   Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 12 disputes 5 disputes
   Anti-Dumping 32 disputes 6 disputes
Total Number of Non-Trade Remedy Disputes 63 disputes (55.75%)
29 disputes   
(70.73%)
Average RPT of Trade Remedy Cases 8.33 months 10.82 months
   Safeguards 5.21 months 14.00 months
   Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 9.85 months 9.59 months
   Anti-Dumping 8.31 months 11.31 months
Average RPT of Non-Trade Remedy Disputes 10.84 months 11.53 months
V. Analysis and Result
1. Overview : Patterns of Reasonable Period of Time
Table 2. Patterns of RPT－DSU Article 21.3(b) vs. Article 21.3(c)118
     
113 Dominican Republic－Cigarettes (DS302) 
114 EC－Bananas (DS27)
115 Dominican Republic－Bag and Fabric Safeguards (DS415, 416, 417, 418)
116 Canada－Pharmaceuticals (DS114)
117 Refer to <Appendix 4> for DSU Article 21.3(b) and <Appendix 6> for Article 21.3(c). 
118 Refer to <Appendix 3> or DSU Article 21.3(b) and <Appendix 5> for Article 21.3(c).
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     Table 2 summarizes overall patterns of RPT that has been determined 
under DSU Article 21.3(b) and Article 21.3(c). Most disputes determined 
RPT by reaching agreement between the parties according to DSU Article 
21.3(b). Interestingly, even though RPT under DSU Article 21.3(c) was 
assumed to be shorter than that under Article 21.3(b) due to arbitrator's 
mediation, who would emphasize promptness in determining RPT by 
applying common law interpretation of DSU, the RPT under Article 21.3(c) 
turned out to be longer than that of the Article 21.3(b). Most heavy user of 
RPT under both provisions at issue were developed countries, particularly 
the United States and the European Communities. This may be due to the 
fact that developed countries tend to be more active in WTO dispute 
settlement system with well established financial and human resources 
available to engage in litigation within international organization.
     Interestingly, it was also found that most RPT from disputes requiring 
legislative means of implementation for compliance were determined under 
DSU Article 21.3(b), while those requiring administrative means of 
implementation were determined under DSU Article 21.3(c). Possible 
explanation on such phenomenon would be provided in more detail in 
Section 4 of the 'Analysis and Result' part of this study. 
     Moreover, supporting assumptions for Factor 3 of this study as stated 
in the above 'Method and Factors at Issue' section, the average length of 
RPT for disputes in need of legislative means of implementation were 
entitled to longer RPT than those requiring administrative means of 
implementation under both DSU Article 21.3(b) and Article 21.3(c). 
Interestingly, RPT for both administrative and legislative means of 
implementation under DSU Article 21.3(c) turned out to be longer than 
those agreed under DSU Article 21.3(b). This indicates that presence of 
arbitrator and application of their common law interpretation of DSU, which 
emphasizes promptness in every step of the dispute settlement system, does 
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not necessary result in shorter RPT.  
     Last but not least, in relation to RPT with effect from violation of 
certain WTO covered agreements, it was found that RPT determined for 
disputes covering violation of trade remedy agreements were shorter than 
RPT from disputes covering violation of non-trade remedy agreements. This 
also supports the assumption that RPT from trade remedy disputes would be 
shorter than those from non-trade remedy disputes. Each question at issue 
addressed in this section will be discussed further in the following sections.
     With that note, the study observed trend of RPT under both DSU 
Article 21.3(b) and Article 21.3(c) over the past twenty years. Ever since 
the first RPT was agreed between the United States and Venezuela in May 
1996, no significant trend has been observed over time. Interestingly, it was 
shown that RPT agreed in early disputes under DSU Article 21.3(b) were 
fifteen months long. Since no specific guidelines are available in DSU 
regarding how and what to consider to reach agreement on RPT, it appears 
parties who have reached agreement on RPT under Article 21.3(b) from 
early disputes referred to fifteen months guideline stated in Article 21.3(c).
Figure 2. Agreed RPT under DSU Article 21.3(b)
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     In order to observe how RPT under DSU Article 21.3(c) is 
determined, it is pertinent to review RPT that has been proposed by both 
respondent and complainant parties. The average RPT proposed by the 
complainant was 6.99 months. The average RPT proposed by the respondent 
was 18.79 months, exceeding the fifteen months guideline stated in DSU 
Article 21.3(c)(iii). This confirms that complainant want swift compliance by 
the respondent, while respondent want to secure maximum time period 
feasible for compliance. 
     To observe in more detail, the shortest RPT proposed by the 
respondent was 11 months, requested by Canada in Canada－
Pharmaceuticals (DS114). Canada’s proposed RPT, however, was still 10 
months longer than that proposed by the European Communities, the 
complainant of dispute. The longest RPT proposed by the respondent was 
46 months and 15 days, requested by Argentina in Argentina－Bovine Hides 
(DS155). The shortest RPT proposed by the complainant was 1 month, 
requested by Indonesia from Indonesia－Autos (DS54,55,59,64), Australia 
from Australia－Salmon (DS18), and Canada from Canada－Pharmaceuticals 
(DS114). The longest RPT proposed by the complainant was 15 months, 
requested by the European Communities from Japan－Alcohol (DS8,10,11). 
Figure 3. Proposed and Awarded RPT under DSU Article 21.3(c)      
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     It was shown in Figure 3 that the length of awarded RPT under DSU 
Article 21.3(c) has decreased over the past twenty years. Interestingly, the 
awarded RPT moved closely together with RPT proposed by the 
complainant. Overall, 23 disputes received RPT shorter than fifteen months 
while only 4 disputes received RPT longer than fifteen months.119  
     To elaborate further on decreasing trend of RPT under DSU Article 
21.3(c), arbitrators from Japan－Alcohol (DS8,10,11) and EC－Bananas 
(DS27) stated in the Award of the Arbitrator reports that he was not 
convinced that the "particular circumstances" advanced by the complaining 
parties justify a departure from the fifteen month guideline.120 Since it was 
the very first time for arbitrator to award RPT, he did not provide detailed 
reasoning and rationale behind why RPT shall not depart from fifteen 
months stated in DSU Article 21.3(c)(iii). However, it is clear that 
arbitrators in early cases adhered to fifteen months as guideline period for 
RPT. 
     However, as shown in Figure 3, RPT began to decrease after a 
ground breaking case, EC－Hormones (DS26,48), in 1998. The arbitrator 
stated that the legal text of DSU Article 21.3(c) provides a guideline, not a 
rule for the arbitrators that the reasonable period of time to implement 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB should not exceed fifteen months 
from the date of adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report.121 However, 
he added that the time may be shorter or longer, depending upon particular 
circumstances.122 With that note, the arbitrator understood the fifteen month 
guideline to be an "'outer limit or a maximum in the usual case," while 
119 Refer to <Appendix 5> for more details.
120 Award of the Arbitrator (14 February 1997), Japan－Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages 
[hereinafter "Japan-Alcohol"], Recourse to Arbitration under DSU Article 21.3(c), WT/DS8/15, 
WT/DS10/15, WT/DS11/13, para. 27. Award of the Arbitrator (7 January 1998), European 
Communities－Regime for the Importation [hereinafter "EC-Bananas"], Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas, Recourse to Arbitration under DSU Article 21.3(c), WT/DS27/15, paras. 18-20.
121 Award of the Arbitrator, EC－Hormones (Article 21.3(c)), paras. 24-25. 
122 Ibid., para. 25. 
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recognizing that the time period may be shorter or longer, "depending upon 
the particular circumstances."123 The arbitrator also added that Article 21.3(c) 
should be interpreted in its context, pointing in particular to the "prompt" 
compliances and settlement of disputes requirements of DSU Article 21.1 
and Article 3.3.124 Based on the dictionary definition of "prompt," the 
arbitrator stated "it is clear that the reasonable period of time, as determined 
under Article 21.3(c), should be the shortest period possible within the legal 
system of the Member to implement the recommendations and rulings of the 
DSB" (emphasis added) and that "this should not be greater than fifteen 
months in the usual case, but could also be less."125 Providing such clear 
interpretation of DSU Article 21.3(c), EC－Hormones (DS26,48) was not 
only the first arbitration to set clear legal principle in determining RPT, but 
also the first dispute where arbitrator explicitly stated that RPT should be 
the shortest period possible. Since this historical dispute, arbitrators have 
invoked the shortest possible time principle as a basis for determining 
whether factors constitute "particular circumstances."126 
     Restating arguments stated in the Award of the Arbitrator report of 
EC－Hormones (DS26,48), the arbitrator of Canada－Pharmaceuticals 
(DS114) noted that fifteen months is established as a maximum guideline.127 
Moreover, he added that DSU Article 21.3(c) is not available 
unconditionally, for respondent shall receive reasonable period of time for 
implementation only in case where immediate compliance to DSB rulings is 
impracticable to do so and that as suggested by other provisions of the 
DSU, namely Article 3.3, 21.1, and 21.4, the implementation should be 
made "promptly" if not immediately.128 
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid., para. 26. For text of DSU Article 21.1 and Article 3.3, refer to <Appendix 1>.
125 Ibid., para. 26.
126 Hansen and McRae, "Reconciling the International and the Domestic: The Reasonable 
Period of Time under Article 21.3 of the DSU," 989.
127 Award of the Arbitrator, Canada－Pharmaceuticals (Article 21.3(c)), para. 45.
128 Ibid., paras. 45-47.  
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     Since these early arbitrations, the standard of "the shortest period 
possible within the legal system of the Member" has been a clear principle 
applied to later arbitrations in determining RPT. However, the arbitrator of 
US－Gambling (DS285) sent out a cautionary warning on overusing this 
standard. The arbitrator stated that "the shortest period possible for 
implementation within the legal system of the implementing Member is a 
convenient phrase that has been used by previous arbitrators and that this 
standard can and must also take due account of the two principles expressly 
mentioned in Article 21 of the DSU, namely reasonableness and the need 
for prompt compliance."129 He concluded that each arbitrator must take 
account of "particular circumstances" relevant to the case at hand and that 
strict insistence on this standard would tie an arbitrator's hands and prevent 
him or her from properly identifying and weighing the particular 
circumstances that are determinative of "reasonableness" in each individual 
case.130 
     Overall, it is unclear how much of importance arbitrator has imposed in 
each dispute on this standard when determining RPT. However, as shown in 
Figure 3, RPT has continued to show decreasing trend even after the US－
Gambling (DS285) in 2005, indicating that the standard of RPT to be the 
shortest period possible for implementation within the Member's legal system 
continues to play a critical and significant role in determining RPT by the 
arbitrators. Moreover, past interpretation by the arbitrators suggests that the 
shortest period principle can be approached in two ways: see it as an 
overarching principle or to see it as a factor that is to be taken into account, 
alongside the requirement to determine whether claimed particular 
circumstances justify a longer or shorter period of time for implementation.131 
129 Award of the Arbitrator, US－Gambling (Article 21.3(c)), para. 44.
130 Ibid. 
131 Hansen and McRae, "Reconciling the International and the Domestic: The Reasonable 
Period of Time under Article 21.3 of the DSU," 991.
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2. Factor 1 - Economic Status and Development Level
     
     The first statistical analysis focused on the relationship between 
duration of RPT and economic status and development level of respondent 
and complainant. In every case where a developing country participated in a 
dispute as a respondent or as a complainant, special treatment132 to protect 
its interest as a developing country has been raised as a key argument to 
support their position in relation to duration of RPT. A developing country 
will ask for longer RPT when it is a respondent and will ask for shorter 
RPT when it is a complainant. However, absence of specific standard and 
detailed guidelines in determining the implementation timeline in DSU 
Article 21.3(c) places developing countries and least developed countries, in 
particular, in a more degrading and marginalized position within the WTO 
dispute settlement system.133 In order to observe how developing countries' 
request for special attention is carried out in practice, this study has divided 
each respondent and complainant country into a developed or developing 
country according to the size of its GNI/capita (current US$). Then first 
compared four distinctive groups separately: respondent who is a developed 
country, respondent who is a developing country, complainant who is a 
developed country, and complainant who is a developed country. The result 
of the first analysis is written as below.
132 "Special attention" or "special treatment" is a technical term used throughout the WTO 
Agreement to designate those provisions that are applicable only to developing country 
Members. (from WTO Secretariat, A Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 11 
(Footnote 15)).
133 "Determining a Reasonable Implementation Timeline for Developing Countries in WTO 
Disputes: An Appraisal of Special Treatment Commitments in DSU Article 21.3(c) 
Arbitrations," 37.
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Total Number of 
Countries 6 countries 5 countries
Average GNI/Capita US$38,466/capita US$32,971/capita
Average RPT 9.79 months 11.26 months
Developing






Total Number of 
Countries 9 countries 7 countries
Average GNI/Capita US$4,932/capita US$5,463/capita











Total Number of 
Countries 9 countries 6 countries
Average GNI/Capita US$36,103/capita US$27,415/capita
Average RPT 9.63 months 11.32 months
Developing






Total Number of 
Countries 21 countries 12 countries
Average GNI/Capita US$4,014/capita US$4,218/capita
Average RPT 9.48 months 11.73 months
2.1 Group Analysis - Developed vs. Developing Countries
 Table 3. Economic Status and Development Level - Group Analysis
2.1.1 DSU Article 21.3(b)
     The most frequent users of DSU Article 21.3(b) as respondent were 
developed countries, the United States (31 disputes) and the European 
Communities (12 disputes). The most frequent users as complainant were 
also developed countries, the United States (26 disputes) and the European 
Communities (15 disputes). 
     Interestingly, although China joined WTO much later than other 
Members, it was found as the third most frequent user of DSU Article 
21.3(b), both as a respondent (8 disputes) and as a complainant (6 disputes). 
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Such observation demonstrates China’s active participation in WTO. The 
countries who were granted with longer RPT via agreement as a respondent 
under DSU Article 21.3(b) were mainly developing countries (Philippines 
and Turkey).134 The same observation also applied to countries who have 
agreed on RPT with its counterpart as a complainant (Venezuela, Honduras, 
Malaysia).135 However, according to analysis above, where RPT was 
measured in two distinctive groups of developed and developing countries, it 
was shown that despite small difference, developed countries as a group, 
who agreed on RPT via DSU Article 21.3(b) received longer RPT both as a 
respondent and as a complainant than in the case for DSU Article 21.3(c). 
2.1.2 DSU Article 21.3(c)
     The most frequent users of DSU Article 21.3(c) as respondent were 
all developed countries, i.e., the United States (8 disputes), the European 
Communities (5 disputes), and Canada (3 disputes). The most frequent users 
of DSU Article 21.3(c) as complainant were also developed countries, the 
European Communities (11 disputes), the United States (7 disputes), Canada 
and Japan (5 disputes each). Unlike its behavior under DSU Article 21.3(b), 
China only determined its RPT as a respondent in one dispute (China－
GOES (DS414)) under DSU Article 21.3(c), which its panel and Appellate 
Body report was adopted in year 2012. The countries who were granted 
with longer RPT via arbitration as a respondent were mainly developing 
countries (Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia).136 Such observation also 
134 Philippines received longest RPT as a respondent (13.53 months), followed by Canada 
(12.24 months), Turkey (10.5 months), EC (10.22 months), and India (10.03 months). Refer 
to <Appendix 4> for more details. 
135 Venezuela received longest RPT as a complainant (15 months), followed by Honduras 
(13.12 months), Malaysia (13 months), Pakistan (13 months), and Argentina (12 months). 
Refer to <Appendix 4> for more details. 
136 Chile received longest RPT as a respondent (14.15 months), followed by EC (13.14 
months), Argentina (12.4 months), Brazil and Indonesia (each 12 months respectively). Refer 
to <Appendix 6> for more details. 
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applied to countries who agreed on RPT with its counterpart as a 
complainant (Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Argentina, India).137 According 
to above group analysis, it was found that developing countries actually 
receive longer RPT both as a respondent and as a complainant, while 
developed countries received shorter RPT both as a respondent and as a 
complainant.
2.1.3 DSU Article 21.3(b) vs. DSU Article 21.3(c)
     It was found that developed countries were the most frequent users of 
both DSU Article 21.3(b) and Article 21.3(c) as respondent and as 
complainant. Based on the analysis above, developing countries tend to 
enjoy better benefits with longer RPT as respondent under DSU Article 
21.3(c) than under DSU Article 21.3(b). On the other hand, developing 
countries would enjoy better benefits with shorter RPT as complainant under 
DSU Article 21.3(b) than under DSU Article 21.3(c). 
2.2 Scenario Analysis 
       In order to elaborate further on above analysis, the study placed 
each distinct group against another group, observing RPT under four 
different dispute scenarios : i) developed country against another developed 
country, ii) developed country as a respondent against a complainant who is 
a developing country, iii) developing country as a respondent against a 
complainant who is a developed country, and last but not least, iv) 
developing country against another developing country. The number of 
disputes and average RPT of each scenario was assessed in Table 3 as 
written below.
137 Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras received longest RPT as a complainant (15.23 months each 
respectively), followed by Argentina (13 months). Refer to <Appendix 6> for more details.
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Respondent Complainant Question Article 21.3(b) Article 21.3(c)
Developed Developed
# of Disputes 37 disputes (34.26%)
23 disputes
(42.59%)
Average RPT 9.76 months 11.43 months
Average Gap138 - 11.22 months
Developed Developing
# of Disputes 28 disputes(25.92%)
19 disputes
(35.19%)
Average RPT 9.84 months 12.02 months
Average Gap - 10.26 months
Developing Developed
# of Disputes 30 disputes(27.78%)
10 disputes
(18.52%)
Average RPT 9.47 months 11.81 months
Average Gap - 14.50 months
Developing Developing
# of Disputes 13 disputes(12.04%)
2 disputes
(3.70%)
Average RPT 8.71 months 11.25 months
Average Gap - 9.58 months
Table 4. Dispute Scenarios based on Parties' Economic Status and 
Development Level
2.2.1 DSU Article 21.3(b)139
     
     When each distinct group was placed in actual dispute against another 
country, longer RPT was agreed when respondent is a developed country and 
complainant is a developing country. This is an interesting finding since even 
though developing group as a whole received shorter RPT as complainant, 
those developing countries in dispute against developed countries as 
complainant received longer RPT. It was expected that RPT would be longer 
than other types of cases when both respondent and complainant were 
developing countries due to establishment of mutual understanding between 
the parties on each other’s economic status as a developing country. 
Interestingly, however, in such circumstances, shorter RPT was agreed 
138 “Average Gap” indicates the gap between RPT proposed by the respondent and that by 
the complainant. Thus, this measure only applied to RPTs awarded under DSU Article 
21.3(c). 
139 Refer to <Appendix 7> for more details.
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between the parties. This may be due to the fact that all disputes between 
developing countries required administrative means of implementation for 
compliance, which tends to require shorter length of time for implementation 
than those disputes in need of legislative means of implementation. 
2.2.2 DSU Article 21.3(c)140 
     Similar to results from DSU Article 21.3(b), longer RPT was granted 
when respondent is a developed country and complainant is a developing 
country. Again, shorter RPT was awarded when both parties were 
developing countries. Moreover, it was also found that the average gap 
between the RPT proposed by the respondent and complainant was the 
greatest when respondent is a developing country and complainant is a 
developed country.141 On the other hand, such gap was smallest when both 
respondent and complainants were developing countries. 
2.2.3 DSU Article 21.3(b) vs. DSU Article 21.3(c) 
     Supporting previous finding that developed countries were the most 
frequent users of DSU Article 21.3(b) and DSU Article 21.3(c) as both 
complainant and respondent, most of the trade conflict arose between 
developed countries. When RPT was simply compared as a single group of 
those agreed by or awarded to 'Respondent-Developing', 
'Respondent-Developed', 'Complainant-Developing', and 'Complainant- 
Developed', it was found that developing countries tend to enjoy better 
benefits with longer RPT as a respondent under DSU Article 21.3(c) and 
with shorter RPT as a complainant under DSU Article 21.3(b). 
140 Refer to <Appendix 8> for more details.
141 Refer to <Appendix 7> for more details. 
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     Interestingly, however, different outcome was generated when each 
group was placed in a dispute against another group, i.e., affected by 
counterpart’s economic status and exposed to other external factors. Unlike 
findings in 'Group Analysis' (Section 2.1 of the 'V. Analysis and Result')  it 
was found that developing countries actually do not enjoy better benefits 
with shorter RPT as a complainant under both DSU Article 21.3(b) and 
DSU Article 21.3(c), especially against a respondent who is a developed 
country. Moreover, it was found that developing countries also do not enjoy 
benefit as a respondent with longer RPT under both DSU Article 21.3(b) 
and DSU Article 21.3(c) since developing countries were entitled to shorter 
RPT as respondent than when developed countries were respondent of a 
dispute. 
     In conclusion, even though it is said that developing countries shall 
receive special attention under WTO dispute settlement procedure, empirical 
analysis above showed that such special and differential treatment may not 
be easily granted in practice, at least in terms of determining RPT. 
2.3 Statistical Analysis
2.3.1 DSU Article 21.3(b)
2.3.1.1 F-test
     Before moving on to correlational and regression analysis, the study 
first used F-test to observe variances of two populations, i.e., RPT conferred 




Developing Developed Developing Developed
Variance 19.656 9.004 20.417 9.098
P (F<=f) One-Tail 0.0023 0.0019
F 2.183 2.244
F Critical One-Tail 1.574 1.581
Respondent Complainant
Correlation Coefficient (r) 0.047 0.171
Pearson R2 0.002 0.029
Equation y = 9E-06x + 9.341 y = 3E-05x + 8.828
Table 5. Result from F-Test (Article 21.3(b))
     When F-test was applied to RPT of respondents and complainants each 
separately under DSU Article 21.3(b), the result showed that there is a 
meaningful difference between variance of RPT conferred to developing 
countries and those conferred to developed countries when these countries 
participated in disputes as respondents and complainants. ('F' value was 
greater than the 'F Critical one-tail' and 'P (F<=f) one-tail' was smaller than 
α=0.05 from 95% confidence intervals).
2.3.1.2 Correlational Analysis
 
Table 6. Factor 1 - Result from Correlational Analysis (Article 21.3(b))
     In order to measure how strong the relationship is between RPT and 
the economic status of complainant and respondent, the study engaged in 
correlational analysis. Correlational analysis showed that there is a positive 
relationship between the economic status of respondent and complainant with 
RPT, i.e., greater the GNI/capita, longer the RPT and vice versa. Such 
result coincides with the result from 'Group Analysis' section (Section 2.1 of 
the 'V. Analysis and Result') that developed countries with greater 
GNI/capita tend to reach agreement with longer RPT as both respondent and 
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Respondent Complainant
Pearson R2 0.002 0.029
Significance F & p-Value 0.626 0.077
complainant. Even though correlation coefficient was very small, indicating 
that there is a very weak relationship (below 0.2) between economic status 
of a respondent and complainant with RPT, the correlation coefficient of 
complainant was approximately 3.64 times greater than that of the 
respondent, indicating that complainant’s GNI/capita has relatively stronger 
relationship with RPT. 
2.3.1.3 Regression Analysis
Table 7. Factor 1 - Result from Regression Analysis (Article 21.3(b))
* Confidence Intervals 95% (α=0.05)
          
     In addition to correlational analysis, the study also ran a regression to 
observe whether change in length of RPT can be explained by the size of 
GNI/capita of respondent and complainant. Coefficient of determination, R2, 
was small in both cases, confirming duration of RPT cannot be explained 
by the economic status of respondent and complainant.142 However, the R2 
of complainant was 14.5 times greater than that of the respondent, indicating 
that the complainant's GNI/capita had more effect on duration of RPT than 
that of the respondent.        
     Interestingly, the scatter plot demonstrating relationship between 
duration of RPT and GNI/capita of respondent under DSU Article 21.3(b) 
displayed three distinctive clusters, while no such clusters were found in 
scatter plot for complainant GNI/capita and duration of RPT. When each 
cluster was segregated and analyzed in depth, it was found that such 
clusters are formed due to difference in size of GNI/capita of respondent. 
142 The result of regression analysis showed that GNI/Capita of Respondent can explain only 
0.2% of change in length of RPT, while GNI/Capita of complainant can explain 2.9% of 
change in length of RPT. 
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Cluster #1 Cluster #2 Cluster #3
Correlation 









Pearson R2 0.077 0.167 0.275
Figure 4. Scatter Plot from Statistical Analysis - Article 21.3(b) (Factor 1)
Cluster #3, especially, included data of RPT from most recent WTO 
disputes where the United States participated in dispute as a respondent. 
Furthermore, when statistical analysis was applied to each cluster group 
separately, it was found that the size of GNI/capita of respondent does 
explain duration of RPT when respondent is a developed country (one-tailed 
p-value was smaller than α=0.05 from 95% confidence intervals for both 
Cluster #2 and Cluster #3 which includes data of RPT agreed by developed 
respondent countries). Approximately 16.7% and 27.5% of the change in 
duration of RPT can be explained by the size of GNI/Capita for Cluster #2 
and Cluster #3, each respectively. For Cluster #3, such result implies that 
the United States, as a developed country, whether intended or not, has 
been agreeing on RPT considering its counterpart's economic status as a 
developing country. 
Table 8. Result from Statistical Analysis - Cluster Group
* Confidence Intervals 95% (α=0.05)
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Respondent Complainant
Developing Developed Developing Developed
Variance 3.052 6.199 4.617 6.042
p-Value (F<=f) One-Tail 0.103 0.267
F 2.031 1.308
F Critical One-Tail 2.528 2.028
     In conclusion, overall statistical analysis showed thar even though 
significant difference in variance exists between RPT conferred to developing 
and developed countries via agreement between the parties under DSU 
Article 21.3(b), the result of correlation and regression analysis indicates 
there is a limit to state that such difference in variance between two 
populations is due to different size of GNI/capita of both respondent and 
complainant.
2.3.2 DSU Article 21.3(c)
2.3.2.1 F-Test
Table 9. Result from F-Test (Article 21.3(c))
     When F-test was applied to RPT of respondents and complainants each 
separately under DSU Article 21.3(c), the result showed that no meaningful 
difference exists between variance of RPT conferred to developing countries 
and those conferred to developed countries ('F' value was smaller than the 
'F Critical one-tail' and 'P (F<=f) one-tail' was greater than α=0.05 from 
confidence intervals of 95%). 
143 For statistical analysis in social science studies, correlational coefficient between 0.4 and 
0.6 is interpreted as moderate relationship. Correlational coefficient below 0.4 indicates weak 




Correlation Coefficient (r) -0.108 -0.130
Pearson R2 0.012 0.017
Equation y = -2E-05x + 12.152 y = -2E-05x + 12.109
Respondent Complainant
Pearson R2 0.012 0.017
Significance F & p-Value 0.439 0.349
2.3.2.2 Correlational Analysis
 
Table 10. Factor 1 - Result from Correlational Analysis (Article 21.3(c))
     Interestingly, opposite from the result of DSU Article 21.3(b),  
negative relationships were found between the economic status of  
respondent and complainant with RPT, i.e., greater the GNI/capita, shorter 
the RPT and vice versa. This confirmed previous finding that developed 
countries received shorter RPT both as a respondent and as a complainant 
under DSU Article 21.3(c). Even though correlation coefficient was small, 
close to zero, the correlation coefficient of complainant was slightly (1.2 
times) stronger than that of the respondent. 
2.3.2.3 Regression Analysis
Table 11. Factor 1 - Result from Regression Analysis (Article 21.3(c))
* Confidence Intervals 95% (α=0.05)
     Similar to result from DSU Article 21.3(b), small coefficient of 
determination, R2, close to zero, indicated that the size of GNI/Capita of 
respondent and complainant are inadequate to explain the length of RPT. 
      Unlike the scatter plot from DSU Article 21.3(b), which showed three 
unique clusters in demonstrating the relationship between GNI/Capita of 
respondent and duration of RPT, no such clusters were found in the case of 
DSU Article 21.3(c) for both respondent and complainant. Such observation 
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demonstrates that  even though the legal text of DSU clearly states that 
special and differential treatment shall be granted to developing countries 
throughout the dispute settlement procedure, respondent countries, especially 
the developed countries, tend to consider its counterpart's economic status 
more than the DSB Arbitrators, with having more discretion in applying  
certain factors and principles to determine RPT under DSU Article 21.3(b).
Figure 5. Scatter Plot from Statistical Analysis - Article 21.3(c) (Factor 1)
         
     Overall, the statistical analysis showed that there is no significant 
difference in variance between RPT conferred to developing and developed 
countries by the arbitrator and the result of correlation and regression 
analysis also found that the change in duration of RPT cannot be explained 
by the change in size of GNI/Capita of respondent and complainant under 
DSU Article 21.3(c).   
2.3.3. DSU Article 21.3(b) vs. 21.3(c)
     Even though it was found that the relationship between economic 
status of respondent and complainant with length of RPT is weak, it is 
pertinent to note some of the key findings. Comparing correlation coefficient 
and R2 from statistical analysis of DSU Article 21.3(b) and 21.3(c), it was 
found that the gap between the strength of relationship between respondent 
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and complainant’s economic status with RPT was smaller under DSU Article 
21.3(c) compared to that of DSU Article 21.3(b). Such finding indicates that 
the benefit accrued to respondent or complainant developing countries, 
considering their economic status, is much greater under DSU Article 
21.3(b) than DSU Article 21.3(c). This may be due to the fact that parties 
are allowed to be more flexible in terms of considering various factors in 
reaching agreement on RPT under DSU Article 21.3(b), thus able to 
establish peaceful mutual understanding regarding each other’s economic 
status, while RPT under DSU Article 21.3(c) is awarded by the arbitrator 
who is mandated to consider legal interpretation of the said provision and 
often adopts reasoning from previous disputes, thus relatively more rigid in 
providing special treatment due to parties’ economic status. Actually, in 
practice, most DSU Article 21.3(c) arbitrators required developing countries 
to provide supporting evidence and proof to demonstrate how shorter RPT 
(when developing country is a complainant) or longer RPT (when 
developing country is a respondent) may damage their interest and benefit 
as developing countries in order to receive special attention or treatment, 
which is not required or necessary under DSU Article 21.3(b). 
     Furthermore, since correlational analysis was conducted by observing 
GNI/capita of each individual respondent and complainant with RPT, 
independent from any influence from counterpart’s economic status or other 
possible external factors, similar to the analysis designed for the 'Group 
Analysis' (Section 2.1  from Section V 'Analysis and Result'), similar 
findings were confirmed, i.e., developing countries tend to enjoy better 
benefits with longer RPT as a respondent under DSU Article 21.3(c) due to 
negative correlational relationship and with shorter RPT as a complainant 
under DSU Article 21.3(b) due to positive correlational relationship. 
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2.4 Review of the Past DSU Article 21.3(c) Arbitration Report 
                      : On Economic Status and Development Level  
 
     Since this study has generated statistical results on patterns and 
relationship between economic status and development level with length of 
RPT, it is pertinent to observe how above empirical results are actually 
reflected in practice. Since no official report is published in WTO on how 
parties have reached agreement on RPT under DSU Article 21.3(b),144 the 
study will solely discuss its review on past DSU Article 21.3(c) Award of 
the Arbitrator report.  
     According to the legal text of DSU, special rules and procedures has 
been provided for developing countries in every step of the dispute 
settlement procedure.145 Regarding implementation of recommendation and 
ruling, DSU Article 21.2 states that "particular attention should be paid to 
matters affecting the interest of developing country Members with respect to 
measures which have been subject to dispute settlement." The DSU further 
states that if the matter is raised by a developing country Member, the DSB 
shall consider what further appropriate action to take146 and that if the case 
is brought by a developing country Member, in considering what appropriate 
action to take, the DSB shall take into account not only the trade coverage 
of measures complained of, but also their impact on the economy of 
developing country Members concerned.147 Even though this may be the 
case in theory, it has been found from above in-depth analysis that 
developing countries do not fully enjoy special attention in terms of 
determining duration of RPT. 
144 Parties only publish an official communication on how both have agreed on certain 
length of RPT. Any rational or reasoning behind their agreement is not disclosed. 
145 Please refer to <Appendix 2> for relevant DSU Articles granting special treatment and/or 
attention to developing countries. 
146 DSU, Article 21.7.
147 DSU, Article 21.8.
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     First of all, when implementing party is a developing country, it has 
been found in the above 'Group Analysis' that respondent who are 
developing countries were actually awarded with longer RPT compared to 
other groups. Furthermore, in the 'Scenario Analysis,' it has been found that 
developing country as a respondent enjoy some benefit due to its economic 
status, especially against a complainant who is a developed country, for its 
RPT turned out to be longer than the scenario where a respondent is a 
developed country in dispute against a complainant who is also a developed 
country. Such result was also confirmed by correlational and regression 
analysis.
     Interestingly, such statistical result was reflected in actual practice. 
Among six disputes under DSU Article 21.3(c) where respondent was a 
developing country and complainant was a developed country, developing 
countries received special treatment under DSU Article 21.3(c) with longer 
RPT when it is an implementing member (respondent) of a dispute. In 
Indonesia－Autos (DS54,55,59,64), arbitrator granted additional period of six 
months considering Indonesia's status as a developing country with severe 
economic and financial situation.148 In Chile－Alcohol (DS87,110), arbitrator 
gave additional time due to Chile's status as a developing country by 
inserting that "DSU Article 21.2 enjoins an arbitrator to be generally 
mindful of the great difficulties that a developing country Member may, in 
a particular case, face as it proceeds to implement the recommendations and 
rulings for the DSB."149 Similarly, the arbitrator from Argentina－Bovine 
Hides (DS155) also considered Argentina's economic status as a developing
148 Award of the Arbitrator (7 December 1998), Indonesia－Certain Measures Affecting the 
Automobile Industry [hereinafter "Indonesia－Autos"], Recourse to Arbitration under DSU 
Article 21.3(c), WT/DS54/15, WT/DS55/14, WT/DS59/13, WT/DS64/12, para. 24.
149 Award of the Arbitrator (23 May 2000), Chile－Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages [hereinafter 
"Chile－Alcohol"], Recourse to Arbitration under DSU Article 21.3(c), WT/DS87/15, 
WT/DS110/14, paras. 41-45. 
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country confronted with severe economic problems.150 In other three 
disputes, Korea－Alcohol (DS75,84), Brazil－Tyres (DS332) China－GOES 
(DS414), developing country as a respondent did not request for special 
attention or treatment due to their economic status and development level. 
     However, it is pertinent to note here that implementing countries from 
those three disputes with longer period of RPT may have received special 
attention not simply because of their status as developing countries, but 
mainly due to their dire financial and economic circumstances at the time of 
adoption of panel (and Appellate Body) report.151 Thus, these disputes 
demonstrate that it is extremely difficult for developing countries to receive 
special attention, unless there are significant unavoidable circumstances. 
     Regarding disputes where complainant country is a developing country, 
the 'Group Analysis' found that longer RPT was granted when complainant 
is a developing country. Similar result was also found in 'Scenario Analysis' 
where complainant developing country received longer RPT compared to 
other scenarios when they are in trade disputes against a respondent 
developed country, i.e., developing country as complainant were not granted 
with special attention or treatment due to their economic status. Again, the 
result was confirmed by correlational and regression analysis. 
     Actually, as found in the empirical analysis, arbitrators in previous 
disputes were not easily convinced when special attention or treatment was 
requested by a complainant who is a developing country. EC－Bananas 
(DS27) was the very first dispute under DSU Article 21.3(c) where 
developing members (Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico) filed a 
complaint against a developed member (European Communities). Even 
though complainants requested for special attention to be given for their 
150 Award of the Arbitrator (31 August 2001), Argentina－Measures Affecting the Export of 
Bovine Hides and Import of Finished Leather [hereinafter "Argentina－Bovine Hides"], 
Recourse to Arbitration under DSU Article 21.3(c), WT/DS155/10, paras. 50-51.
151 Lee and Kim, "A Study on WTO Dispute Settlement Process: Focusing on the 
Reasonable Period of Time," 146.
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interest as developing countries, the arbitrator imposed more weight on the 
language of DSU Article 21.3(c) than considering complainants' economic 
status, granting 15 months and 1 week as RPT, adhering to the fifteen 
months guideline.152 
     As more RPT were awarded via arbitration under DSU Article 21.3(c), 
arbitrators began to pay more attention to the matter of considering 
developing country's status in determining RPT. In US－Offset Act 
(DS217,234), arbitrator for the first time actually provided comment on the 
argument made by certain developing countries that arbitrator must pay 
particular attention to matters affecting the interests of developing country 
Members due to DSU Article 21.2.153 However, arbitrator rejected 
complainants' argument by stating that the complaining parties have not 
explained specifically how developing country Members' interests should 
affect arbitrator's determination of the reasonable time period for 
implementation.154 
     The arbitrator in EC－Tariff Preference (DS246) also rejected India's 
assertion based on the same reasoning.155 Antigua and Barbuda, as a 
complainant of US－Gambling (DS285), actually provided evidence and 
explanation, seeking to receive special attention as a developing country. 
However, the arbitrator rejected Antigua and Barbuda's claim by raising the 
very same reasoning that has been stated by the arbitrator from US－Offset 
Act (DS217,234) and EC－Tariff Preference (DS246) that Antigua and 
Barbuda did not provide specific data in support of its arguments and did 
not seek to demonstrate any clear relationship between the decline of its 
industry and the measures which were subject to dispute, thus failing to 
152 Award of the Arbitrator, EC－Bananas (Article 21.3(c)), paras. 18-20.  
153 Award of the Arbitrator, US－Offset Act (Article 21.3(c)), para. 81.
154 Ibid.
155 Award of the Arbitrator (20 September 2004), European Communities－Conditions for the 
Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries [hereinafter "EC－Tariff Preferences"], 
Recourse to Arbitration under DSU Article 21.3(c), WT/DS246/14, paras. 57-59.
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satisfy criteria expressly mentioned in DSU Article 21.2.156 
     Brazil from EC－Chicken Cuts (DS269,286) was also successful in 
providing satisfactory explanation and evidence to request for particular 
attention as a developing country. However, emphasizing that the reasonable 
period of time shall be the shortest period of time possible, arbitrator 
concluded that the reasonable period of time for implementation is not 
additionally affected by the fact that Brazil is a developing country.157 
Applying the same reasoning as the EC－Chicken Cuts (DS269,286), 
arbitrator rejected Mexico's assertion for particular attention due to its status 
as a developing country in US－COOL (DS384,386) by imposing more 
weight on the fact that reasonable period of time for implementation shall 
be the shortest period possible and complainant's status as a developing 
country should not affect his final determination.158 
     In US－OCTG (DS268), arbitrator outright rejected complainant's request 
for particular attention by stating that complainant's size of the economy or 
development level is irrelevant in determining duration of RPT.159 
Interestingly, however, the same arbitrator later applied Article 21.2 in EC－
Sugar Subsidies (DS265,266,283), inserting that the DSU Article 21.2 should 
be interpreted as directing an arbitrator to pay particular attention to matters 
affecting the interests of both an implementing and complaining developing 
country Member (emphasis added) and thus complainants' status as 
developing countries was, in fact, a relevant factor to be taken into account 
in determining reasonable period.160 
156 Award of the Arbitrator, US－Gambling (Article 21.3(c)), paras. 62-63. 
157 Award of the Arbitrator (20 February 2006), European Communities－Customs 
Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts [hereinafter "EC－Chicken Cuts"], Recourse to 
Arbitration under DSU Article 21.3(c), WT/DS269/13, WT/DS286/15, paras. 81-82.
158 Award of the Arbitrator (4 December 2012), United States－Certain Country of Origin 
Labelling (COOL) Requirements [hereinafter "US－COOL"], Recourse to Arbitration under 
DSU Article 21.3(c), WT/DS384/24, WT/DS386/23, paras. 99-100.
159 Award of the Arbitrator (7 June 2005), United States－Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping 
Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina [hereinafter "US－OCTG"], 
WT/DS268/12, paras. 47-28, and 52.
160 Award of the Arbitrator, EC－Sugar Subsidies (Article 21.3(c)), para. 99.
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     Lastly, statistical analysis has found that shortest RPT is granted when 
developing country is challenged by another developing country as a 
complainant, indicating that granting special treatment to developing countries 
does not play a role in determining RPT in such cases. The very first 
dispute involving two developing countries was Chile－Agricultural Products 
(DS207). Even though arbitrator recognized that the terms of DSU Article 
21.2 are relevant for both Chile and Argentina, he concluded that he is not 
swayed towards either a longer or shorter period of time by the particular 
attention he pays to the interest of developing countries.161 In Colombia－
Ports of Entry (DS366), arbitrator stated that “in a situation where both the 
implementing and the complaining Member are developing countries, the 
requirement provided in DSU Article 21.2 is of a little relevance.”162 Even 
though the reasoning of the two arbitrators are slightly different, it is 
concluded that particular attention to developing country is not considered in 
determining RPT when both parties of dispute are developing countries. 
     In conclusion, both statistical analysis and normative review of 
previous WTO disputes under DSU Article 21.3(c) found that even though 
granting special attention to developing countries and degree of such 
treatment differ in each dispute, arbitrators are consistent in applying 
conservative interpretation of relationship between DSU Article 21.2 and 
Article 21.3(c), especially when complainant is a developing country, i.e., 
special attention to developing countries is not granted consistently under the 
current dispute settlement system and it is even tougher for developing 
countries who participate in a dispute as a complainant. On the other hand, 
it was found that parties' economic status and development level are more 
161 Award of the Arbitrator, Chile－Agricultural Product (Article 21.3(c)), para. 56.
162 DSU Article 21.2 directs arbitrators acting under Article 21.3(c) to pay “particular 
attention to matters affecting the interests of both an implementing and complaining 
developing country Member or Members, given that the scope of this provision is not 
textually limited to either of these parties.” (from Report of the Panel (27 April 2009), 







Highest Tariff Rate 60%164 47.53%165
Lowest Tariff Rate 0%166 0%167
Average Tariff Rate 10.43% 13.40%
Complainant
Highest Tariff Rate 70%168 38.08%169
Lowest Tariff Rate 0%170 0%171
Average Tariff Rate 7.96% 8.01%
taken into consideration by the disputants under DSU Article 21.3(b), due to 
greater discretion granted to parties in agreeing on specific period of RPT. 
3. Factor 2 - Protection Level of Product at Issue 
Table 12. Overview - Protection Level (Tariff Rate) and Duration of RPT
     
     The second statistical analysis focused on relationship between the 
protection level of product at issue of dispute with the duration of RPT. 
The protection level was measured in MFN (Most Favored Nation) Applied 
tariff rate. Brief overview of patterns of RPT in relation to protection level 
of product at issue is shown in Table 12.
 
163 Under DSU Article 21.3(c), there were two disputes where non-ad valorem tariff was 
applied: Japan－Alcohol (DS8,10,11) and Chile－Alcohol (DS87,110). Since Parties applied $/l 
or €/l unit in measuring tariff, which could not be converted into percentage, these two cases 
were excluded in analyzing relationship between RPT and tariff rates of the respondent and 
complainant. Moreover, since products at issue of EC－Tariff Preference (DS246) were 
“imports benefiting from the Drug Arrangements under the EC GSP scheme,” affecting 
approximately 60% of EC’s total imports, this dispute was also excluded from analysis.
164 Thailand’s MFN Applied Tariff Rate on Cigarettes (HS2402) from Thailand－Cigarettes (DS371).
165 Indonesia’s MFN Applied Tariff Rate on autos and auto parts (HS8702~8704, 8706~8709, 
8711, 8714) from Indonesia－Autos (DS54,55,59,64).
166 Respondents from 16 cases applied 0% MFN Tariff Rate. Refer to <Appendix 9>.
167 Respondents from 4 cases applied 0% MFN Tariff Rate. Refer to <Appendix 10>.
168 The United States MFN Applied Tariff Rate on biotech products (HS0701, 0702, 070521, 
1005, 110220, 110313, 110423, 1201, 1205, 1209, 2403, 5201) from EC－Biotech Products 
(“GMO”) (DS291,292,293). 
169 Thailand’s MFN Applied Tariff Rate on chicken and chicken products (HS0207, 0210) 
from EC－Chicken Cuts (DS269,286).
170 Complainants from 17 disputes applied 0% MFN Tariff Rate. Refer to <Appendix 9>.
171 Respondents from 7 disputes applied 0% MFN Tariff Rate. Refer to <Appendix 10>.
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Respondent Complainant
Correlation Coefficient (r) -0.014 0.055
Pearson R2 0.0002 0.003
Equation y = -0.365x + 9.475 y = 1.754x + 9.297
3.1 DSU Article 21.3(b)
Table 13. Factor 2 - Result from Correlational Analysis (Article 21.3(b))
     Interestingly, while the duration of RPT and respondent’s protection 
level of product at issue showed negative relationship, i.e., higher the tariff 
rate (high level of protection level), shorter the RPT and vice versa, RPT 
and complainant’s protection level of product at issue showed positive 
relationship, i.e., higher the tariff rate (high level of protection level), longer 
the RPT and vice versa. Such result demonstrates complete opposite 
phenomenon from original assumption that higher the protection level in 
respondent country would likely result in longer RPT (positive relationship), 
while higher the protection level in complainant country would likely result 
in shorter RPT (negative relationship). 
     Moreover, comparing key numbers generated from correlational 
analysis, it was found that relationship between the protection level of 
product issue in complainant country, measured in tariff rate, had stronger 
relationship (3.9 times) with RPT than that of the respondent. Such 
observation was also confirmed by the size of coefficient of determination 
(R2 of the complainant was 15 times greater than that of the respondent). 
Overall, however, such relationships proved to be weak for both complainant 
and respondent, with correlation coefficient and coefficient of determination, 
R2, close to 0. 
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Respondent Complainant
Pearson R2 0.0002 0.003
Significance F & p-Value 0.886 0.576
Table 14. Factor 2 - Result from Regression Analysis (Article 21.3(b))
* Confidence Intervals 95% (α=0.05)
     Even though weak relationship was found between protection level of 
product at issue and length of RPT from correlational analysis, the study 
further engaged in regression analysis. With one-tailed p-value greater than 
α=0.05 from confidence intervals of 95%, the regression analysis showed 
change in duration of RPT cannot be explained by the protection level of 
product at issue in both respondent and complainant countries under DSU 
Article 21.3(b), confirming result from above correlational analysis. 
Moreover, no significant cluster was found from scatter plots as shown 
below.
Figure 6. Scatter Plot from Statistical Analysis - Article 21.3(b) (Factor 2) 
    
     Overall, since it is logically infeasible for a respondent with high 
protection level of product at issue to agree with shorter RPT and for it 
also has been found that there is a very weak, negative relationship between 
the duration of RPT with the protection level of product at issue of a 
respondent, it is concluded that protection level of product at issue of 
respondent does not affect the length of RPT. Similarly, for it is not 
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Respondent Complainant
Correlation Coefficient (r) 0.212 0.127
Pearson R2 0.045 0.016
Equation y = 3.834x + 11.111 y = 3.693x + 11.329
logically sensible for a complainant country dealing with economically or 
socially sensitive product to agree with longer RPT and since very weak 
positive relationship has been found via correlational analysis, it is 
concluded that protection level of product at issue of complainant country is 
not a factor to be considered in determining RPT under DSU Article 
21.3(b).  
3.2 DSU Article 21.3(c)
Table 15. Factor 2 - Result from Correlational Analysis (Article 21.3(c))
     Unlike results from DSU Article 21.3(b), both the respondent and 
complainant’s protection levels of product at issue showed positive 
relationship with RPT. Such observation supports part of the original 
assumption that higher the protection level in respondent country would 
likely result in longer RPT (positive relationship), but not so in the case for 
the complainant since the result showed that higher the protection level in 
complainant country would also likely result in longer RPT. 
     While stronger relationship was shown between complainant’s 
protection level of product at issue with length of RPT under DSU Article 
21.3(b), the respondent’s protection level of product at issue with RPT was 
stronger (1.67 times greater than correlation coefficient of complainant) 
under DSU Article 21.3(c). The coefficient of determination, R2, was also 
2.8 times greater than that of the complainant. This demonstrates that 
respondent country's tariff rate of product at issue tends to impose stronger 
influence on RPT than that of the complainant country. Nevertheless, since 
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Respondent Complainant
Pearson R2 0.045 0.016
Significance F & p-Value 0.236 0.482
both the correlation coefficient and coefficient of determination were close to 
0, it is concluded that there is no significant relationship between the 
protection level of product at issue in complainant and respondent countries 
with RPT under DSU Article 21.3(c). 
Table 16. Factor 2 - Result from Regression Analysis (Article 21.3(c))
* Confidence Intervals 95% (α=0.05)
     In addition to correlational analysis, the study also engaged in 
regression analysis. Similar to result from DSU Article 21.3(b), one-tailed 
p-value was greater than α=0.05 from confidence intervals of 95%, 
indicating duration of RPT cannot be explained by the protection level of 
product at issue in both respondent and complainant countries under DSU 
Article 21.3(c), supporting result from above correlational analysis. Again, no 
significant cluster was found from scatter plots as shown below.
Figure 7. Scatter Plot from Statistical Analysis - Article 21.3(c) (Factor 2)
     
     In summary, it is concluded that there is no significant relationship 
between the protection level of product at issue of respondent and 
complainant country in relation to the duration of RPT under both DSU 
Article 21.3(b) and 21.3(c). 
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Means of Implementation DSU Article 21.3(b)172
DSU Article 
21.3(c)173
Legislative # of Cases 24 (27.91%) 16 (59.26%)Average RPT 11.08 months 12.62 months
Administrative # of Cases 62 (72.09%) 11 (40.74%)Average RPT 9.13 months 9.56 months
4. Factor 3 - Means of Implementation 
4.1 Overview
Table 17. Means of Implementation and Length of RPT
     The next analysis focused on relationship between duration of RPT 
and the means of implementation. According to the analysis above, majority 
of disputes implemented rules and recommendations of DSB via legislative 
means of implementation under DSU Article 21.3(c). Unlike DSU Article 
21.3(c), majority of disputes under DSU Article 21.3(b) implemented DSB’s 
recommendation via administrative means of implementation. Such difference 
may occur due to the way process of determining RPT has been structured 
under DSU Article 21.3(b) and Article 21.3(c) and also due to different 
perspectives complainant and respondent have on means of implementation. 
     According to DSU Article 21.3, the parties who fail to reach 
agreement on RPT request for arbitrated RPT under DSU Article 21.3(c). 
Since legislative means of implementation requires significant length of time 
to complete the process, it is highly unlikely for complainant to agree with 
respondent if it chooses to achieve compliance via legislative process, unless 
legislative means of implementation is the one and only way for the 
respondent to comply to the WTO law. Thus, in most cases, parties of 
disputes will both agree on administrative means of implementation or 
172 Refer to <Appendix 11> for more details
173 Refer to <Appendix 12> for more details.
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otherwise argue against one another between administrative and legislative 
means of implementation. 
     Since the length of RPT is closely related to means of 
implementation, if both parties agree that administrative means is the only 
available option to be selected by the respondent to bring WTO inconsistent 
measure into compliance, then it is also likely for complainant and 
respondent to agree on RPT. Moreover, since administrative means of 
implementation is less complicated and thus requires shorter amount of time, 
it is easier to reach an agreement in terms of duration of RPT. On the 
other hand, when respondent and complainant disagree on which means shall 
be adopted by the respondent, it is more probable for parties to disagree on 
length of RPT, thus moving on to the DSU Article 21.3(c) in request for 
arbitrated RPT, resulting in most disputes under DSU Article 21.3(c) to be 
those in need of legislative means of implementation.
     In addition, as shown in Table 17, RPT for disputes requiring 
legislative means of implementation were much longer than those requiring 
administrative means of implementation, even longer than the overall average 
RPT of all disputes, indicating that the means of implementation is a critical 
factor affecting RPT under both DSU Article 21.3(b) and 21.3(c).
4.2 Statistical Analysis
     In order to test if significant relationship exists between the means of 
implementation and duration of RPT, first, the study applied F-test to 
observe difference in variance of two populations at issue: RPT determined 
from disputes in need of administrative means and those in need legislative 
means for compliance. 
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Article 21.3(b) Article 21.3(c)
Administrative Legislative Administrative Legislative
Variance 13.008 9.652 4.317 4.429
P (F<=f) one-tail 0.212 0.467
F 1.348 1.026
F Critical one-tail 1.842 2.544
DSU Article 21.3(b) DSU Article 21.3(c)
Pearson R2 0.066 0.358
Significance F & p-Value 0.017 0.00097
Table 18. Factor 3 - Result from F-Test
     With 'F' value smaller than the 'F Critical one-tail' and 'P (F<=f) 
one-tail' greater than α=0.05 from confidence intervals of 95%, the result 
showed there is no meaningful difference between variance of two 
populations: RPT determined for disputes in need of administrative and 
legislative means of implementation for compliance under both DSU Article 
21.3(b) and Article 21.3(c). 
Table 19. Factor 3 - Result from Regression Analysis
* Confidence Intervals 95% (α=0.05)
     
     Interestingly, regression analysis generated meaningful results. Since 
independent variable, the means of implementation, is qualitative, the study 
used dummy variables174 to run regression. With one-tailed p-values smaller 
than α=0.05 from confidence intervals of 95%, the regression analysis 
showed that the independent variable, means of implementation, can explain 
approximately 6.6% and 35.8% of change in length of RPT, under DSU 
Article 21.3(b) and 21.3(c), each respectively. Thus, statistical analysis 
demonstrated that means of implementation has significant and meaningful 
relationship with duration of RPT under both provisions at issue. 
174 The study used '0' for RPT from disputes in need of administrative means for compliance 
and '1' for RPT from disputes in need of legislative means for compliance.
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4.3 Review of the Past DSU Article 21.3(c) Arbitration Report
: On Means of Implementation
     The importance of means of implementation in determining RPT, 
especially under DSU Article 21.3(c), has been also reflected in previous 
disputes. Canada－Pharmaceuticals (DS114) was the very first dispute where 
arbitrator explicitly stated that the means of compliance is a factor to be 
considered for "particular circumstances."175 Moreover, the arbitrator also 
stated that if implementation is by administrative means, such as through a 
regulation, then the reasonable period of time will normally be shorter than 
for implementing through legislative means.176 Additionally, the arbitrator 
suggested following relevant factors shall be examined in determining RPT: 
i) the means of implementation, in that regulatory changes typically take 
less time than legislative changes, ii) the complexity of the change, e.g., 
whether consultation with a large number of groups is required, and iii) 
whether the time frame of the amendment process is of a legally binding or 
mandatory nature or whether the timing or the process is subject to 
discretion.177 The arbitrators in other disputes, including US－Copyright Act 
(DS160)178 and Colombia－Ports of Entry (DS366)179, all agreed that means 
of compliance is a critical factor in determining the duration of RPT. 
175 Award of the Arbitrator, Canada－Pharmaceuticals (Article 21.3(c)), para. 37.
176 Ibid.
177 Ibid., paras. 48-52.
178 Award of the Arbitrator (15 January 2001), United States－Section 110(5) of the US 
Copyright Act [hereinafter "US－Copyright Act"], Recourse to Arbitration under DSU Article 
21.3(c), WT/DS160/12, paras. 33-34.
179 Award of the Arbitrator (2 October 2009), Colombia－Indicative Prices and Restrictions 
on Ports of Entry [hereinafter "Colombia－Ports of Entry"], Recourse to Arbitration under 
DSU Article 21.3(c), WT/DS366/13, para 90. 
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Agreement









Anti-Dumping 32 (64%) 8.31 months 6 (50%) 11.31 months
Safeguard 6 (12%) 5.21 months 1 (8.3%) 14.00 months
SCM 12 (24%) 9.85 months 5 (41.7%) 9.59 months





Accession 2 9.20 months - -
Agriculture 5 10.93 months 2 13.05 months
ATC 1 15.00 months - -
Customs 1 12.50 months 1 8.50 months
Enabling - - 1 14.37 months
GATS 3 12.67 months 3 11.57 months
GATT 35 10.68 months 15 11.84 months
Licensing 1 8.27 months - -
SPS 4 9.27 months 2 11.50 months
TBT 4 12.50 months 1 10.00 months
TRIMs 1 10.00 months 1 12.00 months
TRIPS 5 11.27 months 3 9.33 months
WTO 1 7.63 months - -
TOTAL 63 (56.7%) 10.84 months 29 (70.7%) 11.53 months
5. Factor 4 - Violation of Certain WTO Covered Agreements
     Lastly, the relationship between length of RPT and effect from 
violation of certain WTO covered agreement(s) was analyzed. Over the 
years, more 'trade remedy' complaints were filed in WTO pursuant to the 
Anti-Dumping, Safeguards, and Subsidy and Countervailing Measures 
Agreements.180 Majority of disputes, however, still dealt with violation of 
non-trade remedy agreements under both DSU Article 21.3(b) and DSU 
Article 21.3(c). The length of RPT was also longer for non-trade Remedy 
disputes under both DSU Article 21.3(b) and Article 21.3(c). Detailed 
analysis are shown in Table 20. 
Table 20. Violation of Certain WTO Covered Agreements181
180 Leitner and Lester, "WTO Dispute Settlement 1995-2013－A Statistical Analysis," 194.
181 Refer to <Appendix 13> for DSU Article 21.3(b) and <Appendix 14> for Article 21.3(c).
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     Before we discuss result from each trade remedy agreement, it is 
pertinent to note that reasonable time period for compliance for prohibited 
and actionable subsidies is not determined under DSU Article 21.3(c).182 
Rather, the time period for compliance is determined by the panel in its 
report in cases of prohibited subsidies (ninety days, SCM Article 4.7), or 
already explicitly specified in the SCM Agreement in cases of actionable 
subsidies (six months, SCM Article 7.9).183 Thus, those cases categorized as 
violating SCM Agreement are the ones that received two sets of RPT 
(Indonesia－Autos (DS54,55,59,64), Canada－Autos (DS139,142)): one set of 
RPT for violating SCM Agreement and another set of RPT for violating other 
certain WTO covered agreement and also for those in violation of other SCM 
Agreement's provisions specifically addressing following matters: i) satisfying 
certain substantive requirements to impose a countervailing measure, ii) 
procedural requirements regarding the conduct of a countervailing investigation, 
iii) imposition and maintenance in place of countervailing measures, and iv) 
those addressing non-actionable subsidies which another member believes results 
in serious adverse effects to its domestic industry184. 
     Anti-Dumping Agreement was the most frequent trade-remedy agreement 
to be violated by the respondent in both Article 21.3(b) and 21.3(c). Observing 
the RPT of trade remedy disputes, disputes addressing violation of SCM 
Agreement received longer RPT than others under DSU Article 21.3(b), while a 
disputes dealing with violation of Safeguard Agreement received longer RPT 
than others under DSU Article 21.3(c). Moreover, disputes with violation of 
Safeguards Agreement received shorter RPT compared to others under DSU 
Article 21.3(b), while disputes with violation of SCM Agreement received 
182 World Trade Organization, WTO Analytical Index: DSU Article 21.3(b) Parties' Agreement 
after Appointment of Arbitrator, para. 1099.
183 Ibid.
184 Indonesia received two sets of RPT awards, 12 months under DSU Article 21.3(c) and 6 
months under SCM 7.9. Canada also received 8 months under DSU Article 21.3(c) and 90 
days under SCM 4.7. For the purpose of this study, RPT awarded solely under DSU Article 
21.3(c) were considered.
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shorter RPT than others under DSU Article 21.3(c). 
      Overall, it is concluded that RPT from disputes covering violation of 
trade remedy agreements result in shorter RPT than those with violation of 
non-trade remedy agreements under both DSU Article 21.3(b) and Article 
21.3(c), for violation of trade remedy agreements usually can be resolved 
via administrative means of implementation. Among 51 trade remedy 
disputes under Article 21.3(b), only 8 disputes185 were found to be in need 
of legislative means of implementation (6 disputes addressing violation of 
Anti-Dumping Agreement and 2 disputes addressing violation of SCM 
Agreement186), while 43 disputes187 were in need of administrative means of 
implementation. The average RPT of those 8 disputes with legislative means 
of implementation was 10.52 months, while average RPT of 43 disputes 
with administrative means of implementation was 7.94 months. 
     Moreover, among 12 trade remedy disputes under Article 21.3(c), 6 
disputes dealt with administrative means of implementation while 6 disputes 
involved legislative means of implementation. Even though equal number of 
disputes existed under each type of means of implementation, the average 
RPT was 12.4 months for those in need of legislative means of 
implementation and 9.66 months for those requiring administrative means of 
implementation. Thus, it appears that the length of RPT is not affected by 
which WTO covered agreement was found to be in violation, but rather 
affected by which means of implementation is necessary for compliance.
185 EC－Bed Linen (DS141), EC－Pipe Fittings (DS219), Mexico－Rice AD (DS295), US－
Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) (DS379), EC－Fasteners (DS397), EU－
Footwear (China) (DS405), US－Carbon Steel (India) (DS436), US－Countervailing and 
Anti-Dumping Measures (China) (DS449).
186 US－Carbon Steel (DS436) and US－Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (DS449).
187 11 disputes in violation of SCM Agreement, 6 disputes in violation of Safeguard 
Agreement, and 28 disputes in violation of Anti-Dumping Agreement.
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6. Other Relevant Factors in Determining RPT
     As briefly mentioned earlier, since no official report is filed in WTO 
for DSU Article 21.3(b), containing reasoning and rationale behind parties' 
agreement on specific period of RPT, it is difficult to observe what other 
factors would be considered by the parties to affect the length of RPT 
under DSU Article 21.3(b). Thus, the contents of this section will focus on 
other factors and principles that have been taken into account in previous 
disputes to determine RPT under Article 21.3(c).
     Along with party's economic status as a developing country (Factor 1) 
and means of implementation (Factor 3), the use of time by respondent after 
adoption of panel (and Appellate Body) reports have been raised as a factor 
to consider. In US－Copyright Act (DS160), the arbitrator stated that when 
prompt compliance is required, timeline is of the essence, such that 
Members must make good use of time after adoption of the relevant dispute 
settlement reports to begin the implementation process.188 The arbitrator sent 
out a cautionary warning that if it is perceived by an arbitrator that an 
implementing Member has not adequately begun implementation after 
adoption so as to effect prompt compliance, it is to be expected that the 
arbitrator will take into account in determining the reasonable period of 
time.189 Moreover, even though it is very rare for the panel to invoke DSU 
Article 19.1190, arbitrator from US－Offset Act (DS217,234) stated that 
reasonable period of time would be affected by such suggestion by the 
188 Award of the Arbitrator, US－Copyright (Article 21.3(c)), para. 46.
189 Ibid.
190 According to DSU Article 19,1, the panel may suggest ways in which the Member 
concerned could implement the recommendation. However, panel is not obliged to make such 
a suggestion, even when requested by the complainant(s). If the panel makes use of its right 
to suggest possible ways of implementation, such "suggestion" on how the respondent "could" 
put itself into compliance are not binding on the responding party. The responding party 
enjoys the freedom to choose any of the various options that may exist to bring about 
compliance. All the respondent is obliged to do is to make its measure(s) fully compatible 
with WTO law. (from WTO Secretariat, A Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 
58).
80
panel.191 In addition, the arbitrator from Canada－Pharmaceutical (DS114) 
stated that the complexity of the proposed implementation can be a relevant 
factor.192 Furthermore, previous reasoning on particular circumstances stated 
by previous arbitrators,193 flexibility of the legislative process,194 legally 
binding nature of the component steps leading to implementation,195 and role 
of the measures found to be inconsistent with WTO rules in a particular 
society196 were each mentioned as factors to be considered in determining 
RPT.
     Arbitrators from previous disputes have also commented on which 
factors are not considered in determining RPT under DSU Article 21.3(c). 
In Indonesia－Autos (DS54,55,59,64), the arbitrator found economic or 
political structural adjustment from withdrawal or modification of an 
inconsistent measure is not a particular circumstances that can be taken into 
account in determining the reasonable period of time under DSU Article 
21.3(c), for it is an issue that any Member, whether developed or 
developing, faces whenever withdrawal or modification of a measure is 
necessary.197 Moreover, in Canada－Pharmaceuticals (DS114), arbitrator 
stated that he was not convinced that the domestic "contentiousness" of a 
change should be a relevant factor in the reasonable period of time 
determination, for WTO disputes are always, to some extent, domestically 
contentious, as there otherwise would be no need for recourse to dispute 
settlement.198 
191 Award of the Arbitrator, US－Offset Act (Article 21.3(c)), paras. 51-52.
192 Award of the Arbitrator, Canada－Pharmaceutical (Article 21.3(c)), para. 51.
193 Award of the Arbitrator, Chile－Alcohol (Article 21.3(c)), para 48.
194 Award of the Arbitrator (28 February 2001), Canada－Term of Patent Protection 
[hereinafter "Canada－Patent Term"], Recourse to Arbitration under DSU Article 21.3(c), 
WT/DS170/10, paras. 63-64.
195 Ibid., para. 52.
196 Award of the Arbitrator, Chile－Agricultural Products (Article 21.3(c)), para. 48.
197 Award of the Arbitrator, Indonesia－Autos (Article 21.3(c)), para 23.
198 Award of the Arbitrator, Canada－Pharmaceuticals (Article 21.3(c)), para. 60.
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     Interestingly, however, an exception was made in Chile－Agricultural 
Product (DS207), where arbitrator accepted to consider political 
contentiousness in determining RPT. Noting that simple contentiousness of 
implementation may not be a sufficient consideration under DSU Article 
21.3(c) to justify a longer period of time, the arbitrator said Chile's Price 
Band System, which has been fundamentally integrated into policies of 
Chile, plays unique role and impact on Chilean society (emphasis added), 
thus is a relevant factor in determining reasonable period of time.199 
Furthermore, the arbitrator from Canada－Patent Term (DS170) explained 
that commercial harm is irrelevant to determination of RPT because such 
harm would exist in almost any case when there is a WTO inconsistent 
measure.200 The arbitrator of US－Offset Act (DS217,234) provided a good 
summary of factors and principles to be considered in determining the 
length of RPT as written below.201  
l The fifteen month period set forth in Article 21.3(c) is a "guideline" 
and does not represent "an average, or usual, period." Rather, "it is 
ultimately the relevant 'particular circumstances' that influence what is a 
'reasonable period of time' for implementation."
l The term "reasonable" should be interpreted as including "the notions 
of flexibility and balance," in a manner which allows for account to be 
taken of the particular circumstances of each case, but must be read 
together with the term "prompt compliance" in Article 21.1.
l The reasonable period of time should be "the shortest period possible 
within the legal system of the Member to implement the 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB," on the basis of the 
"normal," rather than "extraordinary," legislative procedures of the 
implementing country.
199 Award of the Arbitrator, Chile－Agricultural Products (Article 21.3(c)), paras. 47-48.
200 Award of the Arbitrator, Canada－Patent Term (Article 21.3(c)), paras. 46-48.
201 Award of the Arbitrator, US－Offset Act (Article 21.3(c)), paras. 39-44.
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l It is for the implementing Member to establish that the duration of the 
period it proposes constitutes the "shortest period possible" within its 
legal system; where the implementing Member fails to establish that 
this period is the shortest possible, the arbitrator must determine the 
"shortest period possible" on the basis of the evidence presented by all 
parties in their submissions, and taking into account the fifteen month 
guideline provided by Article 21.3(c).
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VI. Conclusion 
1. Summary of Results
     In summary, both statistical analysis and case-based reasoning of 
previous WTO disputes under DSU Article 21.3(b) and DSU Article 21.3(c) 
have shown that economic status and development level of parties are 
relevantly more taken into consideration by the parties under DSU Article 
21.3(b) compared to DSU Article 21.3(c). Moreover, even though providing 
special and differential treatment to developing countries and degree of such 
treatment may differ in each dispute, overall, arbitrators are consistent in 
applying very conservative interpretation of relationship between DSU Article 
21.2 and Article 21.3(c). Thus, it was found that special attention to 
developing countries is not granted easily and consistently under the current 
dispute settlement system, especially when complainant is a developing 
country under DSU Article 21.3(c).
     Regarding the second factor, it is concluded that protection level of 
product at issue of respondent and complainant country does not affect 
length of RPT under  both DSU Article 21.3(b) and Article 21.3(c). 
     As for the third factor, it has been found that the duration of RPT for 
disputes requiring legislative means of implementation were much longer than 
those requiring administrative means of implementation. Furthermore, statistical 
analysis found that means of implementation is a critical factor to be taken in 
to account in determining RPT, under both DSU Article 21.3(b) and 21.3(c). 
     Last but not least, regarding relationship between the duration of RPT 
and effect from violation of certain WTO covered agreements, RPT from 
disputes addressing violation of trade remedy agreements turned out to be 
shorter than those covering violation of non-trade remedy agreements. 
However, it is difficult to say such difference is due to violation of 
different WTO covered agreement, but more due to the type of means of 
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implementation adopted for compliance, since most of those disputes dealing 
with violation of trade remedy agreements required administrative means of 
implementation to comply with the WTO law. 
2. Implications : Suggestions for WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure
     Even though the current dispute settlement procedure has accomplished 
significant improvement from that of GATT by establishing a single 
compulsory mechanism of dispute settlement for all WTO covered 
agreements, reverse-consensus rule for the establishment of panel and 
adoption of reports, and standing Appellate Body,202 this study found that 
there are still some areas left for improvement within the current system. 
2.1 Process of RPT Determination for Developing Countries
     The very existence of a compulsory multilateral dispute settlement 
system is itself a particular benefit for developing countries and small 
Members, allowing all Members to have equal access in which decisions are 
made on the basis of rules rather than on the basis of economic power, 
empowering developing countries and smaller economies to stand on a more 
equal footing with developed and larger economies.203 Nevertheless, this 
study found that special attention or favorable treatment is not easily granted 
in practice in determining length of RPT especially under DSU Article 
21.3(c) and in order to protect its interests as developing countries via 
receiving special attention or differential treatment under the current system, 
developing countries, first, have to overcome various obstacles, including 
lack of experts and financial infrastructure to initiate and to participate in 
202 David Evans and Celso de Tarso Pereira, "DSU Review : A View from the Inside," in 
Key Issues in WTO Dispute Settlement : The First Ten Years, ed. Rufus Yerxa and Bruce 
Wilson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 252.
203 WTO Secretariat, A Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 109.
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litigation within international organization. In addition to these burdens, 
developing countries face another burden under DSU Article 21.3(c). 
     The arbitrators imposed that in order to receive special attention or 
treatment as a developing Member, the party itself shall provide supporting 
evidence and explanation exhibiting how their interest as developing country 
would be negatively affected due to short or long reasonable period of time. 
Unfortunately, however, arbitrators have never been clear on how much and 
of what additional information developing countries needs to submit to 
receive special attention or treatment in determining RPT. Thus, in order to 
establish a reliable and secure dispute settlement system, it would be helpful 
if arbitrators would provide lucid guideline on what additional information 
or further elaboration is needed from developing countries. Furthermore, in 
order to prevent abuse of special treatment via favorable duration of 
reasonable period of time by developing countries, it is pertinent for dispute 
settlement system to establish clear guidelines and standard on defining 
which countries would be qualified as developing countries, when favorable 
treatment would be granted to these countries, and also define exactly how 
such factor would be reflected in determining duration of RPT.  
2.2 Arbitrator's Mandate
     It has been found that the arbitrator's sole task is to determine the 
reasonable period of time for implementation and that it is not within 
arbitrators mandate to determine the ways and means of implementation, 
which is left to the discretion of the implementing Member. However, in 
order to balance the needs of implementing and complaining party in 
relation to RPT, it is still pertinent for arbitrators to have more information 
and understanding regarding potential implementing measures available for 
the respondent. Thus, even though choosing ways and means of 
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implementation shall remain as discretion for the respondent, i) establishment 
of additional process within current dispute settlement system, guaranteeing 
information sessions for arbitrator to hear more about the possible 
implementing measures with sufficient and realistic time frame for them to 
review, or ii) refining arbitrator's mandate to have right to request for more 
information on compliance measures available to respondent, or even 
possibly iii) allowing arbitrator to provide non-binding suggestions on ways 
and means of implementation could be possible options to improve reliability 
of current dispute settlement system.
2.3 Ambiguous Reasonable Period of Time
     Even though arbitrators provide explanation on how they have 
determined the duration of final RPT in Award of the Arbitrator reports, it 
is still not clear how much of what factor and standard were actually 
considered in calculating certain length of RPT. Such silence may have been 
convenient for the arbitrator, allowing him to avoid debates regarding 
whether he attached either too much or too little importance to the specific 
factor.204 However, such aspect has left RPT to be ambiguous, subjective, 
and untransparent, thus drifting away from DSU's purpose of securing 
objectivity and predictability within the dispute settlement system. By 
allowing Member countries to be aware of what arbitrators have considered 
for "particular circumstances" in previous disputes to determine the length of 
RPT, parties can expect something more than mere speculation regarding 
RPT. Thus, improving the contents of be included in Award of the 
Arbitrator report would significantly help Members to learn lessons regarding 
RPT from previous arbitrations. 
204 Alvarez-Jimenez, "A Reasonable Period of Time for Dispute Settlement Implementation: 
An Operative Interpretation for Developing Country Complainants," 460.
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2.4 Defining the "Impracticality" 
    As briefly mentioned in Section III on overview of DSU Article 21.3, 
RPT for implementation is not available unconditionally to an implementing 
Member.205 Rather, an implementing Member is entitled to a RPT only 
when "it is impracticable to comply immediately with the recommendation 
and ruling of the DSB."206 However, the legal text of DSU Article 21.3 
does not provide clear guideline on how to judge certain circumstances to 
be impracticable (emphasis added) for the losing party to immediately 
comply to the recommendation and ruling of the DSB, i.e., leave such 
judgment to arbitrator's discretion. In other words, the current system leaves 
a room for losing party to simply state that it needs a RPT to comply in 
order to avoid immediate compliance due to impracticality.207 Since such 
openness of DSU may permit application of subjective and ambiguous 
standard to determine impracticality of circumstances that losing party is 
facing, thus resulting in unpredictable and unstable conferment of RPT, it is 
pertinent to establish specific guidelines on which circumstances would be 
considered as impracticable for immediate compliance by the losing party.   
     
2.5 Burden of Complainant 
     Interestingly, under the current dispute settlement system, the 
complaining party must initiate and engage in the procedural stages available 
under the DSU to bring about the implementation of the report.208 Basically, 
even though complainant wins the dispute against an implementing party 
205 Award of the Arbitrator, US－Offset Act (Article 21.3(c)), para. 40.
206 DSU, Article 21.3.
207 Gambardella and Rovetta, "Reasonable Period of Time to Comply with WTO Rulings: 
Need to Do More for Developing Countries?," 101.
208 Brendan McGivern, "Implementation of Panel and Appellate Body Rulings : An 
Overview," in Key Issues in WTO Dispute Settlement : The First Ten Years, ed. Rufus Yerxa 
and Bruce Wilson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 100.
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who have violated WTO provisions, complainant has to bear significant 
amount of burden in order to receive compensation from its counterpart for 
damaging complainant country's benefits or interests. For instance, if parties 
of dispute cannot reach an agreement on RPT under DSU Article 21.3(b), 
both complainant and respondent have to go through DSU Article 21.3(c). If 
respondent fails to undertake any implementation, complainant has to initiate 
recourse of dispute settlement procedure under DSU Article 21.5. If WTO 
inconsistent measure continues to exist even after recourse under DSU 
Article 21.5, the complainant may ask for compensation or retaliate under 
DSU Article 22.6.209 
     On the other hand, unlike the complainant, surprisingly few interim 
requirements are imposed upon losing member between the time when the 
losing member must inform the DSB of its intentions in respect of 
implementation of the recommendation and rulings of the DSB and the time 
the member's reasonable period expires many months later.210 The member is 
not required to identify the measures it will seek to remove or implement, 
nor is it required to specify any sort of implementation schedule or even 
consult with a winning party who may be concerned about whether the 
implementation period is being used in good faith.211 The only intervening 
obligation of the losing members is that it provide a "status report" at 
regular intervals, beginning six months into the reasonable period, which can 
be as specific or vague as the losing member elects to make it.212  
     Overall, the current dispute settlement system appears to be extremely 
odd, since the winning party has to bear most of the burden to seek for 
solution in every step of the way, while the losing party as the actual 
violator of WTO provision does not have to bear any punitive actions or 
209 Ibid., pg. 106.
210 Gleason and Walther, "The WTO Dispute Settlement Implementation Procedures: A 




burdens from initiating complicated procedures. Therefore, it would be 
necessary to restructure the overall dispute settlement process to reduce the 
amount of burden beared by the complainant, while imposing procedural 
requirements to losing party by mandating communication with the winning 
party on regular basis or requiring losing party to specifically list every 
action they have engaged for implementation in status reports.  
     Even though current dispute settlement has achieved significant 
improvements compared to previous GATT dispute settlement by establishing 
rule oriented system with detailed procedure and time frame in every step 
of the way, a lot of work could be done to improve the current system 
which provides transparent guideline for the WTO Members' to achieve 
prompt compliance, moving closer to trade liberalization. Thus, Members 
shall continue to raise their voice via various communication channels 
available, including the on going Review Negotiations on how to improve 
and clarify implementation provision and procedures within the WTO dispute 
settlement system. 
3. Limitations and Suggestions for Future Study 
     Despite its achievements, there were some limitations in this study. 
First of all, regarding analysis on Factor 1, which investigated the 
relationship between duration of RPT and economic status of disputants, the 
current result might have been skewed due to higher participation rate of 
developed countries in WTO dispute settlement system than developing 
countries, offering overwhelmingly more data available for developed 
countries. Thus, different result may come out once developing countries 
become more active within the current dispute settlement system. 
     For Factor 2, each product at issue of a dispute received either 4-digit 
or 6-digit HS Code, indicating the statistical result may contain minor errors 
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due to adopting two different digits in finding HS Code. Since tariff rate 
was also found based on the HS Code, minor statistical gap could also exist 
in tariff rate. 
     Moreover, this study did not observe effect on RPT from multiple 
factors combined together. This study only focused on one-on-one 
relationship between a single factor with duration of a single set of RPT. 
However, since arbitrators consider multiple factors together in determining 
RPT in practice, future studies could focus on analyzing effect from 
multiple factors on duration of RPT, reflecting the reality of RPT 
determination.   
4. Significance of this Study 
 
     This study upholds significant value as a research on RPT for five 
reasons. First, as the first study to apply statistical method of correlation 
and regression analysis on RPT from both DSU Article 21.3(b) and Article 
21.3(c), this study generated a meaningful database on 81 disputes under 
DSU Article 21.3(b) and 27 disputes under Article 21.3(c). Creating a 
database with GNI/capita of respondent and complainant, HS Code for 
product at issue, MFN tariff rate for those products, and other variables for 
each dispute and utilizing these wide range of data was a challenging but 
meaningful task. 
     Secondly, this study raised two additional factors that have not been 
discussed in the previous literatures nor Award of the Arbitrator report: 
protection level of product at issue measured in tariff rate and effect from 
violation of certain WTO covered agreement(s) on duration of RPT. Since 
these two factors were found to have no relationship with duration of RPT, 
such result implies that these two factors can be added to the list of factors 
that are rejected by the arbitrators to be considered in determining RPT, 
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including structural adjustment, commercial harm, and political 
contentiousness. 
     Moreover, statistical analysis in this study found some significant 
patterns in determining RPT under DSU Article 21.3(b) and Article 21.3(c). 
Since most of the arbitrators have adopted or re-interpreted what has been 
established in previous Award of the Arbitrator reports, Members could gain 
meaningful information on determining RPT. For instance, one of the 
analysis of this research found that RPT from disputes challenged by a 
developing complaining party against developed implementing party would 
be shorter under DSU Article 21.3(b) than Article 21.3(c), indicating that it 
is more efficient to reach agreement with its counterpart on determining 
RPT, rather than exhausting precious time on finalizing RPT and end up 
receiving long RPT by the Arbitrator under DSU Article 21.3(c), which 
would only extend the period of WTO inconsistent measure to be in place. 
Thus, the result of this study would be useful for Members of WTO 
involved in trade disputes. 
     Furthermore, this study also pointed out potential areas to be improved 
within the current dispute settlement system, which would be helpful for 
current system to accomplish its objective of providing security and 
predictability in multilateral trading system.
     Last but not least, it is pertinent to note that the very existence of 
dispute settlement system and having an international organization like WTO 
to enforce rules and provisions in multilateral trading system would be 
meaningless if proper and prompt compliance mechanism is not established. 
Thus, more studies shall be conducted not only on reasonable time period 
for implementation, but also on overall compliance and implementation issue 
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Appendix 1. Text from Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing 
the Settlement of Disputes
: Key Provisions
Article 3. General Provisions
1. Members affirm their adherence to the principles for the management of disputes 
heretofore applied under Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1947, and the rules and 
procedures as further elaborated and modified herein.
2. The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing 
security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members recognize 
that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered 
agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance 
with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Recommendations 
and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations 
provided in the covered agreements.
3. The prompt settlement of situations in which a Member considers that any 
benefits accruing to it directly or indirectly under the covered agreements are being 
impaired by measures taken by another Member is essential to the effective 
functioning of the WTO and the maintenance of a proper balance
between the rights and obligations of Members.
Article 19. Panel and Appellate Body Recommendations
1. Where a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent 
with a covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned213 bring 
the measure into conformity with that agreement.214 In addition to its 
recommendations, the panel or Appellate Body may suggest ways in which the 
Member concerned could implement the recommendations.
2. In accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 3, in their findings and 
recommendations, the panel and Appellate Body cannot add to or diminish the 
rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.
Article 21. Surveillance of Implementation of Recommendations and Rulings
1. Prompt compliance with recommendations or rulings of the DSB is essential in 
order to ensure effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all Members.
2. Particular attention should be paid to matters affecting the interests of developing 
country Members with respect to measures which have been subject to dispute 
settlement.
213 The "Member concerned" is the party to the dispute to which the panel or Appellate 
Body recommendations are directed.
214 With respect to recommendations in cases not involving a violation of GATT 1994 or 
any other covered agreement, see Article 26. 
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3. At a DSB meeting held within 30 days215 after the date of adoption of the panel 
or Appellate Body report, the Member concerned shall inform the DSB of its 
intentions in respect of implementation of the recommendations and rulings of the 
DSB. If it is impracticable to comply immediately with the recommendations and 
rulings, the Member concerned shall have a reasonable period of time in which to 
do so. The reasonable period of time shall be:
(a) the period of time proposed by the Member concerned, provided that such  
period is approved by the DSB; or, in the absence of such approval,
(b) a period of time mutually agreed by the parties to the dispute within 45 days 
after the date of adoption of the recommendations and rulings; or, in the 
absence of such agreement,
(c) a period of time determined through binding arbitration within 90 days after the 
date of adoption of the recommendations and rulings.216 In such arbitration, a 
guideline for the arbitrator217 should be that the reasonable period of time to 
implement panel or Appellate Body recommendations should not exceed 15 
months from the date of adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report. 
However, that time may be shorter or longer, depending upon the particular 
circumstances.
4. Except where the panel or the Appellate Body has extended, pursuant to 
paragraph 9 of Article 12 or paragraph 5 of Article 17, the time of providing its 
report, the period from the date of establishment of the panel by the DSB until the 
date of determination of the reasonable period of time shall not exceed 15 months 
unless the parties to the dispute agree otherwise. Where either the panel or the 
Appellate Body has acted to extend the time of providing its report, the additional 
time taken shall be added to the 15－month period; provided that unless the parties 
to the dispute agree that there are exceptional circumstances, the total time shall not 
exceed 18 months.
215 If a meeting of the DSB is not scheduled during this period, such a meeting of the DSB 
shall be held for this purpose.
216 If the parties cannot agree on an arbitrator within ten days after referring the matter to 
arbitration, the arbitrator shall be appointed by the Director General within ten days, after 
consulting the parties.
217 The expression "arbitrator" shall be interpreted as referring either to an individual or a 
group.
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Appendix 2. Text from Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing 
the Settlement of Disputes
: On Special Attention for Developing Countries
Article 3. General Provisions
12. Notwithstanding paragraph 11, if a complaint based on any of the covered 
agreements is brought by a developing country Member against a developed country 
Member, the complaining party shall have the right to invoke, as an alternative to 
the provisions contained in Articles 4, 5, 6 and 12 of this Understanding, the 
corresponding provisions of the Decision of 5 April 1966 (BISD 14S/18), except 
that where the Panel considers that the time－frame provided for in paragraph 7 of 
that Decision is insufficient to provide its report and with the agreement of the 
complaining party, that time－frame may be extended. To the extent that there is a 
difference between the rules and procedures of Articles 4, 5, 6 and 12 and the 
corresponding rules and procedures of the Decision, the latter shall prevail.
Article 4. Consultations
10. During consultations Members should give special attention to the particular 
problems and interests of developing country Members.
Article 8. Composition of Panels
10. When a dispute is between a developing country Member and a developed 
country Member the panel shall, if the developing country Member so requests, 
include at least one panelist from a developing country Member.
Article 12. Panel Procedures
10. In the context of consultations involving a measure taken by a developing 
country Member, the parties may agree to extend the periods established in 
paragraphs 7 and 8 of Article 4. If, after the relevant period has elapsed, the 
consulting parties cannot agree that the consultations have concluded, the Chairman 
of the DSB shall decide, after consultation with the parties, whether to extend the 
relevant period and, if so, for how long. In addition, in examining a complaint 
against a developing countryMember, the panel shall accord sufficient time for the 
developing country Member to prepare and present its argumentation. The provisions 
of paragraph 1 of Article 20 and paragraph 4 of Article 21 are not affected by any 
action pursuant to this paragraph.
11. Where one or more of the parties is a developing country Member, the panel's 
report shall explicitly indicate the form in which account has been taken of relevant 
provisions on differential and more－favourable treatment for developing country 
Members that form part of the covered agreements which have been raised by the 
developing country Member in the course of the dispute settlement procedures.
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Article 21. Surveillance of Implementation of Recommendations and Rulings
2. Particular attention should be paid to matters affecting the interests of developing 
country Members with respect to measures which have been subject to dispute 
settlement.
7. If the matter is one which has been raised by a developing country Member, the 
DSB shall consider what further action it might take which would be appropriate to 
the circumstances.
8. If the case is one brought by a developing country Member, in considering what 
appropriate action might be taken, the DSB shall take into account not only the 
trade coverage of measures complained of, but also their impact on the economy of 
developing country Members concerned.
Article 24. Special Procedures Involving Least－Developed Country Members
1. At all stages of the determination of the causes of a dispute and of dispute 
settlement procedures involving a least－developed country Member, particular 
consideration shall be given to the special situation of least－developed country 
Members. In this regard, Members shall exercise due restraint in raising matters 
under these procedures involving a least－developed country Member. If nullification 
or impairment is found to result from a measure taken by a least－developed 
country Member, complaining parties shall exercise due restraint in asking for 
compensation or seeking authorization to suspend the application of concessions or 
other obligations pursuant to these procedures.
2. In dispute settlement cases involving a least－developed country Member, where 
a satisfactory solution has not been found in the course of consultations the Director
－General or the Chairman of the DSB shall, upon request by a least－developed 
country Member offer their good offices, conciliation and mediation with a view to 
assisting the parties to settle the dispute, before a request for a panel is made. The 
Director－General or the Chairman of the DSB, in providing the above assistance, 
may consult any source which either deems appropriate.
Article 27. Responsibilities of the Secretariat
2. While the Secretariat assists Members in respect of dispute settlement at their 
request, there may also be a need to provide additional legal advice and assistance 
in respect of dispute settlement to developing country Members. To this end, the 
Secretariat shall make available a qualified legal expert from the WTO technical 
cooperation services to any developing country Member which so requests. This 
expert shall assist the developing country Member in a manner ensuring the 
continued impartiality of the Secretariat.
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DS# Decision Agreed RPT
1 2 U.S.－Gasoline 15 months
2 31 Canada－Periodicals 15 months
3 34 Turkey－Textiles 15 months
4 50 India－Patents (U.S.) 15 months
5 56 Argentina－Textiles 242 days
6 58 U.S.－Shrimp 13 months
7 69 EC－Poultry 8 months, 8 days
8 76 Japan－Agricultural Products II 9 months, 12 days
9 79 India－Patents (EC) 6 months, 27 days
10 90 India－QRs 18 months, 8 days
11 98 Korea－Dairy 4 months, 8 days
12 99 U.S.－DRAMS 8 months
13 103, 113 Canada－Dairy 14 months, 4 days
14 122 Thailand－H-Beams 6 months, 15 days
15 132 Mexico－Corn Syrup 6 months, 27 days
16 141 EC－Bed Linen 5 months, 2 days
17 146, 175 India－Autos 5 months
18 161, 169 Korea－Beef 8 months
19 166 U.S.－Wheat Gluten Safeguards 4 months, 14 days
20 174, 290 EC－Trademarks / Gis 11 months, 2 weeks
21 176 U.S.－Section 211(“Havana Club”) 11 months
22 177, 178 U.S.－Lamb Safeguards 6 months
23 179 U.S.－Sheet/Plate from Korea 7 months
24 189 Argentina－Floor Tiles 5 months
25 202 U.S.－Line Pipe Safeguards 5 months, 23 days
26 204 Mexico－Telecoms 13 months
27 206 U.S.－India Steel Plate 5 months
28 211 Egypt－Rebar 9 months
29 212 U.S.－CVDs on EC Products 10 months
30 219 EC－Pipe Fittings 7 months
31 231 EC－Sardines 6 months
32 238 Argentina－Peach Safeguards 8 months, 15 days
33 245 Japan－Apples 6 months, 20 days
34 257 U.S.－Lumber CVDs Final(“Lumber IV”) 10 months
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37 277 U.S.－Lumber ITC Investigation (“Lumber VI”) 9 months
38 282 U.S.－OCTG AD Measures 6 months
39 291,292,293 EC－Biotech Products ("GMOs") 12 months
40 294 U.S.－"Zeroing" of Dumping Margins 11 months
41 295 Mexico－Rice AD Measures218 12 months/8 months
42 296 U.S.－DRAMS CVD Investigation 7 months, 16 days
43 299 EC－DRAMS Countervailing   Measures 8 months
44 302 Dominican Republic－Cigarettes 24 months
45 308 Mexico－Taxes on Soft Drinks219 9 months, 8 days10 months, 7 days
46 312 Korea－Paper AD Duties 8 months
47 322 U.S.－"Zeroing" (Japan) 11 months
48 331 Mexico－Steel Pipes and Tubes 6 months
59 334 Turkey－Rice 6 months
50 335 U.S.－Shrimp AD Measure (Ecuador) 6 months
51 337 EC－Salmon AD Measure 10 months
52 339,340,342 China－Auto Parts 7 months, 20 days
53 343 U.S.－Shrimp (Thailand) 8 months
54 345 U.S.－Customs Bond Directive 8 months
55 350 U.S.－Continued Zeroing 10 months
56 362 China－IP Rights 12 months
57 363 China－Publications and Audiovisual Products 14 months
58 367 Australia－Apples 9 months
59 371 Thailand－Cigarettes (Philippines)220 10 months/15months
60 375,376,377 EC－IT Products 9 months, 9 days
61 379 U.S.－AD & CVD (China) 11 months
62 381 U.S.－Tuna II   (Mexico) 13 months
63 382 U.S.－Orange Juice (Brazil) 9 months
64 383 U.S.－AD on Carrier Bags 6 months
65 397 EC－Fasteners 14 months, 2 weeks
66 394,395,398 China－Raw Materials 10 months, 9 days
67 396, 403 Philippines－Distilled Spirits 13 months, 16 days
68 400, 401 EC－Seal Products 16 months
69 402 U.S.－Zeroing (Korea)221 8 months/ 9 months
70 404 U.S.－Shrimp (Viet Nam) 10 months
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74 413 China－Electronic Payment 11 months
75 415, 416417, 418
Dominican Republic－Bag & Fabric 
Safeguards 2 months, 1 week
76 422 U.S.－Shrimp and Sawblades 8 months
77 425 China－X-Ray Equipment 9 months, 25 days
78 427 China－Broiler Products 9 months, 14 days
79 431,432,433 China－Rare Earths 8 months, 3 days
80 436 U.S.－Carbon Steel (India) 15 months
81 449 U.S.－CVD & AD (China) 12 months
218 With respect to the DSB's recommendations and rulings regarding paragraphs 8.1 and 8.3 of 
the Panel Report (WT/DS295/R) and paragraph 350(b) and (c) of the Appellate Body Report 
(WT/DS295/AB/R), the reasonable period of time shall be 8 months, expiring on 20 August 
2006. With respect to the DSB's recommendations and rulings regarding paragraph 8.5 of the 
Panel Report (WT/DS295/R), and paragraph 350(d) of the Appellate Body Report 
(WT/DS295/AB/R), the reasonable period of time shall be 12 months, expiring on 20 December 
2006. (Agreement under Article 21.3(b) of the DSU WT/DS295/12 (24 May 2006)).
219 On 3 July 2006, Mexico and the United States informed the DSB that they had mutually 
agreed that the reasonable period of time for Mexico to comply with the DSB recommendations 
and rulings shall be nine months and eight days, expiring on 1 January 2007. However, if the 
Mexican Congress enacts legislation between 1 December and 31 December 2006, the 
reasonable period of time shall be ten months and seven days, expiring on 31 January 2007.
220 With respect to the DSB's recommendation and rulings regarding paragraphs 8.3(b) and (c) of 
the panel report, the reasonable period of time to comply shall be 15 months, expiring on 15 
October 2012. With respect to the DSB's recommendation and rulings regarding all other 
measures, the reasonable period of time to comply shall be 10 months, expiring on 15 May 
2012.
221 With respect to the calculation of certain margins of dumping in the Diamond Sawblades and 
Parts Thereof, the reasonable period of time shall be 8 months, expiring on 24 October 2011. 
With respect to the calculation of certain margins of dumping in the Stainless Steel Plate in 
Coils and Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils investigations, the reasonable period of time 




Country # of  Disputes Avg. RPT Country
# of   
Disputes Avg. RPT
Argentina 3 7.19 Argentina 1 12.00
Australia 1 9.00 Australia 2 7.00
Canada 4 12.24 Brazil 3 8.09
China 8 9.61 Canada 6 10.36
Dominican 
Republic 2 6.59 Chile 1 10.18
EC 12 10.22 China 6 10.18
Egypt 1 9.00 Chinese Taipei 1 9.30
India 4 10.03 Costa Rica 1 2.33
Japan 2 8.03 EC 15 8.57
Korea 3 7.07 Ecuador 1 6.00
Mexico 5 9.34 El Salvador 1 2.23
Philippines 1 13.53 Guatemala 2 4.12
Thailand 2 8.25 Honduras 2 13.12
Turkey 2 10.50 India 6 10.18
















Appendix 4. RPT & Number of Disputes Participated by the Respondent 
and Complainant under DSU Article 21.3(b)
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DS# Decision Proposed RPT(Respondent)
Proposed RPT
(Complainant) Agreed RPT
1 8, 10, 11 Japan–Alcohol 23 months 15 months/ 5 months 15 months
2 18 Australia–Salmon 15 months Less than 15 months 8 months
3 26, 48 EC–Hormones 39 months 10 months 15 months
4 27 EC–Bananas 15 months, 1 week 9 months 15 months, 1 week
5 54,55,59,64 Indonesia–Autos222 15 months 6 months/1 months 12 months/6 months
6 75, 84 Korea–Alcohol 15 months 6 months 11 months, 2 weeks
7 87, 110 Chile–Alcohol 18 months 8 months 9 days 14 months, 9 days
8 114 Canada–Pharmaceuticals 11 months Less than 12 months 6 months
9 139, 142 Canada–Autos223 11 months, 12 days 90 days 90 days / 8 months
10 136, 162 U.S.–1916 Act 15 months 6 months 10 days/ 6 months 10 months
11 155 Argentina–Bovine Hides 46 months, 15 days 8 months 12 months, 12 days
12 160 U.S.–Copyright Act 15 months 10 months 12 months
13 170 Canada–Patent Term 14 months 2 days 6 months 10 months
14 184 U.S.－Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan 18 months 10 months 15 months
15 207 Chile－Agricultural Products 18 months 9 months 6 days 14 months
16 217, 234 U.S.－Offset Act ("Byrd Amendment") 15 months 6 months 11 months
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17 246 EC－Tariff Preferences 20 months 10 days 6 months 2 weeks 14 months 11 days
18 265,266,283 EC－Sugar Subsidies 19 months 12 days 6 months 6 days 12 months 3 days
19 268 U.S.－OCTG Sunset Reviews 15 months 7 months 12 months
20 269, 286 EC－Chicken Cuts 26 months 5 months 10 days/ 6 months 9 months
21 285 U.S.－Gambling Services 15 months 6 months1 months 11 months 2 weeks
22 332 Brazil－Tyres 21 months 10 months 12 months
23 336 Japan－DRAMS CVDs 15 months 5 months 8 months 2 weeks
24 344 U.S.－Mexican Stainless Steel AD Measures 15 months 7 months 11 months 10 days
25 366 Colombia－Ports of Entry 15 months 4 months 19 days 8 months 15 days
26 384, 386 U.S.－COOL 18 months 6 months/ 8 months 10 months
27 414 China－GOES 19 months 4 months 1 week 8 months, 15 days
222 Indonesia received two set of RPT : 1) 12 months under DSU Article 21.3(c) and 2) 6 months under SCM Article 7.9 (Indonesia－Autos 
Report of the Panel Paras. 15.1－15.4)
223 Canada received two sets of RPT : 1) 10 months under DSU Article 21.3(c) and 2) 90 days under SCM Article 4.7 (Canada－Autos 
Report of the Panel Paras. 7.258－7.260 ; 11.4－11.7)
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Respondent Complainant
Country # of   Disputes Avg. RPT Country
# of   
Disputes Avg. RPT
Argentina 1 12.40




Australia 1 8.00 Argentina 2 13.00
Brazil 1 12.00 Australia 2 11.55
Canada 3 8.00 Brazil 3 10.70
Chile 2 14.15 Canada 5 11.80
China 1 8.50 Chile 1 11.00
Colombia 1 8.50 EC 11 11.29
EC 5 13.14 Ecuador 1 15.23
Indonesia 1 12.00 Guatemala 1 15.23
Japan 2 11.73 Honduras 1 15.23
Korea 1 11.47 India 2 12.68
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2 U.S.－Gasoline US Developed 30506.67 Venezuela Developing 3086.67 15 months
31 Canada－Periodicals Canada Developed 20843.33 US Developed 31323.33 15 months
34 Turkey－Textiles Turkey Developing 3710 India Developing 443.33 15 months
50 India－Patents (U.S.) India Developing 430 US Developed 32346.67 15 months
56 Argentina－Textiles Argentina Developing 7910 US Developed 32346.67 242 days






69 EC－Poultry EC Developed 19701.32 Brazil Developing 4683.33 8 months 8 days
76 Japan－Agricultural   Products II Japan Developed 33760 US Developed 33783.33 9 months 12 days
79 India－Patents (EC) India Developing 430 EC Developed 19701.32 6 months 27 days
90 India－QRs India Developing 443.33 US Developed 33783.33 18 months 8 days
98 Korea－Dairy Korea Developing 10846.67 EC Developed 19278.80 4 months 8 days
99 U.S.－DRAMS US Developed 33783.33 Korea Developing 10343.33 8 months
103
Canada－Dairy Canada Developed 21513.33
US Developed 33783.33
14 months 4 days
113 New Zealand Developed 14826.67
122 Thailand－H-Beams Thailand Developing 1920 Poland Developing 4786.67 6 months 15 days
132 Mexico－Corn Syrup Mexico Developing 5633.33 US Developed 35286.67 6 months 27 days
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141 EC－Bed Linen EC Developed 19007.96 India Developing 466.67 5 months 2 days
146
India－Autos India Developing 490 EC Developed 19512.16 5 months
175 US Developed 37856.67
161
Korea－Beef Korea Developed 11616.67 US Developed 36470 8 months
169 Australia Developed 20393.33
166 U.S.－Wheat Gluten Safeguards US Developed 36470 EC Developed 19007.96 4 months 14 days
174
290 EC－Trademarks/Gis EC Developed 28658.22 US Developed 45736.67 11 months 2 weeks
176 U.S.－Section 211 US Developed 37856.67 EC Developed 19152.16 11 months
177
U.S.－Lamb Safeguards US Developed 36470
New 
Zealand Developed 13853.33 6 months
178 Australia Developed 20393.33
179 U.S.－Sheet/Plate from Korea US Developed 36470 Korea Developed 11616.67 7 months
189 Argentina－Floor Tiles Argentina Developing 6173.33 EC Developed 19007.97 5 months
202 U.S.－Line Pipe Safeguards US Developed 37856.67 Korea Developed 12486.67 5 months 23 days
204 Mexico－Telecoms Mexico Developing 7250 US Developed 43256.67 13 months
206 U.S.－India Steel Plate US Developed 37856.67 India Developing 490 5 months
211 Egypt－Rebar Egypt Developing 1416.67 Turkey Developing 3586.67 9 months
212 U.S.－CVDs on EC Products US Developed 40256.67 EC Developed 21712.39 10 months
219 EC－Pipe Fittings EC Developed 21712.39 Brazil Developing 3103.33 7 months
231 EC－Sardines EC Developed 19512.16 Peru Developing 1973.33 6 months
238 Argentina－Peach Safeguards Argentina Developing 4375 Chile Developing 4783.33 8 months 15 days
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245 Japan－Apples Japan Developed 34970 US Developed 40256.67 6 months 20 days
257 U.S.－Lumber CVDs Final ("Lumber IV") US Developed 43256.67 Canada Developed 29460 10 months
264
U.S.－Final Lumber AD 
Determination ("Lumber 
V")
US Developed 43256.67 Canada Developed 29460 7 months, 15 days
276 Canada－Wheat Canada Developed 29460 US Developed 43256.67 10 months 5 days
277 U.S.－Lumber ITC Investigation ("Lumber VI") US Developed 43256.67 Canada Developed 29460 9 months
282 U.S.－OCTG US Developed 45736.67 Mexico Developing 7733.33 6 months
291
EC－Biotech Products 
("GMOs") EC Developed 31316.99
US Developed 47416.67
12 months292 Canada Developed 37596.67
293 Argentina Developing 5855
294 U.S.－"Zeroing" of Dumping Margins (EC) US Developed 47416.67 EC Developed 31316.99 11 months
295 Mexico－Rice AD Measures Mexico Developing 7733.33 US Developed 45736.67
12 months / 
8months
296 U.S.－DRAMS CVD Investigation US Developed 45736.67 Korea Developed 17810 7 months 16 days
299 EC－DRAMS Countervailing Measures EC Developed 28658.22 Korea Developed 17810 8 months
302 Dominican Republic － Cigarettes
Dominican 
Republic Developing 2923.33 Honduras Developing 1376.67 24 months
308 Mexico－Taxes on Soft Drinks Mexico Developing 7733.33 US Developed 45736.67
10 months 7 days
9 months 8 days
312 Korea－Paper AD Duties Korea Developed 17810 Indonesia Developing 1236.67 8 months
322 U.S.－"Zeroing" (Japan) US Developed 48570 Japan Developed 38043.33 11 months
331 Mexico－Steel Pipes and Tubes Mexico Developing 8810 Guatemala Developing 2436.67 6 months
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334 Turkey－Rice Turkey Developing 8453.33 US Developed 48570 6 months
335 U.S.－Shrimp AD Measures US Developed 48570 Ecuador Developing 3426.67 6 months
337 EC－Salmon AD   Measures EC Developed 34929.55 Norway Developed 82886.67 10 months
339
China－Auto Parts China Developing 3633.33
EC Developed 35563.01
7 months 20 days340 US Developed 49030
342 Canada Developed 44053.33
343 U.S.－Shrimp (Thailand) US Developed 48890 Thailand Developing 3630 8 months
345 U.S.－Customs Bond Directive US Developed 48890 India Developing 1060 8 months
350 U.S.－Continued Zeroing US Developed 49030 EC Developed 35563.01 10 months
362 China－IP Rights China Developing 3633.33 US Developed 49030 12 months
363 China－Publications and Audiovisual Products China Developing 4250 US Developed 49253.33 14 months
367 Australia－Apples Australia Developed 46850 New Zealand Developed 29886.67 9 months
371 Thailand－Cigarettes (Philippines) Thailand Developing 4730 Philippines Developing 2773.33
10 months
 / 15 months
375
EC－IT Products EC Developed 35448.21
US Developed 49253.33
9 months 9 days376 Japan Developed 41663.33





US Developed 50460 China Developing 4956.67 11 months
xl
381 U.S.－Tuna II (Mexico) US Developed 51913.33 China Developing 9553.33 13 months
382 U.S.－Orange Juice (Brazil) US Developed 50460 Mexico Developing 10620 9 months
383 U.S.－AD Measures on Carrier Bags US Developed 49253.33 Brazil Developing 4266.67 6 months
397 EC－Fasteners US Developed 35380.14 Thailand Developing 4956.67 14 months 2weeks
394
China－Raw Materials China Developing 5730
US Developed 51913.33
10 months 9 days395 EC Developed 35449.01
398 Mexico Developing 9553.33
396 Philippines－Distilled 
Spirits Philippines Developing 2773.33
EC Developed 35380.14
13 months 16 days
403 US Developed 50460
400
EC－Seal Products EC Developed 35025.65 Canada Developed 51388.60 16 months
401 Norway Developed 100952.4
402 U.S.－Zeroing (Korea) US Developed 50460 Korea Developed 22860 8 months/9months
404 U.S.－Shrimp (Vietnam) US Developed 50460 Vietnam Developing 1406.67 10 months
405 EU－Footwear (China) EU Developed 35449.01 China Developing 5730 7 months 19 days







426 EC Developed 35088.11







Costa Rica Developing 8716.67
2 months 1 week
416 Guatemala Developing 3123.33
417 Honduras Developing 2123.33
418 El Salvador Developing 3603.33
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422 U.S.－Shrimp and Sawblades US Developed 51913.33 China Developing 5730 8 months
425 China－X-Ray Equipment US Developing 6620.79 China Developed 35088.11 9 months 25 days
427 China－Broiler Products China Developing 6620.79 EC Developed 53356.06 9 months 14 days
431
China－Rare Earths China Developing 7066.18
US Developed 54074.08
8 months 3 days432 EU Developed 35025.65
433 Japan Developed 41394.79
436 U.S.－Carbon Steel (India) China Developed 54074.08 India Developing 1597.82 15 months
















Japan－Alcohol Japan Developed 40840.00
EC Developed 19550.48
15 months10 Canada Developed 20813.33
11 US Developed 30506.67
27 EC－Bananas EC Developed 19832.70
Ecuador Developing 2170.00






EC－Hormones EC Developed 19701.32 US Developed 32346.67 15 months
48 Canada Developed 21046.67
54
Indonesia－Autos Indonesia Developing 786.67
EC Developed 19701.32 12 months   
(DSU21.3(c))
/ 6 months   
(SCM 7.9)
55
64 Japan Developed 35176.67
59 US Developed 32346.67
18 Australia－Salmon Australia Developed 21720.00 Canada Developed 21046.67 8 months
75
Korea－Alcohol Korea Developing 10343.33
EC Developed 19510.61
11 months 2weeks
84 US Developed 33783.33
87
110 Chile－Alcohol Chile Developing 4863.33 EC Developed 19278.80 14 months 9 days
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114 Canada－Pharmaceuticals Canada Developed 22216.67 EC Developed 19278.80 6 months
139
Canada－Autos Canada Developed 22216.67
Japan Developed 34466.67 8 months (DSU 21.3(c))
/ 90 days 
(SCM 4.7)142 EC Developed 19278.80
160 U.S.－Copyright Act US Developed 35286.67 EC Developed 19278.80 12 months
136
U.S.－1916 Act US Developed 35286.67 EC Developed 19278.80 10 months
162 Japan Developed 34466.67
170 Canada－Patent Term Canada Developed 22216.67 US Developed 35286.67 10 months
155 Argentina－Bovine Hides Argentina Developing 6173.33 EC Developed 19007.96 12 months 12 days
184 U.S.－Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan US Developed 36470.00 Japan Developed 34773.33 15 months
207 Chile－Agricultural Products (Price Band) Chile Developing 4626.67 Argentina Developing 4906.67 14 months
217














246 EC－Tariff Preferences EC Developed 25244.90 India Developing 633.33 14 month 11 days
268 U.S.－OCTG US Developed 43256.67 Argentina Developing 4483.33 12 months
285 U.S.－Gambling US Developed 45736.67 Antigua Barbuda Developing 12103.33 11 months 2 weeks
265
EC－Sugar Subsidies EC Developed 28658.22
Australia Developed 29993.33
12 months 3 days266 Brazil Developing 4023.33
283 Thailand Developing 2620.00
269
EC－Chicken Cuts EC Developed 28658.22 Brazil Developing 4023.33 9 months
286 Thailand Developing 2620.00
336 Japan－DRAMS CVDs Japan Developed 38043.33 Korea Developed 21763.33 8 months 2 weeks
332 Brazil－Tyres Brazil Developing 6126.67 EC Developed 33548.70 12 months
344 US－Mexican Stainless Steel AD Measures US Developed 48890.00 Mexico Developing 8906.67 11 months 10 days
366 Colombia－Ports of Entry Colombia Developing 5056.67 Panama Developing 7560.00 8 months 15 days
384
US－COOL US Developed 51913.33 Canada Developed 49903.33 10 months
386 Mexico Developing 9553.33
414 China－GOES China Developing 5730.00 US Developed 51913.33 8 months 15 days
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# Decision Product at Issue HS Code
Respondent Complainants
Agreed RPT







2710 US 6.40% Venezuela 10.00% 15 months
31 Canada－Periodicals Periodicals 4902 Canada 0.00% US 0.30% 15 months





















3008 India 36.23% US 0.529% 15 months
56 Argentina－Textiles Textile and apparel 51~64 Argentina 16.37% US 9.25% 242 days
58 U.S.－Shrimp
Shrimp and shrimp 









69 EC－Poultry Frozen poultry 0207 EC 6.13% Brazil 13.00% 8 months 8 days
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76 Japan－Agricultural Products II
















as provided under 
TRIPS Art. 27
3001~3006
3808 India 34.86% EC 0.88% 6 months 27 days
90 India－QRs
Imported products 
subject to India's 
import restrictions: 
2,714 tariff lines 
within the eight 
digit level of HS 
96 India 41.17% US 4.48% 18 months 8 days
98 Korea－Dairy 





1901 Korea 32.84% EC 13.60% 4 months 8 days
99 U.S.－DRAMS DRAMs from Korea 8542 US 0.000% Korea 0.667% 8 months
103




14 months 4 days
113 New Zealand 1.96%
122 Thailand－H-Beams H－beams 7216 Thailand 12.37% Poland 10.67% 6 months 15 days
132 Mexico－Corn Syrup
High－fructose corn
syrup grades 42 & 55
170240
170260 Mexico 18.00% US 5.70% 6 months 27 days
xlvii
141 EC－Bed Linen Cotton－type bed linen imports 6302 EC 11.44% India 33.80% 5 months 2 days
146














8 months169 Australia 0.00%















EC 2.87% US 1.38% 11 months 2weeks
176 U.S.－Section 211 ("Havana Club")
Trademarks or trade 
names related to 
confiscated goods
Not 
Applicable US N/A EC N/A 11 months
177 U.S.－Lamb   
Safeguards
Fresh, chilled and 
frozen lamb meat 0204 US 0.00%
New 
Zealand 0.00% 6 months
178 Australia 0.00%
179 U.S.－Sheet/Plate from Korea
Stainless steel plate in 
coils and stainless 
steel sheet and strip
7219
7220 US 5.67% Korea 2.85% 7 months
189 Argentina－Floor Tiles
Imports of ceramic  
 floors tiles 6904 Argentina 13.83% EC 2.00% 5 months
202 U.S.－Line Pipe Safeguards
Circular－welded 
carbon quality line 
pipe 
7306 US 4.00% Korea 0.99% 5 months 23 days
xlviii
204 Mexico－Telecoms




Applicable Mexico N/A US N/A 13 months
206 U.S.－India Steel Plate
Certain 
cut－to－length 









US 1.18% India 38.33% 5 months
211 Egypt－Rebar Concrete steel reinforcing bar 7214 Egypt 20.00% Turkey 12.20% 9 months
212 U.S.－CVDs on   EC Products
Products exported 
to US from EC by 
privatized companies 
that were previously   















US 0.676% EC 0.538% 10 months
219 EC－Pipe Fittings
Malleable cast iron 
tube or pipe fittings 
imported from 
Brazil
7307 EC 3.39% Brazil 14.75% 7 months
231 EC－Sardines
Two species of 
sardines found in 
different waters 
160413
160420 EC 14.86% Peru 12.00% 6 months
238 Argentina－Peach Safeguards
Peaches preserved 
in water 200870 Argentina 14.00% Chile 6.33% 8 months 15 days
xlix
245 Japan－Apples Apples 080810 Japan 17.00% US 0.00% 6 months 20 days
257







4409 US 0.19% Canada 0.18% 10 months
264








4409 US 0.19% Canada 0.18% 7 months 15 days
276 Canada－Wheat
Wheat and grains 









Canada 10.96% US 0.42% 10 months 5 days
277
U.S.－Lumber   
ITC Investigation
("Lumber VI")
Softwood   lumber 
from Canada
4407
4409 US 0.19% Canada 0.18% 9 months
282 U.S.－OCTG OCTG imports   from Mexico 7304 US 0.00% Mexico 12.01% 6 months
291
EC－Biotech   
Products ("GMOs")
Agricultural biotech 
products from the 
















12 months292 Canada 1.717%
293 Argentina 7.472%
294 U.S.－"Zeroing" of Dumping Margins (EC) Not Applicable N/A US N/A EC N/A 11 months
l
295 Mexico － Rice   AD Measures
Long－grain white 
rice from the US 1006 Mexico 14.75% US 11.20%
12 months 
/ 8 months





8542 US 0.00% Korea 0.00% 7 months, 16 days
299
EC－DRAMS   
Countervailing 
Measures
 “DRAM” Chips 
from Hynix of 
Korea
8542 EC 0.000% Korea 0.000% 8 months
302 Dominican   Republic－Cigarettes
Cigarettes imported 
from Honduras & 
imported products in 
case of transitional 
surcharge measure and 
the foreign exchange 
fee
2402 Dominican   Republic 20.00% Honduras 28.33% 24 months
308 Mexico－Taxes   on Soft Drinks
Soft drinks and other 
beverages that use any 
sweetener other than 
cane sugar and 
sweeteners used in the 
preparation of "soft 
drinks and syrups", cane 




Mexico 44.70% US 9.78% 10 months 7 days/9 months 8 days
312 Korea－Paper AD Duties
Business information 
paper and wood－free 
printing paper 
4802
4810 Korea 0.00% Indonesia 4.91% 8 months
322 U.S.－"Zeroing" (Japan) Not Applicable N/A US N/A Korea N/A 11 months
331 Mexico－Steel   Pipes and Tubes 
Various steel   




paddy, husked and 
white rice
1006 Turkey 39.39% US 11.20% 6 months
335 U.S.－Shrimp   AD Measure (Ecuador)
Certain frozen   





States 1.25% Ecuador 23.33% 6 months
337 EC－Salmon AD   Measure Farmed salmon
030212
030322 EC 4.75% Norway 0.00% 10 months
339
China－Auto Parts
Imported auto parts 
(including CKD 
(completely knocked 













7 months 20 days340 US 1.94%
342 Canada 1.34%
343 U.S.－Shrimp   (Thailand)
Frozen warm water  
 shrimp
030613
160520 US 1.25% Thailand 30.00%
8 months
345 U.S.－Customs   Bond Directive
Frozen warm water  
 shrimp from
030613
160520 US 1.25% India 12.50%
350 U.S.－Continued Zeroing Not Applicable N/A US N/A EC N/A 10 months

















China 1.05% US 0.07% 14 months
lii
367 Australia－Apples Apples from New Zealand 080810 Australia 0.00%
New 
Zealand 0.00% 9 months





Flat panel display 
devices, including 
those with digital 
DVI connectors; 
set－top boxes with 
communication 
















9 months 9 days376 Japan 0.000%






carbon quality steel 
pipe; light－walled 
rectangular pipe and 
tube; laminated 












US 3.48% China 10.14% 11 months
liii
381 U.S.－Tuna II (Mexico)















US 0.90% Mexico 1.23% 13 months
382 U.S.－Orange   Juice (Brazil)
Certain orange   
juice imports
200911
200919 US － Brazil 14% 9 months
383 U.S.－AD Measures on Carrier Bags
Polyethylene retail 
carrier bags 392321 US 3.00% Thailand 3.33% 6 months




































Domestic and imported 
distilled spirits, 
including specific types 
of spirits, such as gin,  
 brandy, rum, vodka, 

















402 U.S.－Zeroing   (Korea)225
Stainless steel plate 
in coils; stainless 
steel sheet and strip 












7220 0.00% 0.00% 9 months
404 U.S.－Shrimp   (Vietnam)
Certain frozen   
warm water shrimp 
030613
160520 US 1.11% Vietnam 15.99% 10 months
405 EU－Footwear   (China)
Certain footwear 






EU 7.74% China 10.00% 7 months 19 days
406 U.S.－Clove Cigarettes
Clove cigarettes 







equipment in the 
renewable energy 









413 China － Electronic Payment Services
Electronic payment 
services for all types 
of RMB payment 
card transactions  
N/A China N/A US N/A 11 months
415
Dominican Republic 
－Bag and Fabric 
Safeguards
Polypropylene   







2 months 1 week416 Guatemala 12.50%
417 Honduras 12.50%
418 El Salvador 12.50%
422 U.S.－Shrimp   and Sawblades
(i) Certain frozen 
warm water shrimp; 










425 China－X-Ray   Equipment
X－ray security   
inspection equipment 
902219









China 19.71% US 0.00% 9 months 14 days
431
China－Rare Earths
Various forms of rare 





8 months 3 days432 EU 2.33%
433 Japan 0.79%
436 U.S.－Carbon   Steel (India)
Certain hot rolled 
carbon steel flat 
products from India
722511722519722530722540722599722611722619722691722699721070721090721114721240721250






Not Applicable N/A US N/A China N/A 12 months
224 90 Products listed in Technical Guidance Note Setting out an Indicative List of the Codes of the Combined Nomenclature that may cover 
Prohibited Seal Products Publication made in accordance with Article 3(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 16 September 2009 on trade in seal product (HS 020890, 021099, 0506, 050710, 050790, 051000, 051199, 150430, 151610, 
151710, 151790, 151800, 160100, 160210, 160290, 210690, 230110, 230910, 230990, 300120, 300190, 300490, 340391, 340399, 382490, 
410390, 410691, 410692, 411390, 411410, 411420, 411510, 420211, 420221, 420231, 420291, 420300, 420500, 430180, 430190, 430219, 
430220, 430230, 430310, 6101, 6111, 6114, 6116, 6117, 6201, 6202, 6203, 6204, 6209, 621120, 621132, 6214, 6216, 6217, 6309, 6403, 6404, 
6405, 640610, 640699, 650100, 650200, 650400, 650590, 650599, 650700, 660200, 6603, 7113, 7114, 7117, 911390, 960110, 960190, 960629, 
960630, 970500.
225 Unlike other Zeroing disputes thus far, U.S. － Zeroing (Korea) (DS402) specifically dealt with certain United States final determinations and anti－
dumping duty orders that included margins of dumping calculated using “zeroing” in the context of the “weighted－average to weighted－average” 
methodology in original investigations, specifically on stainless steel plate in coils, stainless steel sheet and strip in coils, and diamond sawblades and parts 
thereof from Korea. Interestingly, the United States and Korea agreed on two sets of RPT; With respect to the calculation of certain margins of dumping in 
the Diamond Sawblades and Parts Thereof (HS8202~8206)from Korea investigation, the reasonable period of time shall be 8 months, expiring on 24 
October 2011. With respect to the calculation of certain margins of dumping in the Stainless Steel Plate in Coils from Korea and Stainless Steel Sheet and 
Strip in Coils (HS7219~7220) from Korea investigations, the reasonable period of time shall be 9 months, expiring on 24 November 2011. (Agreement 
under Article 21.3(b) of the DSU (WT/DS402/6 22 June 2011).
226 The product at issue includes 85 wind and solar photovoltaic (“PV”) electricity generation equipment in the renewable energy and electricity 
generated by such equipment. Official HS code for the product at issue was not available neither in the Panel/AB Report nor the official 
Canadian government documents on the Feed－in－Tariff Program. Thus, HScodesandtheRenewableEnergySector, published by ICSTD 
(International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development), was used as a reference. (HS3802.10, 3824.50, 3824.90, 3926.90, 6810.91, 
700991, 700992, 711590, 730431, 730441, 730451, 730820, 730890, 730900, 741121, 741122, 741129, 741999, 761090, 761100, 830630, 
840510, 840681, 840682, 841011, 841012, 841013, 841181, 841182, 841280, 841290, 841620, 851861, 841931, 841940, 841950, 841989, 
841990, 842129, 842139, 843041, 840349, 847920, 847989, 848210, 848220, 848230, 848250, 848280, 848340, 850161, 850162, 850163, 
850164, 850231, 850239, 850300, 850421, 850422, 850423, 850431, 850432, 850433, 850434, 850440, 853710, 853720, 854140, 854442, 
854449, 854460, 890790, 900190, 900290, 900580, 901380, 902830, 903020, 903031, 903032, 903033, 903039, 903289.
227 23 various forms of rare earths, tungsten, and molybdenum listed in Annex 1 of China－RareEarth,Request for the Establishment of a 
Panel by the United States (WT/DS431/6 29 June 2012). These products include rare earths under HS253090, 261100, 261220, 261310, 261390, 
262099, 280530, 282570, 282590, 284170, 284180, 284610, 284690, 284990, 720270, 720280, 720299, 810110, 810194, 810197, 810210, 
810294, 810297.
lvii
DS# Decision Product at Issue HS Code
Respondent Complainant
Awarded RPT





Vodka and other 
alcoholic beverages such 
as liqueurs, gin, gene, 




15 months10 Canada 0.12$/ l
11 US 0.23$/ l
27 EC－Bananas Bananas imported from third countries 0803 EC 18.00%
Ecuador 16.33%







Meat and meat   
products treated 








Imported motor   














12 months   
(DSU21.3(c))






Fresh, chilled or 
frozen ocean-caught 
Canadian salmon 
0302 Australia 0% Canada 0.16% 8 months
Appendix 10. Protection Level of Product at Issue in Respondent and Complainant Country with RPT : Article 21.3(c)
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75
Korea－Alcohol Imported distilled liquors and Soju 2208 Korea 23.34%
EC 6.07%




Distilled spirits falling 
within HS heading 
2208, including pisco, 
imported distilled spirits 
such as whisky, vodka, 
rum, gin, etc.
2208 Chile 9% EC 0.024$/ l 14 months 9 days
114 Canada－Pharmaceuticals
Patented   
pharmaceuticals
3003
















Japan 0.00% 8 months 
(DSU 21.3(c))
/ 90 days
(SCM 4.7)142 EC 7.06%
160 U.S.－Copyright Act Not Applicable N/A US N/A EC N/A 12 months
136 U.S.－1916 Act Not Applicable N/A US N/A EC N/A 10 months162 Japan
170 Canada－Patent Term Not Applicable N/A Canada N/A US N/A 10 months
155 Argentina－Bovine Hides
Bovine hides and calf 





Argentina 7.81% EC 2.18% 12 months 12days
184 U.S.－Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan
Certain hot-rolled flat 
rolled carbon quality 
steel products





Wheat, wheat   
























246 EC－Tariff   Preferences
Products benefiting   
from the Drug 
Arrangements under 
the EC GSP scheme
N/A EC N/A India N/A 14 months 11days
268 U.S. － OCTG 
Tubes, pipes,hollow 
profiles, seamless, 
of iron or steel.
7304 US 0.24% Argentina 16.00% 12 months
285 U.S.－Gambling Not Applicable N/A US N/A Antigua Barbuda N/A 11 months 2 weeks
265
EC－Sugar   
Subsidies
Sugar beet, sugar 
cane, molasses, 













Frozen boneless chicken 
cuts impregnated with 







336 Japan－DRAMS   CVDs




8542 Japan 0.00% Korea 1.12% 8 months,2 weeks
332 Brazil－Tyres Retreaded tyres 4012 Brazil 16.00% EC 4.13% 12 months
344
US－Mexican   
Stainless Steel AD 
Measures
Stainless steel sheet 
and strip in coils
7219
7220 US 0.000% Mexico 5.23%
11 months, 10   
days
366 Colombia－Ports of Entry
Certain textiles, 
apparel and footwear 
classifiable under HS 
Chapters 50-64 of 
Colombia's Tariff
Schedule, which were 
re-exported and 
re-exported from the 
Colon Free Zone and  
 Panama to Colombia
50~64 Colombia 17.43% Panama 6.08% 8 months, 15 days
384
US－COOL
Imported cattle and 
hogs used in the 
production of beef and 













7226 China 4.44% US 0.00% 8 months 15 days
lxi
DS# Decision Means of Implementation Agreed RPT
2 U.S.－Gasoline Administrative 15 months
31 Canada－Periodicals Legislative 15 months
34 Turkey－Textiles Administrative 15 months
50 India－Patents (U.S.) Legislative 15 months
56 Argentina－Textiles Administrative 242 days
58 U.S.－Shrimp Administrative 13 months
69 EC－Poultry Legislative 8 months 8 days
76 Japan－Agricultural Products II Administrative 9 months 12 days
79 India－Patents (EC) Legislative 6 months 27 days
90 India－QRs Administrative 18 months 8 days
98 Korea－Dairy Administrative 4 months 8 days
99 U.S.－DRAMS Administrative 8 months
103, 113 Canada－Dairy Administrative 14 months 4 days
122 Thailand－H-Beams Administrative 6 months 15 days
132 Mexico－Corn Syrup Administrative 6 months 27 days
141 EC－Bed Linen Legislative 5 months 2 days
146, 175 India－Autos Administrative 5 months
161, 169 Korea－Beef Administrative 8 months
166 U.S.－Wheat Gluten Safeguards Administrative 4 months 14 days
174, 290 EC－Trademarks / Gis Legislative 11months 2weeks
176 U.S.－Section 211 Legislative 11 months
177, 178 U.S.－Lamb Safeguards Administrative 6 months
179 U.S.－Sheet/Plate from Korea Administrative 7 months
189 Argentina－Floor Tiles Administrative 5 months
202 U.S.－Line Pipe Safeguards Administrative 5 months 23 days
204 Mexico－Telecoms Administrative 13 months
206 U.S.－India Steel Plate Administrative 5 months
211 Egypt－Rebar Administrative 9 months
212 U.S.－CVDs on EC Products Administrative 10 months
219 EC－Pipe Fittings Legislative 7 months
231 EC－Sardines Legislative 6 months
238 Argentina－Peach Safeguards Administrative 8 months 15 days
245 Japan－Apples Administrative 6 months 20 days
Appendix 11. Means of Implementation and RPT : Article 21.3(b)
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257 U.S.－Lumber CVDs Final Administrative 10 months
264 U.S.－ Final Lumber AD Administrative 7 months 15 days
276 Canada－Wheat Legislative 10 months 5 days
277 U.S.－Lumber ITC Investigation Administrative 9 months
282 U.S.－OCTG Administrative 6 months
291,292,293 EC－Biotech Products ("GMOs") Legislative 12 months
294 U.S.－"Zeroing" of Dumping Margins (EC) Administrative 11 months
295 Mexico－Rice AD Measures228
Legislative 12 months 
Administrative 8 months
296 U.S.－DRAMS CVD Investigation Administrative 7 months 16 days
299 EC－DRAMS CV   Measures Administrative 8 months
302 Dominican Republic－ Cigarettes Administrative 24 months
308 Mexico－Taxes on Soft Drinks229
Legislative 10 months 7days
Administrative 9 months 8 days
312 Korea－Paper AD Duties Administrative 8 months
322 U.S.－"Zeroing" (Japan) Administrative 11 months
331 Mexico－Steel Pipes & Tubes Administrative 6 months
334 Turkey－Rice Administrative 6 months
335 U.S.－Shrimp AD Measure (Ecuador) Administrative 6 months
337 EC－Salmon AD Measure Administrative 10 months
339,340,342 China－Auto Parts Administrative 7 months, 20 days
343 U.S.－Shrimp (Thailand) Administrative 8 months
345 U.S.－Customs Bond Directive Administrative 8 months
350 U.S.－Continued Zeroing Administrative 10 months
362 China－IP Rights Legislative 12 months
363 China－Publications and Audiovisual Products Administrative 14 months
367 Australia－Apples Administrative 9 months
371 Thailand－Cigarettes (Philippines)230 Administrative
10 months
/ 15 months
375,376,377 EC－IT Products Legislative 9 months, 9days





381 U.S.－Tuna II (Mexico) Administrative 13 months
382 U.S.－Orange Juice (Brazil) Administrative 9 months
383 U.S.－AD on Carrier Bags Administrative 6 months
397 EC－Fasteners Legislative 14 months 2 weeks
394,395,398 China－Raw Materials Administrative 10 months 9 days
396, 403 Philippines－Distilled Spirits Legislative 13 months 16 days
400, 401 EC － Seal Products Legislative 16 months
402 U.S.－Zeroing (Korea)232 Administrative 8 months/ 9 months
404 U.S.－Shrimp (Vietnam) Administrative 10 months
405 EU － Footwear (China) Legislative 7 months 19 days






228 Here the Parties agreed to two different periods of RPT with respect to different 
measures that had been found to be in violation of WTO rules. 12 months were granted for 
violations requiring resolution via legislative means of implementation and 8 months were 
granted for those requiring resolution via administrative means of implementation. <Agreement 
under Article 21.3(b) of the DSU WT/DS295/12 (24 May 2006)>.
229 Mexico and the United States wish to inform you that, pursuant to Article 21.3(b) of the 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), we 
have mutually agreed that the reasonable period of time for Mexico to comply with the 
recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body in the dispute Mexico – Tax 
Measures on Soft Drinks and other Beverages (WT/DS308) shall be nine months and 8 days, 
expiring on 1 January 2007. However, if the Mexican Congress enacts legislation between 1 
December and 31 December 2006, repealing the soft drink and distribution taxes found 
inconsistent with the covered agreements, the reasonable period of time shall be ten months 
and 7 days, expiring on 31 January 2007.  At the end of the day, the Respondent fully 
implemented DSB’s recommendations and ruling via legislative process within 10 months, 7 
days of RPT. <Agreement under Article 21.3(b) of the DSU WT/DS308/15 5 July 2006>.
230 With respect to the DSB's recommendations and rulings regarding paragraphs 8.3(b) and 
(c) of the Panel report (WT/DS371/R), the reasonable period of time to comply shall be 15 
months, expiring on 15 October 2012. With respect to the DSB's recommendations and 
rulings regarding all other measures, the reasonable period of time to comply shall be 10 
months, expiring on 15 May 2012. <Agreement under Article 21.3(b) of the DSU 
WT/DS371/4 (27 September 2011)>.
231 The US implemented recommendation and rulings of the DSB via both legislative and 
administrative process. <Status Report by the United States Addendum WT/DS379/12/Add.7 
(21 August 2012)>.
232 With respect to the calculation of certain margins of dumping in the Diamond Sawblades 
and Parts Thereof from Korea investigation, the reasonable period of time shall be 8 months, 
expiring on 24 October 2011. […] With respect to the calculation of certain margins of 
dumping in the Stainless Steel Plate in Coils and Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils 
from Korea investigations, the reasonable period of time shall be 9 months, expiring on 24 
November 2011. <Agreement under Article 21.3(b) of the DSU WT/DS402/6 (22 June 
2011)).
lxiv




and Fabric Safeguards Administrative 2 months 1 week
422 U.S.－Shrimp and Sawblades Administrative 8 months
425 China－X-Ray Equipment Administrative 9 months 25 days
427 China－Broiler Products Administrative 9 months 14 days
431,432,433 China－Rare Earths Administrative 8 months 3 days
436 U.S.－Carbon Steel (India) Legislative 15 months
449 U.S.－CVD & AD (China) Legislative 12 months
lxv
DS# Decision Means of Implementation Agreed RPT
8, 10, 11 Japan－Alcohol Legislative 15 months
27 EC－Bananas Legislative 15 months 1 week
26, 48 EC－Hormones Legislative 15 months
54,55,59,64 Indonesia－Autos Legislative 12 months / 6 months
18 Australia－Salmon Administrative 8 months
75, 84 Korea－Alcohol Legislative 11 months 2 weeks
87, 110 Chile－Alcohol Legislative 14 months 9 days
114 Canada－Pharmaceuticals Administrative 6 months
139, 142 Canada－Autos Administrative 8 months / 90 days
160 U.S.－Copyright Legislative 12 months
136, 162 U.S.－1916 Act Legislative 10 months
170 Canada－Patent Term Legislative 10 months
155 Argentina－Bovine Hides Administrative 12 months 12 days
184 U.S.－Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan Legislative 15 months
207 Chile－Agricultural Products (Price Band) Legislative 14 months
217, 234 U.S.－Offset Act("Byrd Amendment") Legislative 11 months
246 EC－Tariff Preferences Legislative 14 months 11 days
268 U.S.－OCTG Administrative 12 months
285 U.S.－Gambling Legislative 11 months 2 weeks
265,266,283 EC－Sugar Subsidies Legislative 12 months 3 days
269, 286 EC－Chicken Cuts Legislative 9 months
336 Japan－DRAMS CVDs Administrative 8 months 2 weeks
332 Brazil－Tyres Administrative 12 months
344 US－Mexican Stainless Steel AD Measures Administrative 11 months 10 days
366 Colombia－Ports of Entry Administrative 8 months 15 days
384, 386 US－COOL Administrative 10 months
414 China－GOES Administrative 8 months 15 days
Appendix 12. Means of Implementation and RPT : Article 21.3(c)
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DS# Decision Agreement Agreed RPT
394,395,398 China－Raw Materials
Accession
10 months 9 days





99 U.S.－DRAMS AD 8 months
122 Thailand－H-Beams AD 6 months 15 days
132 Mexico－Corn Syrup AD 6 months 27 days
141 EC－Bed Linen AD 5 months 2 days
179 U.S.－Sheet/Plate from Korea AD 7 months
189 Argentina－Floor Tiles AD 5 months
206 U.S.－India Steel Plate AD 5 months
211 Egypt－Rebar AD 9 months
219 EC－Pipe Fittings AD 7 months
264 U.S.－Final Lumber AD AD 7 months 15 days
277 U.S.－Lumber ITC Investigation AD 9 months
282 U.S.－OCTG AD 6 months
294 U.S.－"Zeroing" of Dumping Margins (EC) AD 11 months
295 Mexico－Rice AD Measures AD
12 months
/ 8 months
312 Korea－Paper AD Duties AD 8 months
322 U.S.－"Zeroing" (Japan) AD 11 months
331 Mexico－Steel Pipes & Tubes AD 6 months
335 U.S.－Shrimp AD Measure (Ecuador) AD 6 months
337 EC－Salmon AD Measure AD 10 months
343 U.S－Shrimp (Thailand) AD 8 months
345 U.S.－Customs Bond Directive AD 8 months
350 U.S.－Continued Zeroing AD 10 months
379 U.S.－AD & CVD (China) AD 11 months
382 U.S.－Orange Juice (Brazil) AD 9 months
383 U.S.－AD on Carrier Bags AD 6 months
397 EC－Fasteners AD 14 months 2 weeks
402 U.S.－Zeroing (Korea) AD 8 months/ 9 months
Appendix 13. Violation of certain Covered Agreements and RPT : Article 21.3(b)
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404 U.S.－Shrimp (Vietnam) AD 10 months
405 EU－Footwear (China) AD 7 months 19 days
422 U.S.－Shrimp and Sawblades AD 8 months
425 China－X-Ray Equipment AD 9 months 25 days





69 EC－Poultry Agriculture 8 months 8 days
90 India－QRs Agriculture 18 months 8 days
103, 113 Canada－Dairy Agriculture 14 months 4 days
161, 169 Korea－Beef Agriculture 8 months

















204 Mexico－Telecoms GATS 13 months
363 China－Publications and Audiovisual Products GATS 14 months





2 U.S.－Gasoline GATT 15 months
31 Canada－Periodicals GATT 15 months
34 Turkey－Textiles GATT 15 months
56 Argentina－Textiles GATT 242 days
58 U.S.－Shrimp GATT 13 months
90 India－QRs GATT 18 months 8 days
103, 113 Canada－Dairy GATT 14 months 4 days
146, 175 India－Autos GATT 5 months
161, 169 Korea－Beef GATT 8 months
177, 178 U.S.－Lamb Safeguards GATT 6 months
202 U.S.－Line Pipe Safeguards GATT 5 months 23 days
219 EC－Pipe Fittings GATT 7 months
lxviii
238 Argentina－Peach Safeguards GATT 8.5 months
276 Canada－Wheat GATT 10 months 5 days
294 U.S.－"Zeroing" of Dumping Margins (EC) GATT 11 months
302 Dominican Republic－ Cigarettes GATT 24 months
308 Mexico－Taxes on Soft Drinks GATT
10 months 7 days
/9 months 8 days
322 U.S.－"Zeroing" (Japan) GATT 11 months
334 Turkey－Rice GATT 6 months
339,340,342 China－Auto Parts GATT 7 months 20 days
350 U.S.－Continued Zeroing GATT 10 months
363 China－Publications and Audiovisual Products GATT 14 months
371 Thailand－Cigarettes (Philippines) GATT
10 months
/ 15 months
375,376,377 EC－IT Products GATT 9 months 9 days
394,395,398 China－Raw Materials GATT 10 months 9 days
396, 403 Philippines－Distilled Spirits GATT 13 months 16 days
400, 401 EC－Seal Products GATT 16 months
404 U.S.－Shrimp (Vietnam) GATT 10 months
405 EU－Footwear (China) GATT 7 months 19 days




and Fabric Safeguards GATT 2 months 1 week
427 China－Broiler Products GATT 9 months 14 days










98 Korea－Dairy Safeguard 4 months 8 days
166 U.S.－Wheat Gluten Safeguards Safeguard 4 months 14 days
177, 178 U.S.－Lamb Safeguards Safeguard 6 months
202 U.S.－Line Pipe Safeguards Safeguard 5 months 23 days
238 Argentina－Peach Safeguards Safeguard 8 months 15 days
415,416
,417,418
Dominican Republic－ Bag 






212 U.S.－CVDs on EC Products SCM 10 months
257 U.S.－Lumber CVDs Final SCM 10 months
277 U.S.－Lumber ITC Investigation SCM 9 months
295 Mexico－Rice AD Measures SCM
12 months
/ 8 months
296 U.S.－DRAMS CVD Investigation SCM 7 months 16 days
299 EC－DRAMS CV Measures SCM 8 months
343 U.S.－Shrimp (Thailand) SCM 8 months
345 U.S.－Customs Bond Directive SCM 8 months
379 U.S.－AD & CVD (China) SCM 11 months
427 China－Broiler Products SCM 9 months 14 days
436 U.S.－Carbon Steel (India) SCM 15 months





76 Japan－Agricultural Products II SPS 9 months 12 days
245 Japan－Apples SPS 6 months 20 days
291,292,293 EC－Biotech Products ("GMOs") SPS 12 months





231 EC－Sardines TBT 6 months
381 U.S.－Tuna II (Mexico) TBT 13 months
400, 401 EC－Seal Products TBT 16 months










50 India－Patents (U.S.) TRIPs 15 months
79 India－Patents (EC) TRIPs 6 months 27 days
174, 290 EC－Trademarks / Gis TRIPs 11 months 2 weeks
176 U.S.－Section 211 TRIPs 11 months
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DS# Decisions Agreements Awarded RPT
207 Chile－Agricultural Products (Price Band) Agriculture 14 months





136, 162 U.S.－1916 Act AD 10 months
184 U.S.－Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan AD 15 months
217, 234 U.S.－Offset Act ("Byrd Amendment") AD 11 months
268 U.S.－OCTG AD 12 months
344 U.S.－Mexican Stainless Steel AD Measures AD 11 months 10 days















27 EC－Bananas GATS 15 months 1 week
139, 142 Canada－Autos GATS 8 months





8, 10, 11 Japan－Alcohol GATT 15 months
27 EC－Bananas GATT 15 months 1 week
54,55,59,64 Indonesia－Autos GATT 12 months
75, 84 Korea－Alcohol GATT 11 months 2 weeks
87, 110 Chile－Alcohol GATT 14 months 9 days
139, 142 Canada－Autos GATT 8 months
136, 162 U.S.－1916 Act GATT 10 months
155 Argentina－Bovine Hides GATT 12 months 12 days
207 Chile－Agricultural Products (Price Band) GATT 14 months
246 EC－Tariff Preferences GATT 14 months 11 days
269, 286 EC－Chicken Cuts GATT 9 months
332 Brazil－Tyres GATT 12 months
Appendix 14. Violation of certain Covered Agreements and RPT : Article 21.3(c)
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344 U.S.－Mexican Stainless Steel AD Measures GATT 11 months 10 days
366 Colombia－Ports of Entry GATT 8 months 15 days










54,55,59,64 Indonesia－Autos SCM 12 months
139, 142 Canada－Autos SCM 8 months
217, 234 U.S.－Offset Act("Byrd Amendment") SCM 11 months
336 Japan－DRAMS CVDs SCM 8 months 2 weeks





26, 48 EC－Hormones SPS 15 months















114 Canada－Pharmaceuticals TRIPs 6 months
160 US－Copyright TRIPs 12 months







WTO 분쟁해결절차에서의 합리적 이행기간 
패턴 및 결정 요인에 관한 연구




     WTO 회원국 간 무역 분쟁 발생 시, 분쟁해결 절차를 거쳐 패널 또
는 상소기구에 의해 최종 판단이 내려지고 그 내용을 담은 최종보고서를 
분쟁해결기구(DSB)가 채택하면 패소국은 즉시 DSB의 권고 사항을 이행해
야 하는데 즉각 이행이 불가능할 경우 패소국은 합리적 이행 기간(RPT)을 
활용할 수 있다. RPT는 WTO 규정 시행 및 더 나아가 세계 무역 자유화와 
보호무역 탈피에 지대한 영향을 미치는 요소 중 하나로 ‘분쟁해결규칙 및 
절차에 관한 양해’ (DSU) 제21조3항의 절차에 따라 그 기간을 정하고 있
으나 안타깝게도 해당 DSU 조항은 정확히 어떠한 결정 요인 및 기준에 
의해 RPT 기간이 확정되는지에 대해서는 명시하고 있지 않다.
     따라서 본 연구는 과거 WTO 분쟁 사례에서의 RPT 패턴 분석을 통
해 그 결정 요인 및 기준을 모색하고자 이미 확정된 RPT 기간과 4개의 잠
재적 결정 요인 (1) 제소국과 피소국의 경제 규모 및 경제 발전 수준 
(GNI/Capita), 2) 제소국과 피소국의 분쟁 대상 품목에 대한 보호 수준 (관
세율), 3) 패소국의 이행 방안 (행정 또는 입법 절차 필요 여부) 및 4) 패소
국이 위반한 WTO 대상 협정) 간의 관계를 면밀히 분석하였다. 보다 심층
적이고 실질적인 분석을 위해 DSU 제21조3항(b)와 제21조3항(c)에 의거하
여 결정된 RPT에 다양한 통계 기법을 적용한 첫 연구 사례로서 본 연구는 
아래의 결과를 도출하였다. 
     우선 제소국과 피소국의 경제 규모 및 경제 발전 수준과 RPT 기간 
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간에 통계적으로 유의미한 관계는 찾을 수 없었으나, DSU 제21조3항(c) 
RPT의 경우 현재 DSU에서 명시하는 것과 같이 개발도상국의 입장을 고려
한 특별대우 또는 배려는 RPT 기간 결정 시 쉽게 부여되지 않으며 이러한 
현상은 특히 개발도상국이 제소국으로 분쟁에 참여했을 때 더 두드러지게 
나타났다. 단, DSU 제21조3항(b) RPT의 경우 양국간 자유로운 협의를 통
해 그 기간을 결정하는 만큼 제 21조 3항(c)의 중재자 보다 상대국의 경제 
규모 및 발전 수준을 더 고려하여 최종 RPT를 결정하는 것으로 나타났다. 
또한 제소국과 피소국에서의 분쟁 대상 품목에 대한 보호 수준은 DSU 제
21조3항(b)와 (c)항에 따라 결정된 RPT 기간에 영향을 미치지 않는 것으로 
밝혀졌다. 세 번째 잠재 요소인 패소국의 이행 방안은 RPT 기간과 유의미
한 관계를 가지고 있었는데 DSU 제21조3항(b)와 (c)항 모두에서 패소국의 
이행을 위해 행정 절차를 거쳐야 하는 경우, 입법 절차를 거쳐야 하는 경
우보다 RPT 기간이 더 짧은 것으로 나타났다. 마지막으로 피소국이 세이
프가드, 반덤핑, 보조금 및 상계관세 등 무역구제 협정을 위반한 분쟁에서
의 RPT는 非무역구제 협정을 위반한 분쟁에서보다 그 기간이 짧은 것으로 
나타났는데, 이는 무역구제 협정 위반 시 대부분 행정 절차를 통한 이행이 
가능하기 때문에 위반 협정에 따른 기간 차이가 아닌 실질적으로는 패소
국의 이행 방안에 의해 발생하는 차이인 것으로 나타났다.
     본 연구가 1995년 1월부터 2014년 12월까지 결정된 RPT에 대한 종합
적, 통계적 분석을 통해 도출한 주요 결과는 합리적 이행 기간이 하나의 
특정 결정 요인 또는 기준에 의해서가 아닌 각 분쟁 사례와 관련된 여러 
주요 사항을 종합적으로 고려하여 결정된다는 것을 시사하고 있다. 물론 
WTO 규정 시행을 위해 모든 패소국의 즉각 이행이 우선시 되어야 하지만 
부득이하게 합리적 이행 기간이 필요한 경우 본 연구가 도출한 합리적 이
행 기간의 주요 패턴 및 결정 요인에 대한 결과는 해당 회원국뿐 아니라 
분쟁해결기구에게도 유용하고 유의미한 지침이 될 것이다. 
주요어 : 합리적 이행 기간, DSU 제 21.3 (b), DSU 제 21.3(c), 특별한 사정, 
분쟁 해결 절차, 분쟁해결규칙과 절차에 관한 양해, 세계무역기구 (WTO)
학번 : 2009-22198
